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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

HEARING HELD
MARCH 5, 2008

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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008

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FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 5, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. We will go ahead and get started, call the committee to order.

We never know when votes are going to interrupt us, but we are certain that they will. I am sure more members will show up as we get going here, but we will go ahead and get started.

I want to welcome our witnesses.

Admiral Olson, the commander of Special Operations Command, thank you. It has been, as I noted talking to you earlier, a long day for you. It started in front of the committee at 10 a.m. We appreciate you being here, both for the full committee and for our subcommittee, and look forward to your testimony.

And, General Renuart, thank you also, head of Northern Command (NORTHCOM); look forward to your testimony and to your comments.

I just have a brief opening statement, and then we will turn it over to Mr. Thornberry for his opening remarks.

I want to welcome both of you gentlemen here today and appreciate your service. I think both of your areas are incredibly important to our national security and to this committee.

Focusing first on Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the demands that have been placed on our special operators since 9/11 have been enormous, more than I think any of us have imagined, and you have responded terrifically in every instance, and we appreciate that and all those who serve under you. They are a doing a fabulous job for us in Iraq and Afghanistan and in dozens of other places that many Americans are unaware of.

And we, on this committee, firmly believe that going forward the Special Operations Command will be a key piece of the global war on terror, if not the key piece. We envision the future is going to be about counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, fighting off the ide-

ology of al Qaeda in all of the places of the world where it is at, and nobody is better qualified to do that kind of counterinsurgency, working with local populations than our special operators, and we want to give you every bit of assistance that you need to get that job done.

And as we look at the budget, one of the things that we are really going to focus on in this committee is the seven percent reduction in SOCOM's budget for this cycle over last.

I know, Admiral, you and I have spoken about that, and you certainly respect the choices of the Pentagon, but we here on the committee are going to advocate for an increase in that and try to get you the help you need in the places you need.

Also, we had a meeting this morning with the general in charge of the Air Force, and we are very much aware of the airframe concerns, particularly on transportation, how SOCOM needs to get more forces in those areas, and we want to try to help with that as well. If we are going to ask this much of our special operators, we need to make sure that they have the equipment and the support that they need, and we are going to need to do that.

And we are also very interested to hear from General Renuart today about NORTHCOM, our most recently stood up command, at least until the African Command gets stood up, and the challenges that you have faced since 2002 in protecting our homeland. And I think the thing that we are most interested in that area is how NORTHCOM—and you and I have had the opportunity to speak about this before—how you have merged in with all the other different pieces.

In that same timeframe, of course, we created the Department of Homeland Security, which has responsibilities in those areas also, and then there are a variety of other areas, both within the Pentagon and without, that you have to work with, and I am curious how that cooperation is progressing and what we could do to help you in those areas.

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member in this committee, Mr. Thornberry, for any opening remarks he has, and I would also say that any member of the committee can submit opening remarks for the record. I will be doing that myself. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 23.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with your opening comments, and I would just add, as I sit here and think about the responsibilities of these two witnesses, I am struck by the fact that after September 11 this country, in many ways, reacted, whether it is airport security or whether it was our actions in Afghanistan, whether it was other things we have done to protect the homeland. But as we go along we refine those actions. We try to be smarter about what we do.

I think that is where we are in fighting this global Islamist terrorist threat. I think that is where we are when it comes to protecting the homeland. How do we need to change, restructure,

refocus, improve our abilities as we go ahead? Those are things I think I am most interested in, and, certainly, these two witnesses can help shed a lot of light on that.

So I look forward to their testimony and yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Thornberry.

And as I mentioned, all members can submit opening statements for the record.

With that, I will turn it over to Admiral Olson for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McIntyre.

With your permission, I will submit my written statement for the record and not repeat my opening statements from the earlier session. I would like to highlight a few things, though.

First, I would like to thank this committee for all its work and all of its success in support of our needs over the last few years. I think that nobody understands Special Operations to the extent that you do. That is very helpful to us in our discussions.

And I reiterate how honored I am to be the one who sits before this committee today representing the 54,000 active and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians who are assigned to the Special Operations Command, many of whom are away from home and many of whom are engaged in some very important and violent activities. I remain in awe of their dedication and courage, and they demonstrate it every day.

I would like to reiterate my conviction that the expectations on this force continue to be very high, as you stated, and that I certainly do not expect that the demand for this force will decrease, no matter what the circumstances in Iraq or Afghanistan relative to a drawdown of conventional forces. Most of the world is stating a deficit of special operations forces in their theatre, and there will be a responsibility, I believe, on behalf of my command to return to some of those places in which we have been underrepresented as we have surged into Iraq and Afghanistan with 80 percent of our deployed force over the last few years.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Admiral Olson.

General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, NORAD/U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here.

Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McIntyre, it is good to be here in front of this committee.

It is a committee that is focused, as Admiral Olson, on support to the special operations but also one that is focused very clearly and very directly on terrorist threat to our homeland, and that is one, obviously, that I have a great deal of interest in.

It is really my privilege to lead the men and women, both of United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, and it is a treat to sit here next to my friend, Eric Olson, to be able to talk about those areas of common interest that we have.

We really do have a unique relationship with U.S. Special Operations Command. We continually watch and assess those potential threats to the homeland. In some of my comments later, I will talk about a concept of layered defense, and, really, Eric's team is that away layer out there, making sure that we can reach out and touch those potential threats to the homeland before they reach our shores, but we have to be ready in case they do.

We collaborate on a variety of plans, on exercises and on operations with U.S. Special Operations Command. Most notably, we have made good progress in the maritime domain, and it is an area that both the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command pay close attention to each day.

As commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, I am assigned, really, two distinct and critical missions: That to defend our homeland from attack and then to support the Nation with those unique capabilities that Department of Defense (DOD) can bring in a time of crisis. And while we certainly pay very close attention to homeland defense, it is hard to prioritize either mission, one over the other, because they can happen, either one, almost unannounced, and so we have to be prepared in every case.

Part of the team that does that is an integrated team of National Guardsmen, Reservists and active duty, and I am pleased to have my National Guard advisor to the commander, Major General Steve Villacorta here, seated behind me, as well as our other important team member of the National Guard Bureau, Brigadier General Fick is here representing the National Guard Bureau as part of our delegation today.

As always, the men and women who defend our Nation are predominantly our young enlisted corps who put on the cloth of our country and serve selflessly around the world, and I am pleased to have them represented by our command sergeant, Major Dan Wood.

Final point I would like to make for the record is the burden that we place on our families and the demands that we ask of our families, and no one has paid more of that price than my own wife. I am pleased to have her with me here today, seated in the second row, to represent the families of so many that are separated from their loved ones on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. Chairman, our missions are especially meaningful, because really nothing is more important than keeping our citizens safe. It is your families and our families that we pay close attention to. This requires a culture of anticipation, and we understand that all too well and understand also that to the citizens of our country failure is just not an option.

After I took command about a year ago we rewrote our mission statement soon after that point and added the word, "anticipate," to our mission statement. It may seem like a small change, but in fact the ability to reach out and look into the future as best we can and anticipate the kinds of threats that may affect us is critical to

our mission. And over the past year, we have substantially increased our focus on planning, integrated planning, on training and on readiness.

We have updated our homeland defense and civil support plans. We have ensured our plans are consistent with the national response framework, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) support plans and all of those 15 national planning scenarios. All of this is done in close partnership with the Department of Homeland Security's Incident Management Planning Team and our friends in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and many other Federal agencies.

We successfully completed the maritime domain awareness concept of operations and the interagency investment strategy to support that. These developments improve situation awareness and provide a way ahead to rapidly assess and respond to maritime threats.

We train with over 50 federal, state and local partners at all operational levels, and just as a couple of examples, we have exercised our chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive Consequence Management Response Force during our exercise, Ardent Sentry, last May, and we will do that again this year.

From an operational perspective, we also incorporated this culture of anticipation into our daily battle rhythm. When NORTHCOM support is needed, we are ready.

Specifically, we monitor and assess and evaluate 12 to 20 potentially dangerous events affecting the homeland every day. I would use an example, the loss of power in south Florida just a week ago. We were in close contact with the state to ensure that if Federal military support was needed, we knew what it was, where it was and how we would get it to the citizens of south Florida should it be required. Fortunately, the state was able to manage the challenge, but we were ready.

Every day, we see the benefits of this kind of coordination in so many ways. On the counterterrorism scene, we work side by side with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Joint Terrorism Task Force and in the National Counterterrorism Center to ensure we all have the same threat picture and that we share that information collaboratively across all of the players, whether they be law enforcement or even special operations, should that be required.

We have built a high degree of confidence among our law enforcement partners, and I am happy with the continued progress that we make.

We also rely on the information and expertise provided by our Joint Interagency Coordination Group. This group integrates and synchronizes the activities of multiple civil, federal, state and private-sector organizations. It includes 60 full-time individuals, professionals from their individual communities, from 40 different Federal and DOD-supported agencies, as well as the private sector. They all live in our headquarters, they work in our headquarters, and they are integrated into our planning and operational teams.

Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to briefly comment on the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Re-

serves. It is clear that Chairman Punaro and his team have done a great deal of work, and a great deal of effort went into that report. In conjunction with the Department of Defense, we are continuing a very detailed, thorough review of each of those recommendations, and the secretary is committed to provide Congress a thorough assessment of that report.

I agree with the commission that we need to increase our support to our Nation's active and reserve components to build and enhance that chemical-biological capability that I mentioned just earlier, and I am leading the DOD charge to do just that. And I have received strong support from the chairman and the secretary.

My integrated priority list to the secretary supports recapitalizing and equipping our National Guard to support those domestic missions, and I firmly believe that our Nation needs a strong, well-equipped guard and reserve force.

That said, some of the findings in the report are a bit incomplete and, in some cases, misleading. I disagree with the commission's assessment that there is an appalling gap in our capability to respond to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack. Let me assure you and the members of the committee, there are plans and a range of state and Federal capabilities in place today that are ready to respond.

The commission also suggests that governors should have command and control of Title 10 forces in certain situations. I disagree. I believe that the current provisions and legislation and law allow the governors to have absolutely all the authority to direct operations in their states, and we are supportive of that.

Upon taking command, I made relationship-building with the governors and state adjutants general one of my top priorities, and I am proud to report that today I have visited the majority of states in our country, and I have met with over 19 governors and lieutenant governors and nearly every state adjutant general and most of their emergency management directors.

My message to the governors is clear and consistent: "We are here to support you, nothing more, nothing less." These governors and lieutenant governors who I talk to are confident that their adjutant generals lead state efforts in times of crisis, and they know they can count on NORTHCOM for support when it is requested.

I believe it is important to ask the question, are the governors receiving the support they need.

Let me also set the record straight on the commission's comments regarding the need for state level experience within NORTHCOM. Today, 46 percent of my staff has National Guard and Reserve experience. Six of my 13 general and flag officers are Guardsmen or Reservists, and I rely on them for advice every day, and they are an integral part of my decision team.

Finally, we are doubling the number of full-time positions for the Guard and Reserves in our headquarters. I think these statistics are good, we are making them better, and they stand on their own two feet.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, our mission is to protect our fellow citizens and our families and to protect the freedoms that are the foundation of our way of life. By anticipating threats, exercising defense capabilities and increasing information sharing with our

partners, we strengthen our ability to protect you and your families and all of our homes.

Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Admiral Olson, as I mentioned, I met with General Wurster this morning, talking about some of your needs in terms of air platforms, and I know there are needs there. Could you give us a little bit of specifics in terms of Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) and also transport and, I guess, an offensive capability to the transport as well? What airframes do you need, both for ISR and to be able to transport and protect your troops?

And if you could, what portion of that do you see coming in the supplemental or a supplemental versus in the rest of the budget? It seems that the supplemental has become very, very important to funding your operations, and I wonder if you could break those two pieces down for us. What do you need, and which budget do you see it coming in?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our most immediate acquisition needs are recapitalization of our C–130 fleet and increased ISR capability and capacity, followed very closely by our V–22 acceleration effort.

We have 37 C–130 platforms that require recapitalization soon. The average age of many of these is close to 40 years old. They are really in three types. There is an early model penetration aircraft, a tanker aircraft and the AC–130 gunship model, which in total, again, add up to 37.

We are facing a degradation of the fleet because of center wing box problems in addition to advancing age. We are reaching the point where investing in upgrading those airplanes or sustaining those airplanes makes less sense than replacing them. So that is our number one pure acquisition need.

The ISR question is a little bit more complex, because it is not just about buying platforms. It is a system of capabilities that has to come together to produce real capability where we need it. There is the recruiting of the right people to fly and analyze the product of overhead systems, and ISR also includes maritime systems and ground systems.

There are airspace issues for training the aircraft, there are schoolhouse pipeline issues, there are bandwidth issues, there are Military Construction (MILCON) and ramp space issues, all of which have to be carefully coordinated and developed simultaneously in order to optimize the production of increased capability.

So we depend on a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned systems, both at the operational level and at the tactical level for both man hunting kinds of missions and force protection kinds of missions. I can provide you separately all of those numbers——

Mr. SMITH. Yes. We would be very interested in that.

Admiral OLSON [continuing]. That add up to that. But it is a matrix kind of a format. If you get more of this, then you need more of that kind of format because of the way that this has to be built together to produce the full capability.

And, third, the V–22 fleet, our venerable Pave Low helicopters, the MH–53s. The last one of 31 that we had operational is coming offline September 30 of this year. They have reached the end of their useful life, and accelerating the V–22 in order to replace some of that capability is an urgent need for us.

We have been talking carefully with the Air Force about this. The Air Force has included in its supplemental request enough funds to purchase an acceleration of V–22s. We have included in our supplemental request enough funds to nearly match that with respect to special operations modifications.

You asked specifically about how dependent we are becoming on the supplemental or how much the supplemental will contribute to this. About two-thirds of our supplemental budget over the last few years has gone to operations and maintenance costs, about one-third to the urgent procurement to fund those items most necessary and engaged in the current conflict.

I don't believe that there will be a decrease in the operations and maintenance requirement anytime soon. My budget request, although down 7 percent from fiscal year 2008, given the top line restrictions that we operated under, does include a $400 million increase in O&M, and that is on top of the supplemental that we have come to expect in 2008 and 2009.

So I believe that our supplemental is now necessary for the continued business of special operations, certainly, now in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader Central Command (CENTCOM) region but in the future more so in terms of funding our global activities.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

General Renuart, if you could help me out a little bit in terms of NORTHCOM's responsibilities in anticipating threats, as you describe. I guess, mentally, I am dividing this up between, sort of, specific threats and then planning against general threats. How closely do you work with the intel community, how good is that relationship on a daily basis?

You know, you receive specific threats and you are responding to a specific threat, whether it is a person of interest in the U.S. or a specific target that is threatened and what your role at NORTHCOM is in responding to those threats versus just protecting what we know to be likely targets. Some of those are private facilities as well as public.

If you could, sort of, explain in those two areas what your responsibilities and challenges are.

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, thank you, I would be happy to. And, really, your question gets to the construct of integrating with our partners, both in terms of developing information and then planning for potential activities.

One of the comments out of the 9/11 Commission and one of the comments out of post-Katrina lessons learned that was common, that affect us, was there was not sufficient collaborative planning among all the partners to understand the nature of the threat and then to act on it if it in fact occurred.

We have worked very hard on that construct of anticipation and of collaboration with our intelligence partners. I mentioned we are integrated into the National Counterterrorism Center and integrated in with the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force.

But it really goes beyond that. Our day-to-day, our intel function collaborates with all of the intelligence community, focused on threats that may be far away from our home and how do they potentially work their way to us in the homeland.

As you know, we have some very carefully worded constitutional limitations on how we collect intelligence, if we can collect intelligence, in the homeland. Our role is really to provide assistance to the law enforcement agencies, but we have built a level of confidence with each of those that they share with us freely within the constraints of the Constitution the information that may help us deter and detect a threat that could be coming from outside the country.

Our focus is on the terrorism nexus, but law enforcement partners have the focus inside the country on acting the potential terrorist leads that we might have at home.

I would use examples that I think have been made public in the last year or two: A cell that was arrested in the vicinity of Fort Dix here on the East Coast, some individuals that were arrested in the vicinity of Charleston Air Force Base a couple months ago.

We were aware that the FBI was working that. We shared information that came from outside our shores that pointed to a terrorist nexus here in the country, and then we were collaborative partners with the FBI as they began to develop that information. That relationship for us has proven to be a very strong one, one I am very pleased with.

Having said that, we have got to be able to take information and then prepare ourselves at home for the consequences if one of these threats comes true. That, too, relies on a very close collaborative effort with the Department of Homeland Security, certainly with the law enforcement partners, with DHS' principal military arm, the U.S. Coast Guard, and we are the DOD lead element for the contingency planning portion of the integrated planning team that DHS has formed.

Now, we work on a day-to-day basis. We have weekly video teleconferences (VTCs), planning VTCs with each of those organizations so that we are both equally abreast of both threat information and then the contingency planning that would be necessary to respond.

So I think we are, in my view, leap years ahead—light years ahead, excuse me, of where we were even after Katrina. We still have work to do, and we will continue to keep those bonds close, but I think if you were to ask any of those agencies in the government, they would identify their collaborative with NORTHCOM as really one of the highlights.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have other questions, but I will yield to other members.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would yield to other members at this time and reserve my questions for later.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much.

Thanks to both of you gentlemen.

Thank you for yielding the additional time.

As I mentioned in this morning's full committee hearing, Admiral Olson, I thoroughly enjoyed my recent trip down to Tampa a couple of weeks ago. Thank you for your wonderful hospitality you and your lovely wife extended, and thank you for the excellent job that you are doing. I was very impressed with what I saw at U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill and with your work worldwide, literally.

I also greatly appreciate the work that you do, General, and thank you for helping us have what we need here in the Northern Command.

I wanted to ask you each just a couple of questions that I think may help clarify some things.

General, when you mentioned a minute about your constitutional requirements or limits on your actions, what would be your understanding of the process needed to flow active military personnel if there were a situation that we had to potential waive posse comitatus and have to bring in the military? I know I get asked that question a lot back home from folks who have concerns. Can you explain to us what is your understanding if such a scenario would entail.

General RENUART. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.

First, the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act cannot be waived. There would have to be an exclusion provided or an exemption provided by the President based on an assessment of whatever the event may be, and I would go back in history to the Los Angeles riots as really the last time that the President chose to invoke that authority, as I recall.

And the process would be, obviously, a concern on the part of the state that an event like that were occurring or a very unique—for example, the theft of a nuclear weapon, which had such substantial national impact that the President would feel strongly that the use of the military was the best way to work and solve that problem.

