[H.A.S.C. No. 111–24]

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
MARCH 18, 2009

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

53–207 WASHINGTON : 2010

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, *Chairman*

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
ROB BISHOP, Utah
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida

ERIN C. CONATON, *Staff Director*
PAUL OOSTBURG, *General Counsel*
AILEEN ALEXANDER, *Professional Staff Member*
CATERINA DUTTO, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, March 18, 2009, Security Developments in the Areas of Responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, Northern Command, Africa Command, and Joint Forces Command 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, March 18, 2009 43

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 2

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 1

WITNESSES

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation for NATO 7

Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene "Gene," Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command . 6

Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command 4

Ward, Gen. William E. "Kip," USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command 8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Mattis, Gen. James N. 112

Renuart, Gen. Victor Eugene "Gene," Jr. 79

Stavridis, Adm. James G. 47

Ward, Gen. William E. "Kip" 135

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Larsen 172

Mr. LoBiondo 171

Mr. Miller 167

Mr. Wilson 170

SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, AFRICA COMMAND, AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2009.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee comes to order. And today's hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with combatant commanders.

And I am pleased to welcome Admiral Stavridis of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Renuart of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), General Mattis of the United States Joint Forces Command, and General Ward of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

We are honored to have each of you with us today. We thank you.

I also want to extend my appreciation to all the servicemen and women who work with you. They provide an invaluable service to our country.

Every day, each of you enter intractable challenges that are not always part of the morning headlines, but are nevertheless vital to our national security. Let me mention a few.

Latin America, narco-syndicates have stained the streets of Juarez, Tijuana, and elsewhere in Mexico with the blood of criminals and innocents alike, as drug lords struggle to survive against a Mexican government-led crackdown and inter-gang warfare.

The impact of this violence on our borders concerns me very much in both the near term, as well as the long term regarding the state of Mexico. I would like to hear from General Mattis and General William Ward about the nature of the threat that we have been experiencing on our Mexican borders and in Mexico.

Turning to the rest of the region, over much of the last decade, a growing number of countries seem to have removed their welcome mats, leaving our country with fewer allies with whom we can contain and continue to build strong military-to-military part-

nerships. The implication of this trend for our ability to conduct counternarcotics and other operations merit careful monitoring.

And, Admiral, I welcome your thoughts on this trend.

General Ward, congratulations on your efforts so far. In short order, you have brought Africa Command from being a little more than a concept to becoming a fully operational combatant command, with robust interagency participation. We thank you for that.

As AFRICOM continues to plan and execute its mission, it seems to me that improving the Combatant Command (COCOM) strategic communications is your primary challenge. Your task is to explain how working with our African partners to promote stability and security on the continent is consistent with our core national security interests.

It is tough to draw the linkage from the work you do today to preventing the coups, the regional wars, and the manmade disasters that hopefully will never happen in the future, but that is precisely what you do.

Beyond your strategic communication challenges, the work of AFRICOM has raised other concerns. A lot of the requirements inherent in promoting stability and security within the African continent do not at first glance appear to be military tasks. Your command must be careful that, by virtue of its size, it does not squeeze out efforts of our civilian agencies, such as the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

With that, let me turn to my good friend, my colleague, John McHugh from New York, and, again, thank each of you for your excellent contributions to our country. We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. McHugh.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, all of us welcome you gentlemen. We are in deep appreciation for the great leadership that you have shown. And please convey back to those brave men and women in uniform that you command ours and the nation's most profound respect and words of thanks.

Mr. Chairman, as always, you have kind of encapsulated this very important hearing. It is certainly, in my judgment, one of the more critical ones we hold on annual basis. We are always very happy that our great leaders can be here in person, join us to cover the broad range of items, some of which you have outlined, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask that my entire statement be entered into the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And beyond that, let me just underscore a couple of things that you said. We have very distinct areas of responsibility here, and each have their own significant challenges.

Like you, one of the most pressing, in my judgment, is the very disturbing situation on the U.S.-Mexico border. I share your concern, as I do many others in this nation, Mr. Chairman, regarding that widening drug war, the possible reach of cartels into America's border towns.