But that authority would be provided to us by the President. It would include the exclusion remarks or the exclusion authorities in the designation of event and the authority given to the secretary to deploy U.S. military forces. The secretary would ask us what forces we had positioned, ready to go, and he would then approve specifically the kinds of forces that would be used in these circumstances.

So a very controlled process by which certainly the state, in the case of something like riots, would have a part to play, and the President would make that determination prior to us deploying anyone.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Is it your understanding that would include a specific timeline or just for the accomplishment of the assignment, not knowing——

General RENUART. My understanding it would be for the accomplishment of that mission. It include a timeline, but, sir, I am not a legal expert on if that is required in order to give that authority.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Also, I wanted to ask you, General, if you could help explain with our close work we all do with state and local authorities, how you would see the command and control relationship between NORTHCOM and state and local officials during a crisis,

such as a terrorist incident, and where you see your interplay to make sure there is a coordination of effort.

General RENUART. Mr. McIntyre, again, this is one of the kinds of scenarios that we work in our interactive planning process with both the Department of Homeland Security and our friends in the National Guard and with the states.

A terrorist event in the country would certainly be responded to. The primary Federal agency to respond would be the Department of Homeland Security. At the onset of any event, we establish an immediate contact with the state that might be affected or multiple states, should that be the case.

We begin to build a level of situation awareness of their capability to respond, and we begin also coordinating with the Department of Defense on whether or not the Federal Government is going to use military to respond in that particular event.

But some examples of support that we might provide could be in the event that were critical infrastructure nodes that were threatened and that the state and private industry was not capable of the size of force necessary to protect those, we could be asked to augment Federal agencies or augment state agencies in that defense.

The command and control will vary with each circumstance, frankly. If it is a very small event, it may be something as simple as the local law enforcement in that county would be in charge.

For example, while not a terrorist threat, when the bridge collapsed in Minnesota, if you will, the supported commander was the local county sheriff, but the DOD support came from our defense coordinating officer who is attached to FEMA region in that area and the Navy divers who were assigned there to provide that assistance to recover the remains of those eight casualties.

And so that is a very clear command and control relationship. The DOD folks were under the command of that Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), that officer, but he was there under the tactical control, if you will, or the on-scene support of that sheriff.

We practice this on a daily basis. We did, for example, in Indiana during Ardent Sentry last spring. We simulated the explosion of a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon. In that case, the governor directed all of the activities in support of that event. His adjutant general commanded the Guard forces that were supported there.

I had a joint task force deployed. That officer maintained the command relationship of the title 10 forces that were there, and the two worked hand in hand. The tag was the supported commander, and so our forces were there to assist and support the adjutant general as he worked directly for his governor.

So each event will have a little different nuance, but we worked very hard to ensure that no matter what it was we had a unity of effort.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Admiral, double thank you for round two here today.

I want to pick up, Admiral, if I could, perhaps because the Marine Corps was kind enough to let me climb in the cockpit and fly an MV–22 last year, I want to explore a little bit further your bringing the CV–22s online. Again, I love this book, so I went back to it. I know you are familiar with it.

So I have a couple of questions about the CV–22. On page 14, you indicate that in fiscal year 2009, U.S. SOCOM requests funds to modify six CV–22s with soft procurer equipment. I thought these things were being built from the ground up in Mr. Thornberry's district for you. So can you tell—I know we don't want to wander into classified area, but what does that mean, you are going to modify the CV–22s, which were built for you in the first place?

Can somebody——

Admiral OLSON. Sir, as with most of the major platforms that we procure, they are purchased under service contracts to service common requirements and then modified with U.S. SOCOM's budget to answer special operations peculiar mission requirements.

In the case of the CV–22, as compared to the MV–22, those modifications are primarily terrain following, terrain avoidance systems and some defensive survivability systems. And it includes also an aerial refueling modification. So those are the primary modifications.

In the end, the Air Force, in the case of the CV–22, is funding about three-quarters of the purchase of the CV–22, and U.S. Special Operations Command is funding about one-quarter of it.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. I think I get it now.

These modifications that you are talking about you are paying for but they are being put in at the production line in Amarillo. This isn't an add-on later or a modification, if you will, to an already produced airframe. This is being modified in production, and that is the part that U.S. SOCOM is paying for; is that correct?

Admiral OLSON. That is correct.

Mr. KLINE. Okay.

Admiral OLSON. The production line splits, and those that are going to become MV–22s as opposed to CV–22s then go through a different production after the basic airframe is rolled down the line.

Mr. KLINE. Right. Well, I have toured that plant a couple of times, and I have watched that split, and I guess that is what drove me to the question, because it looked like, clearly, at the plant, in Amarillo, there is a difference between the MV–22 and the CV–22. It is being, I thought, made from scratch for you and what you are saying, it is but the modifications that are in this nifty book are the part that you are paying for that makes them unique for you.

Admiral OLSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Yes. And you are the only Air Force user right now of the V–22. Is that right?

Admiral OLSON. At this time, that is correct, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Great. Thanks very much.

I will yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Mrs. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, both, for coming here today and giving your testimony. I am very grateful, and I appreciate your service.

I want to ask a little bit about the budget. The President's budget did not fund SOCOM to meet the current and future threat requirements, and there is almost a $700 million shortfall. What do you think the risks will be to security to the American public should Congress not be able to make up this shortfall?

Admiral OLSON. Mrs. Gillibrand, thank you.

First, I would like to be clear that the Department of Defense did approve the budget we submitted. We adhered to the guidance as we submitted it. So our unfunded requirement (UFR) list that you are referring to are those items that didn't make it into our budget request because they either didn't meet the top priority or because we saw opportunities for acceleration of production in certain items or because they were submitted and approved within my headquarters after we submitted the President's budget but before we submitted our unfunded requirements list.

The risk to security is in the capacity of Special Operations Command and some of our high-end capabilities. We are globally engaged, and we are globally engaged without all of the tools that are needed for us to meet the combatant commander's requirements of the war.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. I was most concerned because you have shortfalls in research and development and in science and technology, and I am very concerned about that in particular, because, obviously, some of the areas where we still need to develop increased expertise really require the research and development and the science and technology work.

And, obviously, there is a lot of discussion about roles and missions and allowing special operations forces to expand their mission to include certain kinds of security missions that are unique and are developing, like, cyber security, being able to respond to cyber terrorism. I know the Air Force is recently working on cyberspace command.

So I am concerned that if we are underfunding any area, that underfunding research and development and science and technology is probably not the best place, because that is probably where we are going to find solutions for these new security demands.

Would you like to comment for our committee at all on that issue?

Admiral OLSON. I would like to agree with you on that, ma'am.

I do have authorities as the commander of Special Operations Command that are more like a military service. I can do the research and development, I can invest in science and technology, unlike most combatant commanders but more like the service chiefs.

I am obliged to invest my major force program $11 million on those science and technology items that are Special Operations peculiar in their nature and their application, which means that others are not likely to invest in those items. And therefore, if we don't, nobody does.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Well, I would urge you to continue your advocacy on these issues, because I do see the future of our ability to protect this country very much in that area of science and technology.

Particularly, I want to turn and—General, you can comment on this for the Air Force—with cyber security as a fundamental issue, what have you thought about ways to engage the next generation of our greatest minds from engineering, mathematics, science and technology to turn to public service and military service as an avenue for the profession?

And I have asked this question in other context, it may require a different kind of recruitment that is not traditional, because you are looking for individual that have a certain skill set that may not have a typical background in public service or an interest in military interest. But you truly have the skill set we need to protect this country.

If you are doing any particular innovative outreach or recruiting, I would love to hear about it.

General RENUART. Ma'am, thank you for the question, and I am a little unprepared to answer that question, but I will certainly give you my understanding of where the Air Force is going, even though that doesn't technically fall into my responsibility.

You make a great point, however, that the recruiting base, if you will, is becoming increasingly thin. I think there are some statistics that say that less than five of 10 high school graduates meet the various criteria for service, not just in military but in other areas as well. I think it is important for us to have an ability to reach out and expand that level.

One of the elements that I talk to as the commander of NORTHCOM, as it relates to homeland defense, every day with our private sector partners as well as our education partners, is our ability to develop the technical skills of our students, from local initiatives like working with our local school districts to expand science and technology by using our own officers as mentors and experts in the high schools to working with, for example, the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs on advanced degree programs in homeland security, not to make a military member better educated but to help educate our executives in government and in industry on the issues of homeland security and homeland defense.

So I think we do have to be innovative in that regard. I think we do have to commit to helping that next generation of great young minds, and national service, public service, service to the community a critical element of that. I am blessed with two sons. The oldest is a former active duty enlisted and reservist, three combat tours. He was back in Iraq as a contractor. He is now working for the State Department.

My youngest son is a Peace Corps volunteer who has—he is now a med student who will go back and help developing countries of the world. So we encourage that within our own sons, and I think we have to do that as a Nation.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Five minutes are up?

Mr. SMITH. Five minutes are up, and we have got a couple more people in here, but if we have time at the end, we will come back and get other folks.

Mrs. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, thank you for being here today.

Admiral Olson, I would like to ask you about the Advance SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). You had mentioned in your written testimony that ASDS number one is ready for deployment, and what my concern is, is that the capability gap that this program was designed to address still has not been fully met in the two years since the program has been canceled.

Is SOCOM assessing alternative solutions or is this the capability that SOCOM still needs?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Ms. Drake. ASDS, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, certainly much more than that, in fact, I compare it to an underwater space shuttle. As the space shuttle was designed to do more than take astronauts into space, it was designed to enable man to work in an environment in which he could loiter for previously unattainable periods. ASDS does that in a maritime environment.

We canceled the program because it was a troubled program. The delivery of the first ASDS was way late, way over cost, and it had reliability issues that concerned us seriously about the safety of the people that we were putting inside. So we canceled the program in order to invest with greater focus in enhancing the reliability of the one that was in production.

I believe that we have met the reliability standards, I am convinced that we have. We have declared that one asset operational. It is currently aboard a submarine in the Pacific in, sort of, a—I am sorry, it is not, but it is preparing to do that for, sort of, a shakedown and test opportunity.

One doesn't answer our need. We have a standing requirement for a small fleet. It is somewhere between four and six. I also am convinced that the applicability of the submarine extends beyond special operations applications. We are having discussions with the Navy about potential Navy employment of ASDS.

In specific answer to your question about whether or not we are analyzing alternatives, the answer is, yes. When we canceled the program, we initiated an effort to recommend a way ahead with respect to a material solution to the requirement. I will receive that report in about two weeks.

Mrs. DRAKE. Oh, okay. Thank you. And just one last question for you. When Dr. Chu was here the other day, we did ask him about whether you had the tools you need to retain our more senior SEALS, and I just wanted to know from you if you think you have what you need to retain this very, very valuable asset to our military?

Admiral OLSON. Ma'am, with the support of this committee, we were able to institute a retention bonus that is applicable at the 19-year point for our experienced SEALS. It offers them bonuses to stay in through the 25th year point. That has proven successful. It was a temporary authority at the time that it was granted. It was temporary as it was implemented by the Department of Defense, and so we are working with the department to extend that into a permanent bonus. But given that, we are in pretty good shape.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you. Thank you for being here.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, we had an issue in this subcommittee last year about the civil support teams (CST) and how many we needed where. I have a chart in front of me that describes some of the different organizations that are being created, and, frankly, I am a little concerned that there are lots of people who say, "This is what we do," and there is a lot of overlap and so forth that is a little confusing to me.

In addition to civil support teams, there apparently are joint National Guard Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) enhanced response force packages, and there are Chemical-Biological Incident Response Forces, and there are CBRNE Consequent Management Response Force.

I am not exactly clear what everybody does. I want you to reassure me that there are clear lanes in the road, and everybody is not coming to the taxpayer for money to do the same thing.

General RENUART. Mr. Thornberry, that is a superb question, because at first glance, that chart can be very confusing, but, actually, working in that environment every day I think we have really created a very good synergy among all the players. And let me try to put that in perspective.

Congress provided funding to allow each state to develop a civil support team, and that is a 22-person team that is really designed as the quick response force that can go to a chemical or biological event and relieve those first responders with people who are trained to operate in that kind of environment, a chemical environment, a biological environment or the like.

They are there to assess the initial scene and to make recommendations back to the state on the size of force that it may take to respond. If, in fact, it is a larger event than that small 22-person team can manage, then they can go out either to a state to bring in a supporting team of similar capabilities or they can go to one of the 17 regionally based Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) that you mentioned is that second group, about 200 plus individuals, again, trained to operate in a chemical environment to begin to do consequence management of the site. CST is an assessment team. The CERFP begins to allow you to do consequence management.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Excuse me for interrupting. We have got a vote called——

General RENUART. Understand.

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. And I am a little concerned.

You are making me feel better. If you don't mind, if you could get your folks to provide us, what you have started to do, a description and who the traffic cop is. Who says this is an assessment team versus——

General RENUART. Right.

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. And then going on down.

General RENUART. I would be happy to do that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 97.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think that would be helpful for me, at least, to sort through this.

Admiral Olson, if I could ask just briefly, one of the things that your folks do is train other special forces, and we have seen some of that as we have traveled around. My understanding is that there are those countries that would like to send folks here for us to train but there are limitations, financial and otherwise. Can you describe—what we are talking about is trying to work through others to increase others' capabilities so we don't have to do everything. Is this an area you think Congress should put more emphasis on so that your folks can train others to take care of their security needs for themselves, and what do we need to do to make that happen?

Admiral OLSON. Mr. Thornberry, you are correct, there are limitations, and some of those limitations are funding limitations. In many of the countries with which we work there, the lesser developed countries of the world, the high priority and the priority countries in a campaign against terrorism in which we are investing resources for training for the purpose of enabling them to either fight with, fight alongside us or enable their own sovereignty through governing their own borders and establish their own internal security. These are not the wealthiest nations of the country, in general.

I met the International Military Education Training Program. It is a wonderful program. In my view, it has been underfunded for many years. It is the best tool that we have to enable those carefully selected members from other countries to come to schools in the United States and train, not just skills training but also to our war colleges and graduate schools for education as well.

When we send people forward, we pick, sort of, the people who are regionally oriented, who are in line to go, ensuring that we are regionally specializing as we do that and attempting to send the same people back to the same places. They hand pick virtually everybody who trains with us. It is a badge of honor and a very prestigious point for them to be selected for training in the United States. This is an investment that pays off in many ways.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

I think what we will do—I mean, I have a few more questions. I am sure Mr. Thornberry does as well. But rather than have all of you sit here for a half hour waiting for five minutes more worth of questions, we will submit the ones we have and have not been answered for the record and give you the rest of the afternoon off. How is that? I am sure you have other things to do.

But thank you very much, both of you, for your testimony, and, again, both of you, for your accessibility to this committee and to the full committee. We have had great working relationships with both of you and both of your staffs, and we really appreciate the work that you do to do that.

So thanks for being here this afternoon, and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 5, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 5, 2008

Statement of Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Chairman Adam Smith SOCOM and NORTHCOM FY09 Budget Request

March 5, 2008

"Good afternoon. Welcome to our guests and to our panelists. I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for attending this important hearing in which the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee will begin to consider the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization budget request for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

"Admiral Olson and General Renuart, I want you to know that I appreciate you taking time this morning away from your regular duties to offer your expertise to our members, and also to thank you for your service to our country.

"As members are aware, SOCOM consists of more than 50,000 special operations forces (SOF) personnel who serve as the tip of our spear against terrorists and insurgents. SOF troops are active in dozens of countries around the world, doing a fantastic job of executing the missions they've been given, especially considering the heightened operations tempo required by our continued occupation of Iraq and our commitments in Afghanistan. These actions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have pulled more than 80 percent of our SOF personnel into those specific areas on conflict and have placed an enormous strain on SOCOM.

"This strain makes it exponentially more difficult for SOCOM to pursue terrorists elsewhere around the world in a comprehensive, global struggle against al-Qaida and their violent totalitarian ideology of subjugation. Both the wear and tear on our troops in the CENTCOM AOR and the spread of al-Qaida elsewhere around the world cause me to react with deep concern at the seven percent cut in the fiscal year 2009 SOCOM budget request compared to the FY08 appropriated levels. I am very interested to hear our panel's perspective on the wisdom of such a cut at such a pivotal time.

"In addition, the subcommittee is interested in hearing from the panel about any potentially new authorities required for SOCOM to successfully prosecute the fight against terrorism, as well as any steps that can be taken to improve intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support to our special operations forces.

"NORTHCOM was created in 2002 in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and has grown from an initial size of 1,300 Defense Department personnel to a force of more than 15,000.

"NORTHCOM has continually responded to and worked to become more prepared for catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks, targeting the U.S. homeland. The Command has lent invaluable assistance to civil authorities in numerous scenarios since its inception, including the federal response to Hurricane Katrina and the Minneapolis-St. Paul bridge collapse in August 2007. Challenges remain, however, particularly with regard to questions of interagency coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

"Again I want to thank members and our panel for their time this morning as we consider the authorization for two Defense Department commands that are absolutely essential to our fight against terrorists and insurgents all over the world. I also want to thank Ranking Member Thornberry for his bipartisan cooperation and look forward to continuing our work together to get our men and women in uniform the resources they need to accomplish their mission."

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES

ON THE

POSTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

MARCH 5, 2008

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UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to report on the state of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

USSOCOM's mission is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States and its interests; and to plan and synchronize Department of Defense (DoD) operations against terrorist networks.

America's Special Operations Forces (SOF) are organized, equipped and trained, and then deployed by USSOCOM to meet the high demands of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) around the world. The range of special operations is wide, the geographic dispersion is great, the quality is exceptional and the results are impressive.

Although most special operation forces deployed from the United States since the attacks of 9/11 have served in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, we clearly understand the enduring value of a global presence. We are proud to be serving in about 60 countries today.

The core capabilities of SOF are in the people who choose to do, qualify for and remain committed to this type of work. Finding, training and sustaining them requires steady focus. Ensuring they have the equipment, sensors, weapons, and mobility platforms of the kind and quality demanded by their

peculiar missions requires willingness to invest in the rapid fielding of both existing solutions and cutting edge technologies even when the relatively small purchase quantities do not optimize production costs.

SOF must be manned, trained and equipped to operate globally with unmatched speed, precision and discipline within a culture that promotes innovation, initiative and tactical level diplomacy. While this Nation appreciates the tremendous impact of SOF's day-to-day engagement with global friends, allies and partners, and the powerful impact of SOF on the battlefield is legend, America also expects SOF to be able to appear in places they are not expected to be, with capabilities they are not expected to have.

To accomplish our missions, we are focused on three priorities, each containing nested objectives.

First, we must deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats to our Nation. We do this by planning and conducting special operations, emphasizing culturally-attuned international engagement and fostering interagency cooperation. The Command's synchronization of the plans and planning to deter, disrupt, and defeat our enemies has great influence on allocation of the Department's resources.

Second, we must develop and support our people and their families. Our great people are the foundation of mission success, and they are national assets. We must maintain our quality, train and educate our force as joint warrior-diplomats, and always care for them and their families.

Third, we must sustain and modernize the force by equipping the operator, upgrading our mobility platforms and further developing persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and systems.

These priorities support USSOCOM's ongoing efforts to ensure SOF are highly trained, properly equipped and deployed to the right places at the right times for the right missions. Our personnel must be capable of planning and leading a wide range of lethal and non-lethal special operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments. This specific requirement underpins expectations that SOF will continue a military culture of initiative and innovation at every level. USSOCOM will continue to work closely with the services to ensure that the conventional force enablers upon which we depend remain a part of our future operations.

DETER, DISRUPT, AND DEFEAT TERRORIST THREATS

The enemy threat is complex and patient. USSOCOM anticipates no relief from our deployed commitments even when U.S. force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced. SOF's ability to grow relationships and build partner nation capacity is a fundamental part of the Department's campaign plan against terrorist threats.

We pursue two essential, mutually supporting and often intertwined approaches – direct and indirect. These two approaches integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations while positively impacting the environment in which they operate.

The direct approach addresses the immediate requirement to pursue terrorists, their infrastructure and their resources. Despite the positive trends in Iraq, operations to capture or kill terrorists and disrupt their networks remain both urgent and necessary. In the dynamic and ambiguous environments that constitute today's battlefields, the ability to rapidly analyze and exploit information is key to fast sequential targeting. This requires unique skills, specialized technologies and flexible mobility. We understand the necessity of prosecuting targets with speed, precision and discipline.

The indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. The indirect approach requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately will be the decisive effort.

In a world characterized by protracted struggles, emerging Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine calls for a suite of capabilities to prevail against those who threaten us. IW is a logical, long-term framework that assists in both analyzing and applying many elements of national and international power to achieve mutual security objectives.

IW often employs indirect operations to gain asymmetric advantage over adversaries. IW is not a new mission area for SOF. Unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), civil-military operations (CMO), Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) are all traditional IW activities and core tasks for SOF. With IW's emergence as a focus area for broader participation across the Department, it

increasingly describes activities that both SOF and general purpose forces will employ in their operational approaches.

Theater SOF Efforts – By, With and Through

Deployed SOF are normally under the command of Theater Special Operations Commanders (TSOC) who work directly for the Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Theater SOCs have the regional focus that contributes to a good understanding of the people, the cultures and the issues of their areas of interest.

It is under the Theater Special Operations Commands that permanently deployed and rotational SOF work in other countries to enhance combat skills; establish relationships with counterparts; advise, assist or manage a variety of civil and military projects; contribute to the achievement of U.S. Ambassadors' objectives; or gain the experience that will contribute to future successes.

For example, at the direction of Special Operations Command – Pacific, SOF assist Philippine forces' efforts to identify and defeat indigenous and transnational terrorist organizations in the southern islands. Building on the model that was effective on Basilan Island in 2002, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force works closely with Philippine Army, Marine and Navy units and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide both humanitarian assistance and military training. SOF also manage information and public affairs plans in coordination with the U.S. country team. The combined effect of these efforts has made central and southern Mindanao

and the Sulu Archipelago a much more challenging environment for terrorist activity.

Under Special Operations Command – Europe, Army Special Forces conducted an exercise during the summer of 2007 involving several Trans-Saharan (Pan-Sahel) nations and our European partners. SOF provided training in regional synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for CT related operations. Last year, SOF also participated in Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises in this region. These exchanges enhance SOF skills while building person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.

Under Special Operations Command – Central Command, SOF have continued programs that are building competent and capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces . Iraqi Special Operations Forces are generally touted as some of the most effective military units in the region.

Under Special Operations Command – South, SOF personnel train, advise, and assist in Colombia's campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) narco-terrorists.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

SOF employs its unique abilities to assess, train, advise and assist host nation militaries to build military capability. In so doing we improve our partner nations' confidence and abilities to detect and defeat violent extremist organizations. In 2007, SOF conducted hundreds of FID missions around the world.

Civil Affairs (CA)

Civil affairs projects deter support for violent extremist organizations by legitimizing existing governments and fostering a more favorable opinion of U.S. efforts. Simultaneously, programs that address government corruption, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and basic human needs build confidence in fledgling governments. While CA units are key to success in Afghanistan and Iraq, they remain equally vital to the conduct of myriad other SOF operations throughout the world.

Working closely with Colombian government and military officials, SOF CA personnel carried out more than two dozen medical humanitarian civic action events. These events treated thousands of Columbian patients in remote areas of the country and solidified that government's legitimacy in undergoverned spaces.

The Civil Military Engagement Program employs Civil Military Support Elements which are scalable, modular SOF teams that plan, coordinate, facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that support U.S. and host nation objectives. Combatant Commanders are increasingly requesting this CA augmentation to enhance their indirect operations.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

One of the most important components in defeating terrorism includes countering violent extremist propaganda. These efforts are global in scale and are locally implemented by the geographic Combatant Commands. PSYOP

forces disseminate truthful information to shape behavior and erode the attraction of extremist ideologies among foreign audiences.

USSOCOM's Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) includes functional, cultural and geographic experts who bring a combined approach to tackling what has become a tough, entrenched war of ideas. JMISC currently orchestrates a 24/7 multi-media campaign formatted to the cultures and languages of relevant audiences. This provides a factual message as an alternative to the extremist ideology for global audiences.

A most important tool in our ability to build the capacity of partner nations to conduct counterterrorism or stability operations is our continued authority to train and equip foreign military forces under language included in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Sections 1202 (previously known as 1208) and 1206, which expires this year, are authorities that have made a big difference in developing carefully selected counterpart forces. As an authority specific to Special Operations, Section 1202 is especially germane.

Synchronization and Planning

In 2005, USSOCOM was directed by the Unified Command Plan to plan, synchronize and, as directed, conduct global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders. While this was widely perceived as granting USSOCOM the authority to direct a wide range of operational activities in areas already assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, we have realized in execution that our greatest value is in synchronizing GWOT campaign plans and planning. The operations themselves

are in almost every case conducted by the Geographic Combatant Commander responsible for that region, with USSOCOM in support. Every day at Headquarters USSOCOM, and at numerous outstations and agencies around the world, USSOCOM personnel are collaborating, coordinating and planning with other agencies to achieve desired global effects.

The most comprehensive element of USSOCOM's synchronization effort is the global collaborative planning process. This effort draws on other Combatant Command capabilities and expertise to develop DoD's GWOT campaign plan. This plan, coupled with the Geographic Combatant Commands' regional war on terror campaign plans that support it, are dynamic and under continuous review. USSOCOM and the DoD Global Synchronization Community have developed structured processes to evaluate and prioritize the many capabilities, operations, activities, resources and forces required for DoD's efforts to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorism. USSOCOM provides real and virtual venues for regular meetings, briefings, and conferences with each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, interagency partners, and friendly and allied nations. The primary forum is the semi-annual Global Synchronization Conference. Because collaboration with our partner nations is so important, several other programs such as the foreign attaché-based SOVEREIGN CHALLENGE and our upcoming International Special Operations Forces Week improve global cooperation.

USSOCOM's Interagency Task Force (IATF) is a catalyst to rapidly facilitate CT collaboration within the U.S. government against trans-regional, functional and strategic level problem sets and opportunities.

USSOCOM's International Engagement Program (IEP) identifies requirements and helps coordinate actions within selected foreign countries to assist, resolve and enhance their CT capabilities and increase overall information sharing.

Future Concepts

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified several initiatives to give the Department greater capability and agility in dealing with the most common and enduring threats of the 21st Century. The development of Irregular Warfare capabilities was prominent. USSOCOM plays a lead role in developing IW doctrine.

The IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC), developed by USSOCOM in partnership the Marine Corps, was approved and signed by the Secretary of Defense in September 2007. It is the first step in the promulgation of IW doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel and facilities.

In order to maintain the momentum in IW planning and policy, USSOCOM established an IW Directorate (J10) in 2007. The J10 provides continuous focus on IW related issues that cut across operational and programmatic lines.

DEVELOP AND SUPPORT OUR PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES

The Commander of USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces. With this requirement comes the need for better defined personnel management authorities and readiness reporting frameworks.

Recruiting and Retention

The ability to identify and recruit the best SOF candidates is a challenge requiring innovation and commitment of resources. Diversity across the force is an operational necessity posing additional challenges to recruiting. Attributes sought by the SOF community include culturally-attuned individuals proficient in foreign languages who physically blend into the operational environment.

Ongoing personnel sustainment and programmed growth efforts directed by the QDR require intense cooperation and support between USSOCOM, the Services and DoD. This concentrated effort has paid dividends--89 percent of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 QDR growth was achieved. With support from the Services, the SOF community leveraged a combination of innovative accession programs, revamped training programs and implemented retention incentives.

SOF personnel have deployed often and suffered many casualties. USSOCOM puts great emphasis on sustainment programs that assist families as well as the uniformed member. The SOF Care Coalition project, implemented by my predecessor, has been extremely successful through patient and family advocacy that extends beyond recovery, rehabilitation and any subsequent transition to civilian life. No issue is too large or too small. Care Coalition successes range from minimizing medical and physical evaluation board

bureaucracy, ensuring Traumatic Serviceman Group Life Insurance compensation is appropriate, coordinating home repairs for a family whose father was deployed, making certain a SOF warrior's young daughter received the best TRICARE could provide, and providing personalized support for all families caring for their hospitalized wounded warrior.

Although USSOCOM is specifically responsible for the special operations force defined by Major Force Program (MFP) 11 authorizations, one of the greatest emergent challenges is the health of our service-provided SOF enablers.

Training and Education

The Component assessment and selection programs identify candidates with the potential for entry into the SOF community. The initial SOF qualification training that follows assessment and selection takes up to two years to complete, but skills training is continuous thoughout one's career in SOF.

Professional military education remains an essential element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. One initiative scheduled to begin in 2008 will expand the SOF Interagency Fellow's program to provide post-graduate courses, full degree programs, and independent research opportunities for SOF strategists and long-range planners.

Language and Culture

Language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces, organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact. The 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) language training

program was recognized by the Army and DoD as the best of its kind in 2007 but, although we have enhanced all of our language training programs in recent years, we remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects. We will continue to expand our programs in 2008, stressing the need for a few individuals to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures. Our initiatives will include exploration of innovative options to permit such specialization without sacrificing promotion opportunity.

Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is responding to the increased need for strategic and operational level education for our SOF personnel, enablers, and international partners. JSOU will continue to offer a range of academic options that address strategic and operational subject areas. Programs will include traditional courses and seminars; tailored academic electives at the Service professional military education institutions; joint mobile education teams; symposia and academic workshops; individual performance support; and similar activities aimed at the needs of our student base.

SUSTAIN AND MODERNIZE THE FORCE

Budget

The budget and acquisition authorities provided in the original language that created USSOCOM have proven invaluable in enabling SOF to be properly trained and equipped.

The FY 2009 President's Budget request of $5.727 billion for Major Force Program 11 will permit continued development of capabilities peculiar to special operations. This request will continue our investment in capabilities to improve SOF warrior systems, promote specialized and institutional training, explore and exploit new technologies and refine force structure. Over half of the budget request--$3.7 billion--is for Operations and Maintenance to sustain SOF operational readiness, to maintain equipment, and to provide for fuel, consumable supplies, civilian salaries, spare parts and repair of weapons and equipment.

Of the remainder, $1.5 billion is for Procurement, and will be used to fund vital SOF-unique modernization and recapitalization efforts in force protection, mobility, weapons, munitions, communications and intelligence equipment. An additional $361 million is requested for RDT&E to develop SOF-peculiar equipment, to provide technological advances, and to modernize SOF weapons. Finally, $255 million is requested for Military Construction to fund 13 projects in seven states and one project at an overseas location.

We expect our optempo will remain high even when conventional forces downsize in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the funding we have received in supplementals will still be required to support our efforts. In order to sustain our operations long term, we are working with DoD to pursue a shift of essential supplemental funding to the base budget.

Force Structure

Last year, SOF added 6,443 military and civilian positions. These positions provided needed enhancements to both headquarters and operational force structure.

In FY 2009, USSOCOM will add another 1,536 military and civilian billets across the component commands in order to improve readiness and add capacity and capabilities. We will grow to 55,890 civilian and military personnel by the conclusion of FY 2009, of which 43,745 will be active duty military members, 6,870 will be in reserve components (4,310 Guard and 2,560 Reserve) and 5,275 will be government civilians.

Acquisition Efforts

USSOCOM's acquisition organization is a very important factor in resourcing SOF-peculiar requirements. While Federal Acquisition Regulations uniformly apply to the Department, we strive to take advantage of flexibilities that are inherent in these guidelines to quickly provide materiel solutions for the SOF operator. Because our budget authority is limited to SOF-peculiar equipment and modifications, USSOCOM must work closely with the three military departments (MILDEPs), because the MILDEPs fund, develop, acquire and provide the basic Service-common vehicles, aircraft, boats, weapons, ammunition and other equipment to USSOCOM, which we then modify to SOF-specific platforms, systems and/or equipment.

When a SOF requirement cannot be met using a Service-common solution, USSOCOM uses its authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment or

modify the Service-common equipment to meet SOF needs. USSOCOM's acquisition culture stresses assertive risk management, and process efficiencies to steward a system that is often more tailorable, responsive, and agile than elsewhere in DoD.

USSOCOM's Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA) process continues to provide a rapid acquisition and logistics response to combat mission needs statements (CMNS) submitted by deployed SOF. Most capabilities developed under this program are delivered to the forces within six months to a year after the requirement is validated.

Our total requirements, funding and acquisition sub-processes are still slower and more restrictive than we believe is optimal for this specialized force. During the coming year we intend to explore whether we are using the full extent of our legislated authorities as the Congress and President intended when USSOCOM was established.

Science and Technology

USSOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) strategy is to selectively invest and leverage available resources with the MILDEPs and other agency laboratories, academia, and industry for the purpose of maximizing SOF capabilities. S&T programs identify and assess emerging technologies for potential insertion into current and future SOF concepts, requirements, and acquisition programs of record. As the strategic, tactical, and geopolitical environments in which SOF operates evolve, so too does the S&T investment focus and support.

The USSOCOM Special Operations Technology Development (SOTD), Special Operations Advanced Technology Development (SOST) and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs work together to synergistically develop, evaluate and eventually transition key technologies. The USSOCOM Locating, Tagging and Tracking efforts are being staffed through the SOTD and SOST programs in collaboration with our program executive officers, the Defense Research and Engineering Directorate, the MILDEPs and interagency partners. Our involvement in several Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations allows USSOCOM to leverage the resources of other organizations to create robust opportunities for evaluating and transforming mature technologies in a way that USSOCOM could not otherwise afford on our limited S&T budget.

Equipping the SOF Warrior

The new combat assault rifles, the MK16 and MK17 and their associated enhanced grenade launcher module, completed development and began limited fielding in 2007. We expect these weapons to be fully deployed by the end of 2009. USSOCOM will continue the development of next-generation ammunitions as well as fused-image-capable, clip-on optics for our weapons.

In 2007, USSOCOM fielded more than 11,000 supplemental body armor kits, saving lives and reducing injuries by increasing the area of ballistic protection beyond that of previously issued SOF body armor. More than 4,500 sets of the new protective combat uniform were fielded to provide extreme cold weather protection for SOF operators. The Command implemented a product

improvement effort to reduce the weight and/or increase the ballistic performance of the modular integrated communications helmet.

The worldwide proliferation of night vision devices has somewhat diminished the technological advantage that the U.S. military possessed during the conduct of night operations. Although the technology gap has narrowed, USSOCOM continues to identify, test and field many new night vision and visual augmentation systems. In 2007, USSOCOM continued to field advancements in thermal imaging and camera technology by putting into service visual augmentation systems that were smaller and lighter with increased capabilities.

SOF Munitions

Special purpose munitions, such as demolition, breaching, diversionary, and shoulder-fired munitions, are required to accomplish SOF missions. Future developments will upgrade the SOF shoulder-fired systems with the capability to fire within and from enclosed spaces for use in urban environments. We will continue to procure foreign weapons and ammunition to train SOF operators so they will be better prepared to train the forces of our partner nations.

Once munitions are developed and fielded, our logistics personnel assume responsibility for procurement of replenishment munitions to sustain the force. All SOF munitions are intensively managed in order to minimize stock levels while simultaneously providing time-sensitive capabilities required by the Theater Special Operations Commands.

SOF Communications

USSOCOM continues to transform its respective capabilities in the areas of communications, information technology, automation of intelligence data and collaboration tools into a single, integrated SOF information environment. Such an information environment enhances operations by permitting robust command and control capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and by extending information services to the individual SOF warrior.

As a result, available satellite communications bandwidth is at a premium.

SOF Mobility

USSOCOM continues to sustain and modernize the venerable SOF C-130 fleet. We have engaged with the Department of the Air Force to develop strategies for replacing and modernizing the aging MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow fleets. As an interim solution, four of twelve planned MC-130W air refueling tankers were delivered to date, with four more scheduled for delivery in 2008. The 8 aircraft will help to partially offset those MC-130Es & MC-130Ps. Four CV-22 trainer aircraft and the first three operational CV-22 Ospreys were delivered in 2006 and 2007. Three additional aircraft will to be delivered in 2008, with Initial Operational Capability projected for February 2009.

USSOCOM rotary wing programs, in partnership with the U.S. Army, are providing the latest technologies and sustainability upgrades to the current SOF rotary wing fleet. Taken together, these programs for the MH-47s, MH-60s, and the MH-6Ms will improve current capabilities and prepare for future

modernization while consolidating the fleet into three common standardized airframes. The MH-47G variant has been deployed since February 2007. The MH-60M program was accelerated and will begin deliveries in 2008. The MH-6M Little Bird is nearing completion of its first block modification upgrade. Meanwhile, the MH-53M fleet is being drawn down for total retirement later this year.