And it has gotten to the extent where even, just last week, the President has stated that he is at least considering deploying National Guard troops along that southern border and, like you, Mr. Chairman, I am very interested—and I hope we gather the opportunity today to discuss a bit about that circumstance and the way forward.

NORTHCOM plays an important role in directing missile defense operations to protect the homeland. And given the nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, and particularly in recent days of Iran and North Korea, we have the opportunity today to talk about NORTHCOM's capabilities and force structure to defend the United States from ballistic missile attack.

And, Admiral, as you know and we have had the chance to discuss, you have some very unique security challenges in your region. And just to cite one, over the last few years, Colombia has really risen as a democratic leader with successes against insurgent and paramilitary groups that is due in no small measure to the people under your command and the support of this nation in those efforts.

But for all of that, the drug production and trafficking are still a very significant challenge for that nation. And I think it is important for us to hear what we need to do to best support what I would argue is one of our most stalwart allies in South America and, in fact, in this hemisphere.

And, General Ward, I think the chairman summed it up very well. You have done yeoman's work in setting up the command in one of the most complex and, I would argue, most misunderstood regions on the face of the Earth. And I think you have done an outstanding job.

That has not been without challenges that no one knows more clearly than you, but whether it is questions of interagency presence and buy-ins, as well as the understandable delays in establishing certain offices, we need to hear today from you what kinds of areas still exist where you require the support of this Congress and this committee particularly.

And, finally, General Mattis, as Joint Forces Command, amongst the many roles you play, that of providing mission-ready forces to all geographic commands is key amongst them. And, obviously, as we draw down troops out of Iraq and begin to build up into Afghanistan, the demand in increase of support functions and those kinds of mission personnel is going to be even more critical.

And the challenge that you face in meeting that, as the supplier of forces, is so vital, obviously, to those missions, but to us, as well. And I hope you will be able to give us an idea of how you are going to meet that growing requirement for support functions in Afghanistan and still meet the enduring requirement, as it may exist, in Iraq.

So a lot on our plate here, Mr. Chairman, as you and I both agree. Certainly we want to get to the testimony and for the ques-

tion-and-answer period and a final word of appreciation to our witnesses, and particularly a word of deep thanks to those men and women who they have the honor of leading.

I would yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

We will ask our witnesses—before that, I must say that, at high noon, I have a conflict and someone else will be helping you finish the hearing. Please understand.

If you wish to condense your statement, without objection, each of your written statements will be placed into the record.

With that, we will start with Admiral James G. Stavridis. Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very much for holding this hearing and allowing us to present to you some ideas.

I will make the point that this is a real Goldwater-Nichols hearing. You have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines seated here. You could almost call it the Chairman Skelton hearing, in the sense of all that he contributed to jointness in Armed Forces.

Also, I do want to say, as an admiral, I am always—I feel a little safer in the company of generals, especially Marine generals, so I feel pretty safe today, all things considered.

We have had a good and a challenging year down in Southern Command. I am just going to hit five quick, interesting things that have happened in the course of the last year that maybe will enlighten some of our discussions as we go along today.

First, a very good thing. Last week, in my headquarters in Southern Command, we had the three U.S. hostages who were held by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists for five and one half years. Marc, Keith and Tom are their names, and they came to our headquarters to spend an afternoon with my command, talk about their experiences, and to be congratulated by my command for their performance under very arduous conditions.

So it was a nice moment. And it kind of underscores what Representative McHugh was talking about, Colombia's capabilities. I mean, this was a Colombian operation, but it was mounted after a great deal of partnership-building by the United States over a ten-year period of bipartisan effort with Plan Colombia.

So I am glad we have our hostages back, and I think it is reflective of the good general trend of events in Colombia.

Secondly, last summer, we had a couple of big Navy ships come down to do a great deal of medical engagement and training. It was a terrific deployment. We contributed to medical care for about 200,000 people throughout the region.