The fielding and deployment of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) in June 2007 moved USSOCOM Undersea Mobility capabilities significantly forward. ASDS #1 is now available for deployment as a reliable combat capability based on successful testing, exercises and improvements in reliability. This vehicle enables Special Operations Forces to perform myriad missions in water space that was previously unreachable. Our other Undersea Mobility efforts such as the wet submersible Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) will continue to provide capabilities that enable SOF to perform a wide range of specialized tasks. There are on going studies to better define future undersea mobility joint efforts in this area.

USSOCOM recently enhanced its surface maritime mobility systems by fielding the advanced forward looking infrared systems for installation throughout its combatant craft fleet. As a result of combat lessons learned, USSOCOM has also fielded other improvements on the special operations craft-riverine. As the current models of rigid-hull inflatable boats and the SEAL Delivery Vehicles age, USSOCOM will begin developing the next generation of these surface and undersea maritime platforms.

This year, two new classes of vehicles were introduced for SOF ground mobility: the RG-31 medium mine protected vehicle and the RG-33 mine resistant ambush protected vehicle. These vehicles enable SOF to deploy forces across the theater of operations with a level of protection previously unavailable. In 2008, USSOCOM will begin fielding a suspension upgrade for our primary ground mobility vehicle (HMMWV variants) in order to return payload and mobility to the platform that was lost with the addition of heavy armor packages. Additionally, the light mobility vehicle, delivering in 2008, will carry 3-5 personnel over all types of terrain and is deployable from multiple aircraft platforms, including the CV-22.

SOF Sensor Systems

Sensor systems that provide persistent ISR are essential elements of USSOCOM's operations and force protection. USSOCOM has been swiftly fielding persistent ISR capabilities within budgetary constraints and respective Service training program limitations. We have modified existing SOF equipment where available, procured additional manned and unmanned ISR platforms, and partnered with the MILDEPs, Defense Research and Engineering Directorate and the Joint IED Defeat Organization to cooperatively field additional sensors.

SOF Locating, Tagging and Tracking capabilities are currently providing valuable information regarding hostile force location, movement, and intent while minimizing risk to US personnel. USSOCOM, in conjunction with other government partners, will continue to invest in leading-edge technologies for sensors and data infiltration and exfiltration.

Improved laser range finders and designators, hand-held thermal imagers, infrared pointers and marking and illuminating devices are a few of the capabilities delivered over the past year. Eye-safe laser range finders and binoculars provided a marked improvement in the determination of enemy target locations. Improved target geo-location accuracy was demonstrated in 2007, providing USSOCOM with the world's most accurate self-contained laser targeting geo-locater.

Additionally, USSOCOM acquired and utilizes a combination of several manned and unmanned airborne ISR assets to provide the necessary flexibility for supporting the dynamic SOF mission set. Unmanned aerial systems continue to be powerful force multipliers for SOF activities and a key component of almost every operation. The micro unmanned aerial systems, the long-endurance Predator class systems, and the potential ultra-long-endurance unmanned aerial systems, such as the Global Observer JCTD, are platforms that provide force protection to small SOF units and aid in the identification and tracking of individual targets and items of interest. USSOCOM also continues to grow our manned airborne ISR capability to complement the unmanned ISR systems. In FY 2007, additional airborne ISR aircraft were procured with supplemental funds, and SOCOM partnered with the National Guard Bureau to rapidly modify and employ Air National Guard aircraft and air crews to augment USSOCOM's organic ISR capability.

CONCLUSION

We continue to improve our capability and capacity to conduct all of our assigned missions, carefully balancing the demands of both preceding and responding to the sound of guns. Over the course of USSOCOM's twenty-one year history, Congress has consistently demonstrated strong interest in the command and its people. The joint Special Operations Force you see around the globe today is a direct product of your vision, your trust and your commitment to build the world's premier Special Operations capability. We will prevail against those who threaten us and assist those who don't. The men and women of the Special Operations Force will meet your highest expectations. Thank you for your continued support.

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

AND

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

5 MARCH 2008

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and report to you on the state of our two commands, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Together, these Commands protect and defend the United States and Canadian homelands. I want to leave no doubt in your minds that in the five-year history of USNORTHCOM and fifty-year history of NORAD, the men and women assigned to these Commands have never been more committed to this no-fail mission—they are vigilant, prepared and responsive to threats that may harm our families and our countries.

Since standing up in 2002, USNORTHCOM, partnered with our NORAD teammate, has protected our nation from attack. The USNORTHCOM and NORAD team has been successful thanks to the combined work of our nation's leaders, the Department of Defense, the interagency community, and especially support from Congress. Additionally, since the Hurricane Katrina disaster, USNORTHCOM has re-defined readiness; we have made landmark improvements in our planning, anticipating, communicating and coordinating the federal, state and local response to natural disasters and other events requiring civil support. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states, *"as we face the dual challenges of preventing terrorist attacks in the Homeland and strengthening our Nation's preparedness for both natural and man-made disasters, our most solemn duty is to protect the American people."* This pledge underscores the missions of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as we monitor 12-20 potentially dangerous events every day.

We continue to place strong emphasis on three focus areas: anticipating threats to our continental security, improving our homeland defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission partners. It is my privilege today to report not only on the state of our Commands, but also on our goals for the future.

Our Missions—Anticipate, Prepare and Respond

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate Commands—neither being subordinate to the other—with complementary homeland defense missions. We share common values, understand the urgency and significance of our duties in light of very real and present dangers, and operate in a dynamic and uncertain security environment. A range of threats across all domains represents an immediate and future challenge for both Commands. Whereas the enemies of yesterday were relatively predictable, homogenous, hierarchical and slow to change, today's adversaries are agile, unpredictable, diverse, increasingly networked and dynamic. These adversaries benefit from technologies and materials readily accessible in world markets, to include disruptive systems or the ingredients required to fabricate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This potential availability of WMD to terrorist groups is of vital concern, especially as terrorists thrive in the "gray area" where notions of crime and armed conflict overlap.

Our missions require a culture of anticipation. With every potentially harmful event, through constant vigilance throughout USNORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR), we anticipate appropriate levels of Department of Defense (DOD) response to provide capabilities that protect and defend the American people to prevent and minimize loss of life, suffering and property damage.

USNORTHCOM is prepared to support its federal, state and National Guard partners in responding to a wide range of events. Natural disasters such as major hurricanes, earthquakes or pandemics can quickly exceed the capabilities of local and state emergency response assets and require significant allocation of military resources to help mitigate the effects of and support for relief and recovery efforts. Likewise, a terrorist attack, particularly one involving WMD, may not only cause overwhelming numbers of casualties, but may also initiate a multitude of

cascading events which could require substantial defense support of civil authorities. When needed, our military assets are organized, trained, equipped, and immediately accessible to leverage national, and as appropriate, continental strengths.

An essential element of USNORTHCOM and NORAD success is our ability to anticipate events that may require a military response. We work hard to have global situational awareness of potential events that can affect the safety and security of our homeland. Toward this end, in 2006, the Commands began a project to build a single, integrated command center that supports our requirements for global situational awareness and interconnectivity with key homeland defense and civil support partners. This remains a high priority for the Commands, and we are on track to begin initial operations out of the new, integrated Command Center by May 2008. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center will provide a more efficient and effective means of executing homeland defense against threats coming from all domains. In addition to an increased capacity to coordinate defense activities with other stakeholders, especially Canada Command, the integrated Command Center will provide a significantly enhanced capability to execute defense support of civilian authorities.

We understand Congress' concerns with the Command Center Integration project. In response, we provided the House and Senate Armed Services Committees' leadership a cost-benefit analysis for the integration and a summary of our actions to mitigate physical security vulnerabilities in early December 2007. As required by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, we have completed a Report to Congress on Command Center integration and provided that Report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for coordination and subsequent submittal to Congress.

Planning Efforts—Integral to our Response

The number one priority for USNORTHCOM is continuing to build active and Reserve Component capabilities to support training and readiness for response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents. On behalf of DOD, USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide a rapid and effective federal-level response to a catastrophic domestic CBRNE incident, whether it is a deliberate terrorist attack or an accident. Currently, our nation has 53 certified National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, one in every state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, ready to provide initial detection and identification in a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear event. Additionally, there are 17 regional consequence response Joint National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package units, each consisting of nearly 200 trained people, as well as an active-duty military response unit of nearly 450 Marines which is the gold standard for responding to a WMD attack. Should the event require additional federal forces, we have active duty units of over 3000 members in each unit who are on a short recall to reinforce the initial response teams.

We refined our CBRNE Consequence Management Concept Plan and led efforts within DOD to identify, train and make ready the CBRNE consequence management response capabilities the plan enumerates. Although the DOD response force is intended to augment those of state authorities, such as National Guard WMD-Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, we strongly recommend robust federal response units, referred to as CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF). This capability is needed because local and state capabilities will likely require additional DOD resources in the event a CBRNE incident is catastrophic or multiple events occur simultaneously. When operational, each CCMRF will deliver a range of ready capabilities, including incident assessment, command

and control, medical, decontamination, logistics, transportation, mortuary affairs, general support, and public affairs. In May 2007, USNORTHCOM successfully exercised the first-ever substantial CCMRF deployment to Camp Atterbury, Indiana, during Exercise ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHCOM EDGE 07; we will exercise these CCMRF capabilities again in May and then annually to maintain critical readiness.

Today, we have notional sourcing for the units we have been tasked to build. This remains a high priority for our Command, and we are diligently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Services, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to source the full CCMRFs. The Secretary of Defense has directed a full-time, dedicated force be trained and equipped by the end of this fiscal year. I appreciate Congress' direction to establish an advisory panel to assess DOD's capabilities to provide support to U.S. civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident, and look forward to providing input to the panel's assessment.

We worked hard to complete detailed plans that will guide our operational response in the event of a catastrophic event. USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to our Nation's ability to deter, prevent and defeat threats to our security, and assist civil authorities when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense. We continue to adjust these plans as we evaluate lessons learned from exercises and real world operations. Since the inception of USNORTHCOM, our planning efforts with our mission partners, particularly Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Guard Bureau, and Canada Command, have matured significantly.

Our nation uses the 15 National Planning Scenarios as a vehicle to shape nation-wide planning efforts for terrorist attacks and synchronize planning for natural disasters such as

hurricanes and earthquakes. USNORTHCOM plans, such as CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, address each of the National Planning Scenarios that may require USNORTHCOM support. We have established a close partnership with the DHS's Incident Management Planning Team to ensure DOD plans are integrated into the broader government-wide plans being developed by DHS. These plans will address the range of activities across the prevention, protection, response, and the recovery phases for each of the National Planning Scenarios. In coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, and DHS, we have developed a yearly civil disaster assistance Execute Order and 26 Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments to put specific capabilities on alert in order to respond to specific predetermined requests for assistance from designated primary agencies, which streamline DOD response activation.

In preparation for a potential Pandemic Influenza, USNORTHCOM is leading the DOD effort to globally synchronize military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread of the pandemic. In October 2007, USNORTHCOM completed a DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic Influenza. This plan provides guidance to all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Combatant Commands, Services and DOD Agencies to assist in development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic influenza environment.

Each year, USNORTHCOM anticipates, prepares and trains for significant events that may require a DOD response. The Command, in partnership with NORAD, annually sponsors two large-scale exercises (ARDENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD) and participates in over 30 additional exercises. Our exercise scenarios have involved: air (civil and military) incidents and attacks, maritime and port security, maritime interception operations, missile defense, consequence management in support of civil authorities, nuclear proliferation, nuclear

weapon accidents, weapons of mass destruction attacks, and natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes.

Our exercises (in full partnership with Canada, primarily through Canada Command) are integrated within the annual DHS-coordinated National Exercise Program, wherein we participate in National Level Exercises, and demonstrate our full response capabilities, including the deployment of elements of the CCMRFs. We enthusiastically support and participate in the National Level Exercises, particularly those with senior cabinet involvement, because they are tremendous demonstration and training opportunities for the spectrum of civil and military personnel who may respond to a real world event.

Our Operational Response—Helping Americans Where They Live and Work

We implemented many improvements following Hurricane Katrina that make USNORTHCOM well-prepared for seasonal natural disasters that occur in our homeland, such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires. For example, in August 2007, Hurricane Dean threatened the United States Gulf Coast as a Category V storm. In anticipation of the significant threat posed by the storm and the possibility of a Presidential Emergency Declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, USNORTHCOM quickly responded, including the following:

- Established direct linkage to the Texas and Puerto Rico state Emergency Operations Centers and the Adjutants General Joint Task Force Headquarters.
- Activated our Future Operations Center.

- Pre-deployed Defense Coordinating Officers and their staffs to St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II) and Corpus Christi, Texas (FEMA Region VI) in coordination with DHS (FEMA).
- Coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command to transport the FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support vehicles from Westover, Massachusetts, to Puerto Rico to provide emergency communications support to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, if necessary.
- Developed the first-ever validated transportation plan for a pre-hurricane evacuation of citizens from Texas and Louisiana.
- Prepositioned Mobile Aero-Medical Staging Facility teams in south Texas, prepared to evacuate special needs medical patients.

As Hurricane Dean advanced across the Western Caribbean and gained strength, the state of Texas requested activation of the National Disaster Medical System and the President approved a pre-landfall Emergency Declaration for Texas. We had already anticipated these developments and, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, prepared to assist in the immediate general air evacuation of up to 26,000 people from the Rio Grande River Valley. As it turned out, Hurricane Dean made landfall on the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico on 21 August 2007 and did not reach the United States. However, if the storm had made landfall in Texas or elsewhere along the U.S. Gulf Coast as some storm models predicted, we were positioned to assist state and local authorities in all aspects of disaster response.

Last fall, we quickly provided the DOD response to help fight the fast-moving, Santa Ana-driven wildfires that threatened hundreds of thousands of California residents. To help save lives and protect homes, we:

- Deployed a Defense Coordinating Officer and staff element to facilitate federal response efforts;
- Deployed U.S. Army North's Operational Command Post to command and control Title 10 forces engaged in assisting state and local authorities, as well as a Mobile Air Staging Facility to process any potential casualties, especially burn patients;
- Tasked, in coordination with the National Guard and Reserves, six Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS). MAFFS-equipped, C-130 aircraft flew a total of 76 sorties, dropping retardant to help contain the fires;
- Employed Incident Awareness and Assessment assets that provided critical imagery for local responders.

This was a historical first-use of a DOD unmanned aerial system, the Global Hawk, for a Defense Support of Civil Authorities event. It identified fifty additional hotspots, enabling local responders to optimize the firefighting locations. We conducted these Incident Awareness and Assessment activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations. USNORTHCOM employment of three Incident Awareness and Assessment / Full Motion Video communications suites enabled the Command to receive real-time video from incident sites and then disseminate unclassified video to all of our partners via the Internet.

In summary, USNORTHCOM remains vigilant and ready to respond to all types of disasters, large or small. Our support even extended to several small-scale events, such as the Minnesota I-35 bridge collapse and the Utah mine collapse. When the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi between downtown Minneapolis and St. Paul collapsed into the river in August 2007, killing several people and injuring many more, we responded. In support of Minnesota

Governor Pawlenty's request, USNORTHCOM deployed the FEMA Region V Defense Coordinating Officer and coordinated with U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Navy for the deployment of underwater salvage capabilities to support federal (Department of Transportation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) assistance to the state and local efforts at the scene.

Just five days later, when a portion of the Genwal Coal Mine collapsed in central Utah, trapping six miners approximately 1500 feet below the surface and 4 miles from the mine entrance, we responded again. USNORTHCOM, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, synchronized the delivery of the Department of Labor's Seismic Detection equipment to the incident site.

Our Operational Response—Homeland Defense is Job One

Although USNORTHCOM is better known for coordinating the DOD response to disasters in our AOR, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD remain vigilant in our number one responsibility, homeland defense. Through our operational missile defense program, maritime and air defense activities, both Commands are vigilant and maintain a high state of readiness to respond as necessary against man-made threats.

USNORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations within our AOR and Hawaii to protect the homeland, allies, and other national interests from potentially hostile acts. We have made great strides in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) capability and have fielded 23 Ground-Based Interceptors and additional sensor capability standing ready to defend the United States' and its allies' infrastructure and population centers, if needed.

Last year, I testified that I would do my best to make sure Missile Defense flight tests realistically reflect USNORTHCOM's operational environment. In September 2007, I personally participated in a flight test conducted by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which successfully demonstrated the GMD's warfighting capability. We are also working with MDA to develop systems such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle program, the 21-inch SM-3 program, and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense program. These improved capabilities will significantly enhance our nation's protective shield against missile threats.

For over six years now, NORAD has executed Operation NOBLE EAGLE and provided the air defense of the United States and Canada through airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, air patrols, and the unique National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. We have flown over 48,000 sorties for this operation, and appreciate the National Guard's contribution of flying over 70 percent of these sorties. We continue to fly irregular air patrols to achieve a balance between readiness and sustainability while assuring the defense of our homelands. Despite a grounding of 37% of the U.S. Air Force F-15s due to structural cracks in aging airframes, NORAD air defense fighters remain mission-capable and on alert protecting North America. And reflective of the enduring nature of the NORAD Agreement, during the initial phase of the F-15 grounding, Canadian F-18s seamlessly supported NORAD's Northern Sovereignty Operations.

While our mission requirements are now being met by other aircraft with similar capabilities, such as the F-16s and F-22s, this places an operational strain on the globally-committed F-16s and F-22s. Maritime patrols of our homeland have similar operational challenges, due to the grounding of U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft caused by deterioration of airframes. As such, we strongly support the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy efforts to recapitalize the air

defense and maritime patrol aircraft to keep our nation safe and ensure future homeland defense missions are supported at the required levels.

In the National Capital Region, NORAD continues to improve the robust air- and ground-based air defense system. Improvements to aircraft surveillance systems and close coordination with our interagency partners have resulted in quicker detection and identification of intruders into the protected airspace around Washington DC. In addition to the alert fighters at Andrews AFB, the U.S. Coast Guard supports NORAD with alert helicopters to intercept low-and-slow aircraft in the National Capital Region. NORAD's ability to detect and deter intrusions to the National Capital Region will be further enhanced in the coming year by the interagency effort to delineate the airspace around the region. This rule-making effort is critical to the long-term goal of securing the skies over the nation's capital.

In January 2008, NORAD and USNORTHCOM provided DOD support to the President's 2008 State of the Union Address, designated as a National Special Security Event. We provided unique DOD capabilities, including small medical teams of advanced cardiac and trauma life support teams and the Initial Response Force of the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. We are currently planning support for two other National Special Security Events: the Democratic National Convention, 24-28 August 2008, in Denver, Colorado and the Republican National Convention, 1-4 September 2008, in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.

USNORTHCOM and U.S. Coast Guard coordinate operations in multiple national defense mission areas: maritime intercept operations, mine countermeasure operations, maritime security and defense, theater security cooperation, and environmental defense operations. Twenty U.S. Coast Guard personnel are integrated within the USNORTHCOM staff, and the Command is fully engaged with U.S. Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic Area commands in

maritime planning and execution. Although maritime defense operations are not widely publicized, this quiet mission remains a strong deterrent capability for our nation. In any given month, our Command tracks, and in partnership with DHS and other DOD agencies, takes appropriate measures to ensure these potential threats do not reach our shores:

- 40 foreign flag vessels with potential for intelligence gathering
- 25 vessels of interest to law enforcement (potential contraband)
- 8 foreign nation warships entering USNORTHCOM's AOR
- 100 regulatory vessels (containing hazardous materials or other dangerous cargo)
- 7 vessels of interest to our national security

Our Command also supports DHS in the conduct of port security operations, and we developed plans enabling a rapid response to Secretary of Defense-approved requests for assistance. A significant challenge for port security is our ability to counter underwater mines. An underwater explosive device, either purpose-built or improvised, is a credible threat that could have huge consequences for our nation's port facilities, and would prompt an expensive and challenging recovery effort. The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan tasks DOD as the lead agency for mine countermeasures in the maritime domain with USNORTHCOM assigned that responsibility for the Continental United States. USNORTHCOM, in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, will employ tailored, rapidly deployable forces to respond to a domestic mine incident to re-establish maritime commerce in an expeditious manner balanced with acceptable risk.

The trafficking of illegal drugs continues to be a threat to national security. While our interagency partners have scored record seizures of illegal drugs this year, drugs continue to flow across our northern and southern borders. USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N)

supports law enforcement agencies and ensures unity of effort between Title 10 and Reserve Component forces and those National Guard forces operating under state control (Title 32). Through JTF-N's missions and activities, we continue to sustain important relationships with federal law enforcement agencies and National Guard counterdrug task forces engaged in securing our nation's borders against drug traffickers and their associated activities.

Partnering with Reserve Forces

We understand the vital contributions of the National Guard and Reserves and are firmly committed to helping reconstitute and improve the Reserve Component's operational capabilities. It is in our nation's best interests to enable the states and federal authorities to have the robust resources they need in times of catastrophic events.

Toward that end, USNORTHCOM has been closely coordinating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet milestones laid out in the DOD implementation plan for recommendations made by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Second Report (1 March 2007), and will do so as well for the Final Report (31 January 2008). Much of what has been said in the press about the nation's ability to defend itself is not correct. I agree that USNORTHCOM's plans can always be improved; however, make no mistake—we are trained, ready and prepared to defend our homeland. I look forward to providing my perspective on some of the more significant recommendations made by the Commission in the Final Report.

Specifically, I take exception to the recommendation regarding governors directing federal forces. USNORTHCOM is committed to supporting governors. Based on the Secretary's direction, we have numerous options that allow federal forces to assist state

emergency response personnel in order to have a coordinated response to domestic catastrophes and other emergency operations. USNORTHCOM's role is clear—we respond in support of governors, adjutants general, and designated federal agencies.

I also believe the Commission's recommendation regarding USNORTHCOM staff qualifications is unnecessary. The Commission recommends that *"a majority of U.S. Northern Command's billets, including those for its service component commands, should be filled by leaders and staff with reserve qualifications and credentials. Job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at NORTHCOM should contain the requirement of significant Reserve or National Guard experience or service."* In fact, this already occurs. This recommendation does not reflect the fact that in addition to the nearly 50 full-time National Guard officers we have in USNORTHCOM, 46% of USNORTHCOM service members have previous experience working with National Guard and Reservist personnel and units. I have six two-star National Guard and Reserve officers who serve as my Chief of Staff, subordinate commanders and direct advisors. Virtually all of my air component and a large percentage of my land component are Guardsmen or Reservists. Thus, while we can always improve, and we will, I am satisfied that we possess sufficient experience levels to provide timely and effective support to the states.

Furthermore, I take my role as the Combatant Commander advocate for the Reserve Component very seriously. This advocacy role was also one of the many recommendations in the second report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves that has been implemented throughout the DOD. In each of USNORTHCOM's annual Integrated Priority List and Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, we advocate for and support correcting Guard and Reserve capability shortfalls for both federal and non-federal roles. USNORTHCOM also advocated for and supported NGB efforts to validate key initiatives such

as Joint Force Headquarters-State and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages through DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council. We advocate for changes to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel and training for civil support operations.

Lessons learned during past events serve to underscore the importance of providing training and education opportunities to members of the National Guard including potential Joint Task Force-State Commanders, Commanders of Joint Force Headquarters-State and their respective staffs. At the request of the National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM eagerly took the task to further develop these important National Guard Joint Task Force capabilities. Upon completion of training, participants are better able to conduct and support operations across the entire operational spectrum (State Active Duty, Title 32 status and Title 10 status). In the past year, this program trained over 750 students; in 2008 we plan to train up to 1,000 students.

Three years ago, USNORTHCOM, NGB and U.S. Joint Forces Command launched a combined initiative entitled Joint Force Orientation. The primary objective of this program is to facilitate a mutual understanding of joint operational concepts and information sharing between states, territories and USNORTHCOM. The program currently uses two avenues for reaching the states. The first engagement is a two-day conference held at HQ USNORTHCOM targeting senior civilian and National Guard leadership from states within a FEMA region. The second engagement consists of a team from USNORTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N) traveling to a state's Joint Force Headquarters. To date, USNORTHCOM has engaged all 54 states and territories through the two-day conference and our SJFHQ-N team has traveled to 23 states and territories for individual state engagements, the most recent being New

Hampshire in early February. State feedback has been extremely positive, reflecting the value and importance of a USNORTHCOM-state mission partnership that is based on mutual trust.

We support proposed DOD legislative changes regarding the expanded employment of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Coast Guard Reservists in the homeland. Normally, these Reservists are only available for civil emergencies while in voluntary Inactive Duty for Training status. To eliminate this restriction, we ask for your support of DOD's FY09 legislative proposals that will allow the President to order Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Coast Guard Reservists to Active Duty to provide assistance in large-scale man-made, natural and accidental disasters or catastrophes when the response capabilities of federal, state and local civilian agencies have been, or will be, exceeded. For example, a third of the Army's medical capabilities are resident with the Army Reserve. By enacting the legislative changes, these medical capabilities would also be available in the case of a domestic disaster or emergency. The bottom line is that enactment of these legislative proposals will increase the source of force options available to the President to support the governors and likely decrease the need to federalize National Guard forces.

Partnering with States and Territories

Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the American people obtain assistance during times of need, whether at the international, interagency, or state and local level. Our nation's governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of their state and we respect that authority. Our job is to support our nation's governors in their leadership role to respond to emergency situations and threats in their states.

We are expanding working relationships with the State Adjutants General. Since taking command, I have personally met with 19 Governors, 32 state Adjutants General and 25 Emergency Management Directors. In 2007, our Command hosted many Adjutants General, including members of the Adjutants General Association Homeland Security Committee, in forums designed to increase information sharing, promote unity of effort and facilitate mutual advocacy. I have also addressed the annual meeting of the National Guard Association of the United States and the Adjutant General Association's Winter Meeting. In each instance, my message is the same: Our forces are trained, equipped and ready to support the needs of a state when disaster strikes or during special security events, and we do it in direct support of the governor, his or her Adjutant General, and the primary federal agency. In the years since Katrina, we have built much stronger mutual understanding and respect between USNORTHCOM and the State Adjutants General as we work together during exercises and real-world incidents.

Partnering with the Interagency Community

USNORTHCOM supports and enables other agencies in our common objectives of homeland defense and civil support. Our NORAD and USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate and the Commander's Joint Interagency Coordination Group integrate and synchronize activities of multiple civilian, federal, state and private sector organizations. The group includes 60 full-time people from 40 other federal and DOD-supporting agencies resident at USNORTHCOM. Among the federal agencies are DHS (FEMA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Coast Guard), Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Transportation

Security Administration, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological Survey, and the Central Intelligence Agency. We also integrate similar expertise from five Canadian agencies.

Cooperation with DHS on requirements, science and technology is a key aspect of our partnership. Improvements in coordination have led to a forward-leaning, anticipatory, operational sequence that reacts quickly to requests for assistance from civil authorities, as approved by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

USNORTHCOM closely coordinates and cooperates with FEMA in a number of areas related to the planning process. DOD liaison officers from USNORTHCOM, the Joint Director of Military Support, and the National Guard Bureau have been assigned to FEMA Headquarters. These experts help ensure effective coordination of activities, provide advice, and facilitate relationship building. We maintain visibility of FEMA's logistical preparations and Defense Logistics Agency-sourced deliveries. This improves situational awareness, helps reduce the need for short-notice airlifts and improves our ability to anticipate and rapidly respond to emerging requirements during civil support missions.

Additionally, USNORTHCOM assigned Defense Coordinating Officers, supported by a six-person Defense Coordinating Element, to each of FEMA's 10 Regions to ensure close coordination in planning. FEMA and USNORTHCOM also co-sponsor an annual Federal Coordinating Officer–Defense Coordinating Officer Conference that maintains and enhances civilian-military understanding and support for planning and disaster response activities.

During the 2007 Hurricane season, USNORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation Command provided in-depth evacuation planning assistance to FEMA Headquarters and Region VI planners, resulting in an updated Louisiana Hurricane Plan. We have maintained this planning momentum throughout the off-season to prepare for the 2008 hurricane season through

involvement in FEMA's Joint Coordination Evacuation Planning teleconferences. Additionally, we volunteered to assist FEMA in the development of their 2008 Hurricane CONPLAN. We are also in the midst of coordinating a 2008 Hurricane Transportation Planning Conference for DOD and federal partners.

Working with the DHS Private Sector Office, we have facilitated appropriate relationships for planning with the private sector (business, non-profit, non-governmental, faith-based and academia) to promote mutual understanding, situational awareness, and unity of effort for homeland defense and civil support arenas, including hurricane and other natural disaster support. For instance, we have a particularly strong relationship with the American Red Cross. They participate in our Joint Interagency Coordination Group and we maintain close contact with their representatives to coordinate actions during real-world contingencies and exercises.

One of our primary goals is to ensure DOD is prepared to provide a prompt and effective health services support response to homeland events as delineated in the 15 National Planning Scenarios. To meet this goal, we are working hard to:

- Improve synchronized medical pre-event planning with public, private and federal partners through participation in exercises, working groups and planning efforts.
- Encourage paradigm shifts in the provision of health services support, presenting alternative solutions to event preparation and execution, e.g., Shelter-in-Place planning versus sole reliance on Strategic Air Evacuation during a hurricane event.
- Enhance utilization of our Joint Regional Medical Planners at all levels of medical planning, providing greater visibility of state and local plans while also working to fully train and integrate National Guard Joint Regional Medical Planners to bridge the gaps in synchronization between Title 32 and Title 10 medical support.

- Improve unity of effort for health services support with our international medical partners in Canada and Mexico, coordinating planning efforts for cross-border events.
- Refine National Disaster Medical System planning in our organizational plans to improve and increase DOD's capability to evacuate patients through a well-coordinated effort among Active, Guard and Reserve Component personnel.

Partnering with Canada and Mexico

The DOD Security Cooperation Guidance's top priority is to build the capacity of allies and partners to help win the Global War on Terror by enhancing coordination with our continental neighbors. In 2007, USNORTHCOM, NORAD and Canada Command initiated a study to examine future roles, missions, and relationships for the three commands, with a desired end state of increasing North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between the United States and Canada. The study will focus on strengthening the U.S. and Canadian armed forces' ability to act in a timely and coordinated fashion to identify, deter, disrupt, and defeat threats to the United States and Canada in all domains and to provide timely, effective, and efficient support of civil authorities as directed.

The development of USNORTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy and Implementation Plan have significantly strengthened our relationship with our Mexican defense and interagency counterparts. In 2007, USNORTHCOM hosted high-level members of the Mexican military and interagency community to improve their understanding of our mission in defending the U.S. homeland, while fostering trust and confidence.

The government of Mexico has undertaken an unprecedented war against narco-violence and organized criminal groups, which has been accompanied by improving Mexican interagency

relations, with new partnerships being born between the Mexican military and police. The Merida Initiative captures an opportunity with our critical neighbor to jointly confront the threat of narcotics trafficking and organized crime. We are hopeful that Congress will be able to move this initiative forward this year.

We greatly appreciate Congress' action to lift American Servicemembers Protection Act sanctions in the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. Your action removed long-standing barriers to enhancing our ability to build partner capacity to effectively counter threats such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking in North America by modernizing Mexico's capabilities and improving interoperability against common threats. In support of the Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap, we are already collaborating with other U.S. and Mexican governmental agencies to enhance emergency preparedness and response activities along the southern border.

While much progress has been made, building partnership capacity is an area that still requires additional Congressional support. There are serious shortfalls in the U.S. Government's ability to help build the capacity of foreign partners—both within and outside DOD. The Departments of State and Defense conducted a systematic review of gaps in authority and developed an omnibus bill called the Building Global Partnerships Act, which was personally brokered by the Secretaries of State and Defense. I strongly urge Congress to enact all of these authorities. Building partner capacity is fundamental to our national security strategy and will make our nation safer.

Improving Our Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities

As part of the larger DOD effort to assess its roles, missions, capabilities and resources needed to combat threats to our homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are leading a

comprehensive homeland defense and civil support Capabilities-Based Assessment. This Assessment will define DOD's core capability requirements in our AOR; evaluate existing capabilities; understand capability interdependencies; and determine where gaps, excesses, and redundancies exist and prioritize them to help inform the Department's decisions on risk management and resourcing in a limited resource environment. DHS and the NGB are playing an integral role throughout this analytical effort. Most importantly, DHS will lead the effort to define the contributions of non-DOD agencies to homeland defense and civil support, thus identifying DOD's capability requirements as well as facilitating DHS's continued actions under Homeland Security Presidential Directive "National Preparedness" (HSPD-8).

USNORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center North (JIOC-N) relies on collaborative Intelligence Community networks to gain insight and understanding of emerging international terrorist and strategic threats to North America. Recognizing the challenges of sharing information across agencies and with partner nations, JIOC-N continues teaming efforts with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. Additionally, as a result of lessons learned during the USNORTHCOM response to the California wildfires, JIOC-N is working to centralize the sharing of critical imagery and geospatial information to support first responders and deployed DOD personnel responding to crises.

To effectively execute our missions, NORAD and USNORTHCOM rely on the uninterrupted use of the internet and communications systems that comprise our nation's cyber infrastructure. There are a variety of global actors who threaten the security of commercial and government cyber infrastructure. To reduce vulnerabilities and defend against cyber

infrastructure attacks, we are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Strategic Command.

Space situational awareness is essential to our ability to predict threats from space. Distinguishing a foreign space launch from a missile launch is central to our nation's defense and NORAD requires this space data to determine if North America is under attack. Similarly, the re-entry of a spent rocket body over North America has consequence management implications for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Having a window from which to view space activities enables us to have an overall picture of the next threat to North America. There are over 17,000 man-made objects orbiting earth and thousands more we cannot track. There are eight nations able to launch their own spacecraft and a few that are perfecting this technology. At the same time, there are commercial assets that could—even if unwittingly—launch a malicious payload into space. Saying "don't know what we don't know" is not good enough. I recommend that Congress support the efforts of U.S. Strategic Command to enhance our space situational awareness capability. NORAD requires survivable, protected and dynamic tactical satellite communications capabilities throughout our area of operations, including coverage of the northern Polar Regions. USNORTHCOM requires dynamic satellite communications for capacity and coverage throughout our entire area of responsibility that will support real-time joint force networking, battle space awareness and land air, and sea-borne Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Both Commands' networks must seamlessly bridge with federal, state, and local agencies. In our view, transformational satellites offer the most viable course of action to satisfy our requirements for high-speed, secure, protected, dynamically-allocated and efficiently-utilized communications.

USNORTHCOM communications efforts are focused on ensuring DOD is completely interoperable with our partners in DHS, FEMA, the National Guard, states and local organizations to rapidly and effectively share information to ensure a prompt, coordinated response. We made advances in the area of deployable communications by aggressively addressing shortfalls identified during the response to Hurricane Katrina. In partnership with FEMA and the National Guard, we now have a combined total of 25 Deployable Cellular-Based Suites which include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices for emergency responders. All of the suites are interoperable and can be immediately deployed to an incident site to provide reliable communications for civil authorities.

In 2007, we published our Concept of Operations for Domestic Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Operations, which explains how USNORTHCOM envisions domestic employment of DOD UASs to help accomplish our missions of homeland defense and civil support. UASs will be employed in homeland defense missions to accomplish Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, communications, and CBRNE detection. Civil support applications of UASs include Incident Awareness and Assessment, communications, search and rescue, and CBRNE detection.

Beyond our efforts to solve interoperable communications challenges, we must also resolve challenges with our surveillance radars. Inhibitors to these systems significantly impact our situational awareness and threat detection capability.

The U.S.-Canada Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy is the NORAD and USNORTHCOM centerpiece strategy for improving wide area surveillance of the North American continent. Current surveillance gaps leave our countries vulnerable to attacks in multiple domains. We are

conducting a Command and Control Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) and are developing a Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar JCTD candidate as near-term steps in the strategy to achieve eventual full operational deployment. These technology demonstrations will focus on integrating surveillance sensor data in a developmental command and control system, fielding an enhanced sensor data fusion correlation system at the Continental U.S. NORAD Region Air Operations Center, and operationalizing a more capable wide area surveillance radar system for the homelands.

Our nation lacks an integrated air and missile defense of the homeland against cruise missiles, low-flying aircraft and short-range ballistic missile attacks. As the threat of terrorism looms and the proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, I recommend the Department of Defense initiate the development of a truly integrated air and missile defense system-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the homeland. This system-of-systems must allow for military action to protect the homeland and our citizens against surprise attack while operating within the constraints appropriate to protect our way of life and national freedoms.

The Maritime Domain Awareness Concept of Operations and Interagency Investment Strategy, advocated by NORAD and USNORTHCOM and, approved this past year, provides an interagency way ahead to continue to improve maritime awareness in this vital domain. USNORTHCOM directly supports the newly established Global Maritime Situational Awareness Office and also coordinates with the Global Maritime and Air Intelligence Integration office in their efforts to improve awareness. USNORTHCOM has worked extensively with U.S. Joint Forces Command to conduct an experimentation series to further understand the current maritime domain awareness practices and allow evaluation of future ideas.

Since Maritime Warning was added to the NORAD Agreement in 2006, mission development has steadily progressed, with the planning staff working in cooperation with several external agencies in the United States and Canada. Building upon the initial maritime warning capability established in late 2006, our staff prepared a strategic concept that will set the framework to establish and formalize agreements for improved maritime information sharing, to ensure a comprehensive shared understanding between both nations, and to institute the Maritime Warning process.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD continually evaluate global changes that may impact our continental security. One area of concern recognized by the United States government and DOD is the need to study the implications of Arctic climate change and how it will affect our military capabilities, organizations, and infrastructure in the area. Our homeland defense and civil support plans address the DOD response to potential effects of climate change. We support prudent steps to strengthen our nation's disaster preparedness regardless of the political debate on climate change. We are grateful for Congress' direction in the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act that the next National Security Strategy and the new National Defense Strategy include guidance for military planners to assess the risks of projected climate change to current and future missions of the armed forces. We also urge the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, as it will enable the U.S. to be party to the adjudicating body which will determine rights to the region's resources.

There is no doubt future threats will look to exploit seams and vulnerabilities. Our Commands must close seams, eliminate vulnerabilities and enhance security so as to meet evolving challenges that are associated with an interconnected world. Achieving a truly seamless security posture is our perpetual objective.

Conclusion

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are steadfastly committed to our mission of defending our homelands, and we know we cannot fail. Through continued emphasis on anticipating and preparing for all-hazards response with our mission partners, strengthening relationships with our mission partners, improving our homeland defense and civil support capabilities and anticipating future impacts to our continental security, we are on the right path for a secure nation.

Our committed team of active duty members, civilians, Reserve Component Forces, Canadian personnel, interagency personnel and contractors is trained, ready and vigilant in our missions to defend our homelands and provide civil support. We appreciate the Subcommittee's efforts to ensure our men and women in uniform continue to have the best possible equipment, education, training and care for their families. We applaud the President's call for Congress to enact legislation to allow U.S. servicemembers to transfer their education benefits to family members, to expand access to childcare for military families, and to increase government employment opportunities and funding for professional certification for military spouses. If enacted, these initiatives will greatly help military families cope with the challenges they face with frequent moves. We also strongly encourage support for the life-long needs of our Wounded Warriors—it is an obligation our nation must meet. With Congress' sustained support, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to protect and defend our fellow citizens and the freedoms they enjoy.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 5, 2008

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please share your views about the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Guard and Reserves with regards to NORTHCOM and the homeland defense/civil support mission.

General RENUART. The Secretary of Defense has directed a comprehensive review of the final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. USNORTHCOM is actively participating in the DOD Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Working Group tasked to evaluate each of the 95 recommendations and propose implementation guidance or alternative approaches for the Secretary of Defense's consideration. USNORTHCOM is prepared to implement DOD guidance as directed.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, the Commission criticized NORTHCOM's contingency planning performance. Please comment.

General RENUART. I do not agree with the assessment that USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNET) Consequence Management (CM) is inadequate. CONPLAN 3500 is the DOD strategic plan for a CBRNE event, which includes a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction incident, in support of the overall state and federal response. USNORTHCOM's plan accounts for the National Guard CBRNE response capabilities either resident in each state or supplied from other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact process. These National Guard response forces will operate under the command and control of the Governor. If a catastrophic incident exceeds the state's capabilities, CONPLAN 3500 is designed to quickly deploy thousands of active duty forces to fill capability gaps and support the Governor-controlled state response.

USNORTHCOM's planning process begins with mission analysis and development and refinement of a course of action. Our plans undergo a minimum of three rounds of coordination within the Command, as well as with interagency representatives and the National Guard Bureau. During this development process, Commander, USNORTHCOM presents the Secretary of Defense with In-Progress Reviews of the Mission Analysis, Course of Action Development and the final plan.

The most recent version of CONPLAN 3500 was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 11 May 2007. Before the Secretary approved the final version, it was staffed through the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC), which includes the Joint Staff, the Services, Combat Support Agencies, and other combatant commands. In addition, once the Secretary approved the plan, it began a revision cycle in accordance with the DOD Adaptive Planning process to maintain relevant, living plans. This includes a complete reassessment of the plan to ensure it remains current and consistent with strategic guidance and planning assumptions. As such, CONPLAN 3500 for CBRNE Consequence Management has been reviewed by the JPEC three times since May 2007, and will undergo a complete reassessment in 2008.

In terms of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), USNORTHCOM aggressively plans for catastrophic events such as hurricanes and wildfires by incorporating lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Dean, and most recently the Southern California wildfires. We have made significant impact to DSCA planning and execution by manning Defense Coordinating Officer positions with dedicated full-time senior officers who are linked with their civilian counterparts in the respective FEMA regions. Through comprehensive lessons learned analysis, exercises, and partnering in gap analysis of local, state, and federal response capabilities, USNORTHCOM makes planning recommendations to improve DOD responsiveness when a request for assistance is received from a primary agency such as FEMA. These planning recommendations culminated in revisions to the Joint Staff DSCA Execute Order (EXORD), which is reviewed and updated annually by the DOD. This important tool ultimately improves our ability to anticipate and respond in a timely and effective manner across the spectrum of DSCA events.

With regards to wild land fire fighting, USNORTHCOM goes to great lengths to plan for each wild land fire fighting season. Starting with the USNORTHCOM-hosted Post Wild Land Fire Fighting Conference, we work year-round with the U.S.

Forest Service, the National Interagency Fire Center, the Air National Guard and Reserves, as well as a host of other interagency partners to plan and prepare to provide DOD Fire Fighting capabilities when requested. This planning effort culminates each spring with the publication of the USNORTHCOM Wild Land Fire Fighting EXORD. Among the DOD capabilities available in this EXORD are the C–130 Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System, helicopters capable of using "Bambi" buckets for water drops, and personnel to staff ground fire fighting battalions. The response to the Southern California Wildfires of 2007 shows that USNORTHCOM's planning is effective, and that we continually assess and improve our response process to aid local, state and federal wild land fire fighting efforts.

Finally, USNORTHCOM plans are evaluated primarily through yearly exercises. In May 2007, USNORTHCOM successfully exercised the first-ever substantial CBRNE CM Response Force (CCMRF) deployment during Exercise ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHERN EDGE 07, and will continue annual exercises of these capabilities to maintain critical readiness. USNORTHCOM also conducts Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed plan capability assessments in accordance with the Joint Combat Capability Assessment process. These assessments require force providers to identify specific forces that would be used to respond to a CBRNE incident. We review the forces for adequacy, proficiently, and timely response capability as we assess the level of risk associated with accomplishing the plan's objectives. We are in the process of completing the second such comprehensive assessment for CONPLAN 3500.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think of the Commission's recommendation to alter the active-reserve mix at NORTHCOM?

General RENUART. I believe the Commission's recommendation regarding USNORTHCOM staff qualifications is unnecessary. I am satisfied that USNORTHCOM personnel possess sufficient experience levels to provide timely and effective support to the states. Currently, 46% of USNORTHCOM service members have previous experience working with National Guard and Reservist personnel and units. This percentage would increase if the Reserve Component were able to fill existing USNORTHCOM National Guard and Reserve vacancies. I currently have 13 full time and 324 part-time Reserve Component (comprised of both National Guard and Reserve forces) positions unfilled. In general, I believe that a broad policy of selecting the most qualified personnel for a position, with the goal of increasing the breadth and depth of Reserve Component experience across the board and placing Guard and Reserve officers in particular positions when warranted and supportable, is appropriate. The Guard and Reserve must adopt a professional development program that grows their officers with the right mix of operational and joint experience to make them competitive for these key positions.

USNORTHCOM is leading an OSD implementation plan working group to implement Recommendation #16 in the Second Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and Sec 1821 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. Progress made by this group will influence the overall response to the latest recommendation in the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on the same subject.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the command-and-control relationship between NORTHCOM and State and local officials during a crisis, consequent management, and/or terrorist incident and provide examples.

General RENUART. When conducting consequence management in support of state and local officials, USNORTHCOM is part of a coordinated federal response under the National Response Framework (NRF) and the comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). Under this structure, USNORTHCOM provides support requested by state and local officials, through the primary federal agency. The scope and focus of each mission is controlled by the state's initial request to the primary federal agency, and the subsequent request for support from the primary federal agency through DOD to USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM remains, at all times, under the command and control (C2) of the Secretary of Defense. Within the general parameters of the approved mission and keeping the integrity of its federal C2, USNORTHCOM coordinates with the on-site state or local commander, and responds to the developing needs of the situation.

USNORTHCOM's support to the collapse of the I–35W Bridge between downtown Minneapolis and St. Paul is an example of this process. USNORTHCOM deployed its Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V Defense Coordinating Officer, who worked closely with federal, state and local officials to determine the type and extent of DOD support needed. When state and local officials to determine the type and extent of DOD support needed. When state and local officials requested underwater salvage capabilities. USNORTHCOM coordinated with the U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Navy to deploy underwater specialists. At the scene,

while the Defense Coordinating Officer and Navy divers remained under a federal C2, they responded to and coordinated with the County Sheriff, who remained in control of the on-scene operations. USNORTHCOM responded to the 2007 Southern California wildfires using this same structure. For instance, the Incident Awareness and Assessment assets USNORTHCOM employed to provide critical imagery to local responders remained under federal C2, but were employed only after comprehensive coordination with state and local officials, with the sole objective to provide the precise support local responders needed to effectively fight the fires.

The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or threats within the United States. When requested by the Attorney General and approved by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides support to the Attorney General, remaining under a federal military C2, responding typically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what are among the most stressing scenarios under which NORTHCOM personnel have exercised? In other words, which scenarios offer the most risk to our Nation?

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what are the 15 different national planning scenarios? Can you describe them?

General RENUART. In November 2003, the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began developing the 15 all-hazards National Planning Scenarios (NPS). The objective was to develop the minimum number of scenarios required to test the range of required prevention, protection, response, and recovery resources. They serve as the foundation for the development of homeland security tasks, required capabilities, and standards against which capabilities will be measured. The scenario-derived standards serve as a basis for assessing national preparedness; help guide federal preparedness assistance to state, local, and tribal governments; and to develop national exercises and training programs. The scenarios are:

Scenario 1: **Nuclear Detonation—Improvised Nuclear Device**
Scenario 2: **Biological Attack—Aerosol Anthrax**
Scenario 3: **Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic Influenza**
Scenario 4: **Biological Attack—Pneumonic Plague**
Scenario 5: **Chemical Attack—Blister Agent**
Scenario 6: **Chemical Attack—Toxic Industrial Chemicals**
Scenario 7: **Chemical Attack—Nerve Agent**
Scenario 8: **Chemical Attack—Chlorine Tank Explosion**
Scenario 9: **Natural Disaster—Major Earthquake**
Scenario 10: **Natural Disaster—Major Hurricane**
Scenario 11: **Radiological Attack—Radiological Dispersal Devices**
Scenario 12: **Explosives Attack—Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device**
Scenario 13: **Biological Attack—Food Contamination**
Scenario 14: **Biological Attack—Foreign Animal Disease**
Scenario 15: **Cyber Attack**

The 15 NPS are an integral component of DHS's capabilities-based approach to implementing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: *National Preparedness* (HSPD–8) (2003) and HSPD 8, Annex 1, National Planning (December 2007). HSPD 8, Annex 1, directs the Secretary DHS to develop a standardized federal planning process by developing an Integrated Planning System. It mandates a unified and comprehensive approach to national planning for the 15 NPS with DHS in the lead, and DOD, as well as the other federal agencies, in support. DOD's role is to plan to support the DHS overarching national plans. Since November 2007, USNORTHCOM planners have coordinated closely and frequently with the DHS Incident Management Planning Team to facilitate success in this effort. USNORTHCOM is adding specific appendices to our Concept Plans for the appropriate NPS, which have been aggregated, to improve planning, into eight sets of related scenarios.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the various missions of the National Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs), the CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs). How does NORTHCOM envision employment of such forces during times of crises?

General RENUART. The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) detect and identify CBRNE agents/substances, assess and advise the local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist with

requests for other forces (i.e. CERFPs). They are a 22-person response unit located in each state and territory (55 total, 53 of which are certified) that performs an initial assessment of a CBRNE incident. These units are full time, congressionally authorized, federally funded, and fall under the command and control of the governor.

CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform medical triage and treatment, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination. Each of these units is a task force of between 200 and 400 personnel, composed of an Army battalion or Air Force equivalent C2 element, an Air National Guard Medical Flight, an Army Chemical Company (-) and an Army Engineer Company (-). The 17 CERFPs are congressionally authorized, traditional Guard only, with 4–5 full time personnel per unit, and are located regionally to provide additional support to the WMD–CSTs and the state government. They are capable of decontaminating, performing medical triage, and stabilizing 75 non-ambulatory and 225 ambulatory personnel per hour. The WMD–CSTs and CERFPs support the local and state response to an incident and are not under the command and control of USNORTHCOM.

A CCMRF provides the DOD capability to support the federal response to a request for assistance from a state. CCMRFs consist of roughly 4,000 people in three force packages that are able to respond to a domestic catastrophic CBRNE event. This force is pre-identified from within existing DOD force structure and-is under Operational Control of the Commander, USNORTHCOM. The following outlines the capabilities of the three force packages with additional follow-on forces identified as required:

- Force Package #1 capabilities: Initial C2, Command Assessment Teams, Initial Response Force (Medical, Logistics, Extraction)
- Force Package #2 capabilities: Medical, Decontamination, C2, Transportation and Logistics, Security, Public Affairs
- Force Package #3 capabilities: C2, Transportation, Logistical Support, Mortuary Affairs
- Follow-on Forces: Additional C2, Transportation, Logistics

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please explain the budgeting and funding processes associated with your command. How are requirements established and funding executed?

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM receives funding primarily from the Air Force, our Combatant Command Support Agent, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Upon receipt, funds are distributed to USNORTHCOM headquarters staff sections and subordinate commands. Execution of federally appropriated dollars occurs in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, directives, and instructions.

USNORTHCOM uses a formalized, internal Corporate Deliberative Process to evaluate directorates' and subordinate commands' near- and long-term funding needs against the command mission and strategic guidance. We submit the Commander-approved prioritized requirements—which support mission accomplishment across the Command's entire mission set—to the Combatant Command Support Agent for consideration through the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think is the single, most important contribution of your command to the defense of the Nation?

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM's most important contribution is the integration of all aspects of homeland defense and support to civil authorities. We are an active, engaged Command that pulls together many things that were formerly diffused and scattered in order to prosecute an active layered defense of the homeland and provide effective, timely support to civil authorities. We have strong relationships with our federal partners like, but not limited to, DHS and the National Guard. These relationships offer the opportunity to create unity of effort in our shared national responsibility to defend our homeland against a range of threats—both state and nonstate—extending into all domains.

Additionally, USNORTHCOM is DOD's single integrating location for state and federal response to natural and man-made disasters. We ensure a common picture of air, land, space, and maritime operations in defense of our homeland. Bottom line is that we defend our families, our friends, our communities, and our way of life on the home field

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what do you think is the single greatest challenge to your command and what additional authorities should Congress consider providing to help you succeed in your mission?

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, how has the high operational tempo of the DOD personnel community affected NORTHCOM planning, training and exercise execution? How differently might the command look if such a high number of active and reserve personnel were not regularly deployed overseas?

General RENUART. Since USNORTHCOM has very few assigned forces, the high operational tempo of deployed DOD personnel in support of ongoing operations impacts the Command's ability to train and exercise our two major missions—homeland defense and civil support—using the forces that we would require for an actual event. If the operational tempo of DOD forces decreased, it could potentially result in a larger percentage of DOD forces for USNORTHCOM specific exercises. The elimination of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM requirements would not reduce our steady-state requirement for forces.

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please comment on the relative state of preparedness of the Marines' CBIRF unit. Reports suggest that this unit is in need of training and modernization funding.

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, please share with the committee your vision of CCMRF employment and schedule for the initial operational capability of each. How many personnel do you envision being assigned to each?

General RENUART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, how might our Nation's response have been different on 9/11 and during Hurricane Katrina if NORTHCOM and its current capability had been in place?

General RENUART. I believe that USNORTHCOM contributions and the national response would have been much more responsive and synchronized due to the maturation of the National Response Framework, strong relationships between USNORTHCOM and our federal and state partners, development of Joint Staff Standing Execute Orders (EXORDS), and preparation of prescripted mission assignment lists.

Since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, DOD and USNORTHCOM have acted aggressively, in collaboration with our interagency partners, to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report; and the White House, House of Representatives, and Senate reports on Hurricane Katrina. Today, the Command is prepared to anticipate events and respond in accordance with the tenets of the National Response Framework. Actions taken include:

- Established a rapid intelligence and information-sharing network that spans DOD and several interagency partners, particularly law enforcement agencies
- Established and improved proactive military response capabilities across a wide spectrum of domestic air, ground, and maritime threats to include:
  - Conducted air patrols and deterrence operations above U.S. cities
  - Enhanced maritime domain awareness and warning
  - Enhanced participation as a primary Maritime Operation Threat Response partner
  - Conducted ground missions to secure U.S. airports, protect selected critical infrastructure, and provide support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection to secure the Federal border with Canada
- Established full-time Defense Coordinating Officers in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions to:
  - Build relationships and partnerships with interagency partners
  - Allow quicker response and knowledge of incidents within each FEMA region
- Established the USNORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team
  - Deploys early to establish linkage with the Defense Coordinating Officer and the FEMA Incident Management Assessment Team to ensure:
    - Interagency information sharing
    - Gaps and capabilities that are to be filled or supported by DOD are rapidly identified
    - Interagency unity of effort

- Expanded USNORTHCOM authorities in the Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities Standing EXORD
  - Enables USNORTHCOM to lean forward with the most commonly requested capabilities such as medical, aviation, facilities, and communications
- Developed Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments
  - Reduces staffing time to satisfy Secretary of Defense criteria for legal, lethal, readiness, cost, appropriateness, and risk; staffing done up front
  - Provides common language; Federal agencies understand DOD capabilities
  - Enables each Defense Coordinating Officer to work more efficiently with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer
  - Fulfills a statutory requirement; lesson learned from the White House report on Hurricane Katrina
- Improved engagement with the National Guard for unity of effort
  - Improves interoperability through table top exercises and conferences; USNORTHCOM and National Guard National Hurricane Conference
- Improved engagement with other government agencies
  - Improves planning efforts by providing dedicated DOD representatives to Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, NGB, select Joint Field Offices and Regions
  - Increases exercise participation
  - Establishes a parallel planning relationship with the DHS Incident Management Planning Team and FEMA Current Operations Planning Unit

Mr. SMITH. General Renuart, what is your understanding of the process needed to flow active duty military personnel if a situation requires the potential waiver of the Posse Comitatus Act? Under what scenarios might such consideration be necessary?

General RENUART. Direct military support of civilian law enforcement agencies is very narrowly prescribed under federal law and policy. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) is the principal federal proscription against the use of the federal military to provide such direct support (e.g., search, seize, arrest). The PCA is never waived; specific exceptions to the Act must be invoked. Some notable exceptions include the Insurrection Act, the Presidential Protection Assistance Act, and statutes that authorize the Attorney General to ask for military assistance in the event of crimes involving nuclear, chemical or biological materials.

USNORTHCOM would provide direct military assistance to law enforcement only at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, upon a lawful request by the appropriate law enforcement official (often the Attorney General) to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense would direct, through an execute order, USNORTHCOM to perform the support mission and would provide the forces necessary for such a mission. Scenarios:

- Theft of nuclear material, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation assuming jurisdiction. If the Attorney General determines that the Federal Bureau of Investigation requires military support, a request is made under 18 USC 831.
- Extensive rioting which exceeds the capability of local, state and federal law enforcement to handle. The Los Angeles riot of 1992 is the most recent incident in which the Insurrection Act was invoked.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what additional authorities might you need to better prosecute the GWOT and manage your command?

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM and the other combatant commands need the additional authorities that would be provided by passage of the 19 provisions in the FY09 Building Global Partnerships Act recently submitted to the Hill as draft legislation by Department of Defense. Of particular interest to USSOCOM are the proposals to increase and make permanent the funding authorities for global training and equipping (Sect. 1206) and support for special operations to combat terrorism (Sect. 1208), as well as the expansion globally of the commanders' emergency response program (CERP) funding authority. These and the other provisions of the Act to enhance training, educating, equipping and other support for willing partner

nations are essential if we are to succeed in the indirect approach to the global war on terror.

Additionally, the Commander of USSOCOM is responsible for ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces. With this requirement comes the need for better defined personnel management authorities and readiness reporting frameworks. My staff is currently exploring whether we are using the full extent of our legislated authorities as the Congress and President intended when USSOCOM was established. We are also examining ways to coordinate with the Services in order to better execute our responsibility to maintain readiness in areas to include accessions, assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development, retention, sustainment and training of all special operations forces.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are SOCOM's ISR needs for prosecuting its mission as the overall synchronizer of the GWOT? How much of this requirement is related to areas outside of the CENTCOM AOR? Is the SOCOM ISR requirement balanced between CENTCOM and non-CENTCOM theaters, or is it CENTCOM-centric?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please speak to the issue of dedicated air and ISR assets for non-special mission units, and other regional SOF units. Do you have plans to improve this capability? Could each of the respective services make additional contributions in this area? For example, perhaps the Navy could provide additional rotary-wing support to SOF from sea-going vessels.

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please explain the reasoning for the drop in the FY09 budget request for SOCOM. Is this decrease caused in part because of a delay in baseline service programs on which some SOCOM modernization efforts rely?

Admiral OLSON. Overall, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget request of $5.727 billion is lower than the $6.159 billion FY 2008 budget request, but that is due mainly to the funding surge provided to the command in FY 2008 to begin building the infrastructure and equipping the increased manpower added by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In total, the 2006 QDR added over $9 billion and 13,119 billets to USSOCOM to enhance Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities required to fight the global war on terror, including the standup of a new SOF Component, the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. While the total growth set forth in the QDR will occur through FY 2013, the majority of the Military Construction (MILCON) and equipment requirements were requested as part of the FY 2008 budget.

- There were 21 MILCON projects requested in FY 2008 for QDR infrastructure, as compared to only four in FY 2009. As a result, the MILCON budget request decreased $421 million from FY 2008 to FY 2009.
- The procurement request for SOF-peculiar weapons and communications equipment required to outfit a large percentage of the SOF growth was also requested in FY 2008, resulting in a smaller request in FY 2009. Our aviation procurement requests also decreased due to updated cost estimates and completion of several modifications in FY 2008; as a result, the procurement request decreased by over $372 million in FY 2009.
- A significant portion of USSOCOM's procurement budget is for modification of service-common platforms and systems to meet mission requirements that are peculiar to special operations. Unless such platforms are in the Services' budget requests, the modification funds are not in USSOCOM's request.

While this year's request for the investment accounts has decreased from FY 2008, the request for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) continues to grow. Almost $450 million in additional funding is included to support additional SOF growth across the four components; of this increase, $371 million is for program growth, and will be utilized by the command to grow additional SOF, expand unit and schoolhouse training, and provide additional soldier protection systems such as body armor, protective clothing, and survival equipment.

The Department has been very supportive of SOF since 9/11, and supported all of the resources requested by the command for FY 2009.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, your command has provided an unfunded requirements list of nearly $700 million. Are the items on this list requirements and needs validated by your command?

Admiral OLSON. The items on this list were reviewed and validated through the command, and approved by the Commander. The reason they are on the Unfunded Requirement (UFR) list is due to funding constraints, prioritization, or emergent requirements identified too late for inclusion in the FY 2009 President's Budget.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are the core missions of SOCOM? How does this list compare with the list established in Title 10 more than 20 years ago, and how does Irregular Warfare fit into or affect the SOF mission?

Admiral OLSON. Special Operations core activities today include:

Direct action
Special reconnaissance (formerly strategic reconnaissance)
Unconventional warfare
Foreign internal defense
Civil affairs operations
Counterterrorism
Psychological operations
Information operations (add)
Counter proliferation of WMD (add)
Security force assistance (add)
Counterinsurgency operations (add)
Activities specified by the President or SECDEF

These have changed slightly from the original charter as defense doctrine and definitions have evolved over the last two decades. Additionally, SOCOM Headquarters was given a core activity by the President to synchronize DOD plans and planning for the war on terror.

Irregular Warfare does not affect these core activities. In fact, most of SOF core activities fit into the irregular warfare joint operational concept. Many have suggested that Irregular Warfare be added to SOF core activities, but IW is not an activity but a condition of warfare at the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict from major conventional war. Therefore, it is not, in and of itself an activity but a state of warfare.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please share your views on "1208" or "1202" funding.

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are your views of "1206" funding and general efforts to build partner capacity around the world?

Admiral OLSON. Section 1206 authority has made a big difference in developing carefully selected counterpart forces—it is hard to overstate its importance. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the U.S. to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the global war on terror. Effective partners play a key role in disrupting terrorist networks and other transnational threats around the globe, thereby preventing crises that would otherwise require deployment of U.S. forces. The indirect approach of enabling partners to combat violent extremist organizations addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the environments in which terrorism activities occur. It requires more time than the direct approach to achieve effects, but ultimately it will be the decisive effort in the global war on terror.

Current legislation allows us to address many issues with respect to training and equipping militaries, but this assistance has not kept up with current strategic need. In order to maximize U.S. Government flexibility and efficiency, Section 1206 needs increased funding, expansion to a multi-year appropriation and authority to provide assistance to relevant non-military security forces (i.e., police, Gendarmes, and Border Guards) would improve the effectiveness of this worthwhile program by increasing the U.S. Government's ability to meet time-sensitive requirements to build the capacity of foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations or stability operations in which U.S Armed Forces are a participant.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please discuss the nature of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. How are they similar? How are they different? What challenges are unique to each location?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what can you tell us in this setting about the Afghan-Pakistan border region and the cooperation of the respective Pakistani defense and intelligence communities?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what are your current views on interagency integration not only in direct action missions but also in environments requiring indirect action?

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has a long history of working as a team member with the departments, agencies, bureaus, administrations, and centers of the U.S. government to address mutual problems concerning national security. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, we used this already established relationship to immediately commence actions to counter the threat at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. That work has continued and expanded each year since 2001. It is now a natural and established way of executing our daily work whether we are performing security operations on the streets of Iraq, combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan, or when we are writing and revising our latest strategic plans.

Our plans revolve around five lines of operation. The direct lines are Disrupting Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOS) and Denying access and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by VEOs. Our indirect lines of operation are Enabling partners to combat VEOs, Deter tacit and active support for VEOS, and Erode support for extremist ideologies.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead for the indirect lines and we recognize our supporting role to those agencies who are the leaders as designated in the President's National Implementation Plan. We also recognize that we cannot accomplish the direct lines all by ourselves either. To support this, we've created several new initiatives to further our integration with other agencies in the U.S. government. One example is our week long Global Synchronization Conference held in Tampa, Florida, twice a year and attended by approximately 500 DOD and 100 U.S. government agency members who discuss and recommend the way ahead for numerous aspects of the War on Terrorism. The outbrief for this conference is held a week later and attended by senior interagency leaders.

Another initiative is our Interagency Partnership Program which places USSOCOM personnel full-time at the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy to coordinate and synchronize the planning for mutual tasks in the war on terror.

A third example is the creation of our Interagency Task Forces which combine DOD members and members of other agencies into cohesive full-time organizations to fight the war on terror. The successes of these efforts overseas at the tactical to operational levels drove us to create similar organizations in the United States to address the operational to strategic levels as well.

Are we at the point of perfection? Not yet, but we are very satisfied with our interagency work to date and continue to improve each year. Recent assessments of our GWOT plans have led us to increase our emphasis on supporting the indirect lines of operation through operations, actions, and activities such as our Joint Combined Exchange Training Teams, Civil Military Support Elements, and Military Information Support Teams—to name a few, while maintaining our close attention to the direct lines. As we continue our efforts, we recognize and appreciate the support Congress provides.

Mr. SMITH. Why has our approach not been more productive in defeating AQ and Taliban influences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of significant interest globally? What could be done differently in terms of force structure, authorities and command structures? As the third USSOCOM Commander since 9/11, what will you do differently, and why? How do you define success in this war?

Admiral OLSON. We have not been more productive in defeating al-Qaida (AQ) and Taliban influences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of significant interest globally because we have not yet sufficiently met the challenge of effectively and efficiently implementing the indirect military actions required to defeat the global terrorist threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to increase emphasis on the indirect approach at this time. Within this indirect approach, DOD should increase endeavors to enable our Partner Nations (PN) to help us further reshape the environment around our enemies to reduce their capacity and popular support. In addition, DOD needs to bolster its participation and contributions to the whole-of-government effort, specifically with regard to a reinvigorated strategic communication campaign.

From a strategic perspective, we need to prevent the emergence of new violent extremist threats, particularly those that pose strategic threats to the U.S. and our PNs. To date, we have demonstrated success in this endeavor. Yet, existing extrem-

ist groups continue gaining support and now seek to align themselves with better known "brand names," in an effort to increase their legitimacy among their current and likely constituency. The creation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in Magreb (AQIM) are prime examples of this trend. Increasing our ability to support the development of capable governments in countries with at risk populations, and the development of a PN-focused network capable of delivering culturally effective messages that deter the emergence of new generations of extremist organizations, is vital to long term success in this venue.

Meanwhile we have had mixed results in isolating threats to the regional or local levels, as many violent extremist organizations (VEO) remain as strategic threats. The outcome of the global effort to deprive terrorist organizations of the assets and resources needed to wage war over the long term has been limited. Unfortunately, DOD support to United States Government (USG) and PN actions has neither denied a sufficient number of extremists their access to funds nor their freedom to acquire resources and to recruit adherents and operatives in the global market place.

On the other hand, DOD has been effective in defeating threats once they are isolated, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. VEOs, such as al-Qaeda, have felt the effects of DOD action manifested in significant losses and in precipitating their retreat to sanctuaries as opposed to openly operating among the populace. Yet as fast as we eliminate or capture enemy leaders and fighters, sufficient numbers of recruits and support flow into these organizations. This reality demonstrates the limitation of the direct approach—eliminating enemy combat elements which can be replaced is not enough to achieve long term victory. We must employ additional indirect actions to nullify the extremist networks' strategic capability and capacity to generate and project power.

Likewise, we must prevent the reconstitution of VEOs, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Success depends on the establishment of a PN network that refuses to support extremist organizations or to permit their populations to support terrorism. Many nations continue to develop counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. DOD, however, has been limited in its progress to enable PN CT programs.

While DOD deems enabling PNs to combat VEOs as the decisive military effort in the ongoing struggle, a comprehensive and integrated strategic communication campaign is also critical to countering the appeal of the extremist ideology. DOD must continue working with the U.S. Government lead, the Department of State, to help develop and implement this program. Still, this effort is complicated by the likelihood that almost any publically revealed strategic communication effort linked to DOD will lack legitimacy in the eyes of many targeted populations. As such, DOD and the U.S. Government must also work with PNs to spread the anti-VEO message by amplifying moderate voices that speak out against terrorism.

Finally, to sufficiently meet the global challenge of implementing those indirect military actions required to defeat the terrorist threat, DOD will most likely need to realign resources. Operations designed to remove our enemies' freedom to act and move within vulnerable populations may require a more persistent application over several years. Due to the less tangible nature, the longer approach and the increased challenge of measuring success in these types of operations, patience will be required to reap success.

This reality ties into what needs to be done differently in terms of force structure, authorities and command structures. A major obstacle that needs refinement, especially under the "irregular warfare" umbrella that includes counterterrorism, train-and-assist, stability and reconstruction operations, involves defining roles and missions. Though DOD is the lead in many irregular warfare activities, some of these activities, which would not be termed "warfare", are nested under the lead of other U.S. Government agencies, with DOD playing a supporting role. Therefore, as to roles and missions, we need to clearly define who's going to do what; who's going to have the lead to do what to include the prioritization in which these activities are going to occur and the regions in which they're going to occur; and what access is required, to include access by host nations and our other U.S. Government agencies in order to perform military activities in areas we are not in current conflict and may not expect to be in conflict soon. These accesses will require policy decisions, permissions and authorities for military forces to conduct those kinds of activities.

In the meantime, the continuation of our 1208 (now 1202) authorities for the next three years remains essential to fund the training and equipping of counterpart forces we are engaged with worldwide, including well away from Afghanistan and Iraq. I am also a strong supporter of the 1206 authorities that enable SOCOM to do much important work around the authorities and the building partner capacity act.

As USSOCOM Commander, it is evident that global demand for Special Operations Forces (SOF) exceeds supply, and I anticipate no decrease in demand even as some other U.S. forces eventually drawdown in Iraq. In fact, I expect an increasing demand for SOF as the local environments transition from a larger conventional force presence to smaller train and assist activities, especially considering the continuing deficit of special operations forces in non-U.S. Central Command geographic combatant commanders' areas.

Therefore, as a result of program decisions of the last few years, I am expanding the number of special operators as fast as the command can reasonably absorb the growth. In the long term, I estimate that three-to-five percent per year is about right for SOF military manpower growth. From an equipment standpoint, since much of the equipment used by SOF are initially provided by the Services and then modified to meet the peculiar operational demands of special operators, it is apparent that most of USSOCOM's acquisition programs must be carefully synched with the Services. I am committed this year to exploring my options for making our acquisition systems more responsive.

Finally, to address your question about defining success in this war, upfront I must admit I'm not convinced there's ever going to be a day when we run up the victory flag. This is a different kind of an adversary, much more elusive, living and fighting among the people, and I don't anticipate that it will lead to signing a document aboard the USS Missouri. Our success against al-Qaeda is manifested mostly in the growth of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, trained and equipped to be responsive to local and regional needs within those nations. Success is also a decrease in violent acts, which is a manifestation of a decrease in those who are planning every day to conduct those violent acts against us and our allies. Success, furthermore, is a dismantling of the infrastructure, of the funding lines and the training facilities that contribute to that and an interruption of the flow of weapons and materials that enable them to conduct those acts. Ultimately, the measure of success will be the degree to which those countries facing Islamic extremism can become secure and sovereign nations with self-determination and a functioning government enabled by a growing economy existing in a stable region.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please explain the typical rotation cycles of SOF personnel deploying to the CENTCOM AOR and elsewhere. What challenges exist with respect to sustaining such a pace? Are these deployment cycles based on unit schedules, or those of individual personnel? How common is it for individual personnel to experience more frequent deployments?

Admiral OLSON. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel rotation cycles vary with unit type and mission. Typical rotation cycles for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM follow:

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) units: 7 months
Naval Special Warfare (Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] and Special Boat Units): 6 months
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) air crews and support: 3 to 6 months
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) deployments: 6 months
Active Civil Affairs deployments: 6 months
Active Psychological Operations (PSYOP) deployments: 6 to 12 months
U.S. Army Ranger deployments: 4 months

SOF deployed to Theater Security Cooperation Events (Joint and Combined Exercises for Training, Counter Narco-terrorism, Mobile Training Teams, Exercises) typically vary from 2 weeks to 4 months.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, what SOF equipment and resources are experiencing the greatest "wear and tear"? To what do you attribute this extraordinary aging? Do you have some thoughts on how to best address the situation?

Admiral OLSON. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been engaged in continuous and extensive combat operations since October 2001. The rapid "wear and tear" of Special Operations Forces (SOF) equipment is attributed to the harsh environmental conditions, battle damage, high operational tempo, and the extended length of service that the equipment has been employed and deployed in.

USSOCOM's Rotary Wing (RW) fleet has experienced accelerated aging which can be attributed to several factors. SOF RW airframes are typically flown at higher gross weights and in tactical environments that require rapid and abrupt flight maneuvers to accomplish the missions. Flying hour operations tempo and deployment to extreme environments have also stressed the entire fleet.

USSOCOM is addressing the aging SOF RW fleet through aircraft retirements, modernization and service life extension programs, and increases to the aircraft inventory. Stable funding support for SOF RW aircraft modernization and service life extension programs are critical to the success of USSOCOM's plan to address the aging SOF RW fleet and to keep it flying.

SOF C–130 flying hours have nearly doubled since 2000 due to increased operations tempo. The nature of our SOF Fixed Wing (FW) mission and aircraft weight age SOF C–130 aircraft more rapidly than non-SOF C–130s. The average age of our SOF C–130s is more than 40 years old. Increased flying hours combined with the nature of the SOF mission have accelerated wear and tear on critical wing structural components.

Increased global requirements for SOF have created a pressing need to recapitalize the older MC–130's. In addition to this increased demand, future growth in the SOF force structure will likely require a corresponding increase in SOF mobility and close air support capabilities.

USSOCOM Ground Mobility Vehicles are suffering extreme wear and tear due to extensive combat operations and new mission requirements, specifically, the additional weight of armor and increased payload. We have partially addressed the situation through engineering improvements, establishing a RESET facility in Kuwait, and are procuring heavy duty suspension systems. Moreover, injection of new vehicles, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, has been of great assistance to USSOCOM and has already saved lives.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please comment on the use and effectiveness of 12-man Operational Detachment-Alpha Teams (ODAs). How and where are they most effective?

Admiral OLSON. The 12-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) Teams have proven to be one of the greatest force multipliers in history. While they are a lethal unit in and of themselves, capable of conducting direct action kinetic operations and strategic reconnaissance, they are most effective when they work by, with and through indigenous forces to defeat the enemy. Special Forces (SF) are trained as warriors and diplomats. U.S. Army SF team's small size, coupled with their diverse capabilities emphasizes the demand for tact and professionalism when operating in the global environment. SF also develops and fosters a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction with the local populations.

SF ODAs are most effective in situations and locales where the strategic payoff for the U.S. Government is high, but the overt presence of U.S. forces must be kept to an absolute minimum. ODAs can operate clandestinely if required; their ability to train, equip, and if required employ indigenous forces in support of U.S. objectives in either the foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare role, under the most austere conditions, in the most remote locations in any environment, is their forte'.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral Olson, please comment on the cooperation and effectiveness of the SOF capabilities of our international partners? Is there room for improvement on either side of the relationship?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. What is the best way to ensure appropriate, meaningful interagency participation in all phases of operational, contingency, and crisis action planning? What is your command doing? What successes have you achieved and what challenges have you identified?

Admiral OLSON. The best way to ensure such interagency participation is exactly what we are doing now, i.e. continuing our established relationships and working our plans that revolve around five direct and indirect lines of operation. Initiatives such as the Global Synchronization Conference and Interagency Partnership Program establish the daily interaction and interagency participation in our major planning events. This strategic work forms the foundation for gaining success during contingency and crisis action planning.

Our Interagency Task Forces are examples of success in ensuring appropriate, meaningful participation in all phases of an action. Our Time Sensitive Planning Process (TSP) incorporates interagency participation from the very start of a crisis, even at 2:00 am.

Despite our advances, there is still a challenge in overcoming the bureaucratic inertia to institutionalize lasting change. We may have to accept in the short term that some will view current solutions and initiatives as temporary and will try to resist any permanent change. I believe needed change will be established slowly and patiently over many years, but once done, will be the new "normal." As you are aware, rushing this process is counterproductive, goes against human nature, and

often causes even more resistance. We are proud to be part of this patient but consistent work to establish meaningful interagency participation.

Mr. SMITH. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept identifies eight key risks and associated mitigation strategies. One is that the United States government might not develop the interagency integration mechanisms necessary to achieve unity of effort at every level. The JOC directs DOD to conduct concept development and experimentation focused on improving interagency integration. What actions has the Department of Defense taken to address the need for interagency integration mechanisms?

Admiral OLSON. The Department of Defense continues to integrate the interagency into their processes, but recommend the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide definitive information on their actions. At the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), consistent with our authorities under the Unified Command Plan and CONPLAN 7500, we have established a standing Interagency Task Force (IATF) with USSOCOM members and representatives from 12 interagency partners. Additionally, USSOCOM has established the Global Synchronization process which brings together over 400 participants among the Interagency, Geographical Combatant Commands and DOD, Service Staffs and defense agencies to integrate GWOT efforts. Both of USSOCOM actions are in concert with DOD efforts to support NSPD–44 and the new Interagency Management System.

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the role of Special Forces in fighting Irregular Warfare. Do you perceive a need to enhance interagency coordination for IW at the operational and tactical levels? If so, what type of organizational framework do you think would work best? According to the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, in the future, Irregular Warfare campaigns will increasingly require military general purpose forces to perform missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as Special Operation Forces (SOF) activities. How might this change the future mission of SOF?

Admiral OLSON. At the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), we pursue two mutually supporting approaches—direct and indirect. These approaches integrate the requirement to immediately disrupt violent extremist organizations while positively impacting the environment in which they operate.

The direct approach addresses the need to counter the immediate aggression caused by an adversary, while the indirect approach addresses the underlying causes of terrorism and the relevant population in which terrorism gains its legitimacy, and while this approach requires more time to achieve affects ultimately, will be the decisive effort.

At the operational and tactical level USSOCOM has been successful at integrating the interagency through the use of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) and extensive use of Liaison Officers. While the JIATF framework is effective it is important to maintain some degree of flexibility as we task organize for a specific operation. For broader IW engagement, the Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process is still developing nascent initiatives like the TMAAG concept that will help to inform this process.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) will not change its core tasks or mission focus, however the increased use of general purpose forces in the broader Irregular Warfare environment will allow for greater DOD engagement opportunities and focus SOF on the most appropriate missions.

Mr. SMITH. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept proposes three alternatives for further development and experimentation that would provide models to coordinate interagency command and control: (1) extending the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to irregular warfare; (2) establishing IA Advisory Assistance Teams at sub-national levels of government; and (3) expanding the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to conduct and support IW. Can you explain the pros and cons of each approach?

Admiral OLSON. The potential approaches identified in the Irregular Warfare IW JOC are being explored as part of the concept development and experimentation currently underway by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint Forces Command and a number of other agencies. Some thoughts are expressed below however a thorough analysis has yet to be completed.

The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Model has proved to be a valuable command and control mechanism for integrating civil-military operations in operational areas, but have been historically a short term military led organization. JIATF's operate under the operational control of the Geographic Combatant Commander and are by definition not part of the U.S. Mission (Embassy), therefore not part of the Country team which could lead to sub-optimization and over-militarization of the "whole-of-government" approach to solving or managing the political problem in question.

The IA Advisory Assistance Teams at the sub-national levels of government have proven to be successful, but more recent Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq have been challenged because of insufficient numbers of them, being asked to do too much, inadequate civilian manning, inadequate efforts to integrate them, and a relatively lower priority than combat units.

The expanded MILGRP Model could be a long term solution and organic to the U.S. Mission, fully integrated into the Country Team, and much more likely to subordinate its military activities to the broader "whole-of-government" approach led by the Chief of Mission. Although a permanent organization would solidify relationships and allow for continuous oversight more effectively, it would require additional infrastructure and manning to execute. This model will also likely have to function under constraints imposed by both the host nation and our own Country Team.

Mr. SMITH. Please describe SOCOM's Interagency Task Force. How does it relate to the J–10, which you direct? How does the J–10 interact with SOCOM's Global Synchronization Division, which works with the National Counterterrorism Center in the war on terror?

Admiral OLSON. The Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) serves as a coordinating activity within the Department of Defense (DOD) and across the Inter-Agency (IA). The goal is to be a reliable and connected entity that is able to integrate IA efforts while solving discrete problem sets that support the global war on terror (GWOT). The IATF has developed priorities and focus areas that support US Special Operations Command Center for Special Operations (CSO) and its GWOT synchronization responsibilities. The focus areas were developed through a combination of top down guidance, bottom up and horizontal thinking.

The IATF is functionally organized among two major focus areas and several enduring tasks. Major focus area efforts are combating the foreign terrorist network (FTN) and expanding USG document and media exploitation (DOMEX) capacity. The IATF's enduring tasks include counter narco-terrorism, threat finance, persistent surveillance requirements, counterterrorism research and analysis, information operations, support to the inter-agency partnership program (IAPP), and time-sensitive planning.

The IATF is collaborative and always uses an IA approach to solving problems. The collaborative nature of problem solving ensures any issues raised are already being staffed while the IATF is working the problem. The IATF also leverages other knowledge centers for their analysis and input. The IATF embraces competitive analysis, as long as it remains focused on solving the problem. Knowledge is the key component of synchronization.

The current organization of the IATF includes a mix of USSOCOM operators and intelligence professionals, as well as IA and DOD partners numbering 102 military, civilian and contractor personnel. IA personnel include members of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Additionally, the IATF has personnel embedded from several DOD agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism, the Naval Oceanographic Office, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

The IATF deals with operations, actions, and activities (OAA) across all 7500-series operation and concept plans' lines of operations (LOO), including those activities that fall within the realm of irregular warfare.

Mr. SMITH. What role has SOCOM played in implementation of National Security Presidential Decision (NSPD)–44, given its prepotency for the civil affairs mission?

Admiral OLSON. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is unique amongst the Combatant Commanders in that we do not own battlespace. As a force provider, we support the Geographic Combatant Commander's theater specific plans and operations with uniquely trained and equipped Special Operations Forces (SOF) forces, including active duty Civil Affairs (CA).

As the Department of Defense proponent for CA, USSOCOM continues to develop stability operations-capable CA forces through individual, unit, and institutional training of CA core tasks which are fundamental to stability operations. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, have also incorporated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) training blocks into their curricula. USSOCOM continues participation and coordination with the U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 efforts pertaining to stability operations, joint concept development and experimentation, and supports Unified Action experiments and war games.

USSOCOM has incorporated stability operations into the most recent revision of Joint Publication 3–57, Civil-Military Operations, which consolidates the previous Joint Publications for Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations.

Mr. SMITH. Please describe the nature of SOCOM's "global synchronization" mission and identify the existing metrics for determining its successful execution. What exactly is the focus of SOCOM in this synchronization effort? Do the al Qaeda Execution Order (AQN EXORD) and/or the "7500" Concept Plan (CONPLAN) guide this effort? If so, then how?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. Has SOCOM conducted a strategic assessment of radical Islamic media-related and education-related penetrations of DOD or related U.S. Government organizations and critical institutions? If not, is SOCOM familiar with any U.S. Government strategic assessment in these areas?

Admiral OLSON. The answer is "no" on both accounts.

Mr. SMITH. Has SOCOM conducted a strategic assessment of extremist-Islamic threat doctrines in order to define possible enemy course of action (COA)?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. How precisely does SOCOM's present strategy and approach consider the theological underpinnings of Islamic extremism?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. How would SOCOM propose to revise the AQN EXORD if directed by the Secretary of Defense? What revisions should be considered and why?

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SMITH. How is SOCOM coordinating with the law enforcement and intelligence communities to conduct the GWOT, especially in the CENTCOM area of operations (AOR)? What approaches are most fruitful? What are the greatest challenges and limitations? What is the role of INTERPOL? What is the role of local indigenous law enforcement personnel and resources? How do these efforts differ in mainly high-intensity "direct action" environments from more low-intensity or "indirect action" environments?

Admiral OLSON. Part 1. The SOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) coordinates and collaborates with the law enforcement community via department and agency LNOs that exist in the IATF and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) military personnel that reside within the respective agencies. Specifically there is one LNO each from the FBI, DEA, and Treasury within the IATF. When projects or issues are identified, the IATF, via agency LNOs and SOST personnel reach back to their respective organization and tie into the appropriate sub-directorate. IRT the CENTCOM AOR there exist no special framework. Close coordination among agency LNOs, SOST personnel, SOCOM IATF and CENTCOM action officers exists via the CENTCOM IATF–IW. These relationships are matured via close working relationships and daily/weekly battle rhythm events in which we regularly share effort and information.

Part 2. Approaches most fruitful are as described above. Our ability to include as many LEA into the GWOT community interest, and focus them on a specific problem set will enable IATF to serve as a connecting and synchronizing entity for SOCOM–CSO.

Part 3. One of the most significant challenges is the ability to translate intelligence and information acquired from the battlefield and declassify in an expeditious manner so that it can be used in either USG law enforcement cases or in within Partner Nation (PN) jurisprudence/law enforcement framework.

Part 4. Interpol is an important organization in which there is much dialog among DOD, DOJ and OGA. From the IATF perspective we are looking at ways in which we can enable Interpol action via information sharing. Information sharing and the declassification issue continue to be a significant challenge within the DOD intelligence community.

Part 5. IRT IATF interface with the Law Enforcement community, local indigenous personnel should be a consideration as we look to build PN capacity as well as achieving USG and PN goals by, with, and through the partner nation.

Part 6. It is difficult to answer this question without knowing specific situational factors. The reply to Part 5 above accurately reflects that PN law enforcement personnel and resources are a critical tool/mechanism in which we build partner capacity, enhance PN legitimacy, and execute and achieve both USG and respective nation goals and objectives.

Mr. SMITH. How might the proposed organizational change in the respective Military Group (MILGROUP) structure affect SOCOM activities in affected AORs?

Admiral OLSON. USSOCOM is currently assessing the Military Liaison Element (MLE) program in direct coordination with each Geographic Combatant Command

and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). LTG David P. Fridovich, Director, Center for Special Operations provided general guidance to TSOC Commanders on an MLE roadmap, and in kind received point papers from each Commander. The topic was also highlighted at the Sixth Annual Global Synchronization Conference (GSC) hosted by USSOCOM from 14—18 April 2008, and will be raised at the 25 April 2008 GSC Senior Executive Session. Finally, USSOCOM is establishing a process by which to assess the total SOF requirements for High Priority and Priority Countries of each GCC; this process will inform each iteration of the MLE review.

Mr. SMITH. Please identify the resources inherent in the Center for Special Operations responsible for mission support to Unconventional Warfare (UW) long term persistent operations as opposed to time-sensitive planning. How are these resources positioned and organized to support each respective AOR as identified in the global synchronization mission?

Admiral OLSON. The intent of long-term persistent operations is to develop capabilities to conduct UW, as authorized, and provide potential capabilities and mechanisms to directly support time sensitive operations conducted as part of Time Sensitive Planning (TSP). Within the CSO (one of six Centers within USSOCOM), J3X Special Activities is comprised of global and regional UW desks aligned with their respective Global Combatant Commands (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC). This office also provides requisite information and visibility into which UW capabilities and mechanisms currently exist in each Area of Operation to inform, support or complement operational and/or tactical commanders conducting TSP.

USSOCOM J3 provides oversight, funding management, manpower resourcing and equipping to long-term global Unconventional Warfare/Operational Preparation of the Environment (UW/OPE) and coordinates these long-term planning efforts with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). USSOCOM also prioritizes the global distribution of SOF's long-term resourcing and equipping in each GCC, and is currently supporting these operational activities in numerous countries with the requisite funding and equipment forward-deployed and distributed through respective Theater Special Operations Commands.

Mr. SMITH. What is the mission of SOCOM's new J10, the Irregular Warfare effort?

Admiral OLSON. The mission of the J10, Irregular Warfare (IW) Directorate, is to coordinate the concept implementation, strategy development, and plans integration of irregular warfare applications within a collaborative network of Department of Defense (DOD) and Interagency (IA) organizations to facilitate and support U.S. national objectives. By Direction of the USSOCOM Commander, the Directorate was established 15 June 2007 to maintain the momentum of IW inititatives, synchronize IW efforts with the DOD and IA, and serve as the IW Office of Primary Responsibility for the Command.

Mr. SMITH. SOCOM's plan to increase the number of Special Forces (SF) Battalions is based in part on a reduction in the size of the SF Squad. Does the planned reduction from 9-man to 7-man squads reflect a change in the warfighting requirement facing small units? If so, how? How does SOCOM envision the smaller squads to maintain a level of self-sufficiency, especially after experiencing casualties?

Admiral OLSON. No change has been made to the size of the Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment Alpha's (ODA) [SF ODA] or to the size of our SF Battalions. We are in the process of adding an SF Battalion to each of our Special Forces Groups.

Within the Companies assigned to each Ranger Battalion in the 75th Ranger Regiment, an operational decision was made to reduce the size of a Squad from nine to seven men. This restructuring was accomplished after an assessment of operational employment tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq. Associated with this change in the size of a Squad, was a task/organization decision to add a Company to each Ranger Battalion. While this overall task/organization restructuring is currently being executed in FY08, we continue our assessment of on-going combat operations, and may continue to adjust our Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to best ensure battlefield success.

Mr. SMITH. What benefit and support is SOCOM receiving from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and its "Attack the Network" efforts? Please provide examples.

Admiral OLSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, we had an issue in this subcommittee last year about the civil support teams (CST) and how many we needed where. I have a chart in front of me that describes some of the different organizations that are being created, and, frankly, I am a little concerned that there are lots of people who say, "This is what we do," and there is a lot of overlap and so forth that is a little confusing to me.

In addition to civil support teams, there apparently are joint National Guard (CBRNE) enhanced response force packages, and there are Chemical-Biological Incident Response Forces, and there are CBRNE Consequent Management Response Force.

I am not exactly clear what everybody does. I want you to reassure me that there are clear lanes in the road, and everybody is not coming to the taxpayer for money to do the same thing. If you don't mind, if you could get your folks to provide us, what you have started to do, a description and who the traffic cop is. Who says this is an assessment team versus and then going down.

General RENUART. The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) detect and identify CBRNE agents/substances, assess and advise the local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist with requests for other forces (i.e. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs)). They are a 22-person response unit located in each state and territory (55 total, 53 of which are certified) that performs an initial assessment of a CBRNE incident. These units are full time, congressionally authorized, federally funded, and fall under the command and control of the governor.

CERFPs locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform medical triage and treatment, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination. Each of these units is a task force of between 200 and 400 personnel, composed of an Army battalion or Air Force equivalent C2 element, an Air National Guard Medical Flight, an Army Chemical Company (-) and an Army Engineer Company (-). The 17 CERFPs are congressionally authorized, traditional Guard only, with 4-5 full time personnel per unit, and are located regionally to provide additional support to the WMD–CSTs and the state government. They are capable of decontaminating, performing medical triage, and stabilizing 75 non-ambulatory and 225 ambulatory personnel per hour. The WMD–CSTs and CERFPs support the local and state response to an incident and are not under the command and control of USNORTHCOM.

A CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) provides the DOD capability to support the federal response to a request for assistance from a state. CCMRFs consist of roughly 4,000 people in three force packages that are able to respond to a domestic catastrophic CBRNE event. This force is pre-identified from within existing DOD force structure and may include the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force. CCMRFs operate under Operational Control of the Commander, USNORTHCOM.

The following outlines the capabilities of the three force packages with additional follow-on forces identified as required:

- Force Package #1 capabilities: Initial C2, Command Assessment Teams, Initial Response Force (Medical, Logistics, Extraction)
- Force Package #2 capabilities: Medical, Decontamination, C2, Transportation and Logistics, Security, Public Affairs
- Force Package #3 capabilities: C2, Transportation, Logistical Support, Mortuary Affairs
- Follow-on Forces: Additional C2, Transportation, Logistics

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