And we also had the opportunity as part of that deployment to have one of our Navy ships go to Haiti and respond to an enormous disaster there following the hurricane, a good indication of how our U.S. Navy's Fourth Fleet is able to do its missions of engagement, training, disaster relief in this region.

Thirdly, we had a good year of military-to-military engagement, which is the heart of what we do. We had the largest exercise in the world, in terms of numbers of countries participating, 22 of them in and around the Panama Canal, an exercise called PANAMAX. Also did exercises in special forces, in disaster relief, in human rights training, in peacekeeping, a very robust schedule, and I appreciate the committee's support that makes all of that possible. That military-to-military human contact trumps everything, in terms of moving ourselves forward in engagement in the region.

Fourthly, we continue to struggle with the mission of detection and monitoring of the narcotic flows. And I am sure we will talk about that today. I continue to be concerned, as I have talked to this committee over the last couple of years, about the rise of the use of semi-submersible near submarine-like platforms by the drug cartels.

We have captured several of these moving as much as seven tons of cocaine. The numbers we see are rising; it is a significant challenge for us. We did with international assistance and with interagency assistance participate in interdicting 230 tons of cocaine.

There is a lot more flowing, and I believe that a fundamental part of the solution to this narcotic problem is on the demand side here in the United States. We can only go so far with interdiction and work on the supply side. So perhaps we can touch on those topics today.

I understand the concerns in Mexico. I would make the point to the committee that it is not just Mexico. It is also Central America and parts of the Caribbean. There is a supply chain of narcotics and great difficulties—gangs, poverty—that run through the region. And we need to address it as a regional problem and not focus solely on our border.

And General Renuart and I are in frequent discussion about that, and I think we have a good program to try and work together across Central America and Mexico in addressing these kinds of issues.

Lastly, I want to close by thanking the committee very much for your support to our new headquarters building down in Miami. We have been in a rented facility for ten years since the command moved from Panama. Due to the work of this committee and the support you have provided, there is a new building going up which will bring together Southern Command for the first time all in one building in a modern facility that will allow us to do our mission properly.

It comes on land that was donated from the state of Florida. It is a great savings to the taxpayer over time. And I thank the committee for that.

With that, I will close simply by saying thank you for your support for the men and women of U.S. Southern Command.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Admiral.

General Victor Eugene Renuart, Jr. You like that "Jr."?

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR EUGENE "GENE" RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General RENUART. And my mother does, too, as well, Chairman. Thank you very much.

Chairman Skelton and Congressman McHugh, members of the committee, good morning. And like Jim Stavridis, I want to echo the true heartfelt thanks from all the men and women who serve, for the support from Congress in general, and certainly this committee in particular.

It is really an honor and privilege to be here today representing the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command.

And I want to point out, as I begin, I am pleased to be accompanied this morning by Command Sergeant Major Dan Wood, seated here behind me. Dan will be retiring in May after many years of service to the nation and tours in combat theaters in the recent years. And so I want to highlight Dan's service to you to say thank you to him, but also he represents our children and, in some cases, our grandchildren that are out there wearing the uniform of our nation every day.

As commander of NORTHCOM, I am assigned really two particular missions, very specific and important missions, one, to defend the homeland from attack and, two, to support the nation with unique Department of Defense (DOD) capabilities in times of crisis. And so this runs the gamut from capabilities like ground-based midcourse interceptors for ballistic missile defense, the execution of the air sovereignty mission within the borders of the United States, support to law enforcement in areas like along the border, and to support federal agencies, both before and after disaster strikes, as was evidenced with the California wildfires and the hurricanes along the southern coast this past year.

But it is important to note we are members of a combined national response. We don't do it alone. DOD does not and should not have the lead role in many of these events.

We are part of a coordinated effort—international, federal, state partners, governors, the National Guard, all are keys to success for the nation, and DOD plays a role, in some cases, a very important role, in some cases, very much a small supporting role.

It is also important to note that we have an excellent relationship with our international partners, Canada, Mexico, the—or Bermuda, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. All are part of our area of interest, and all play a key role, most notably our relationship with Mexico is as strong as it has ever been military-to-military, I think, in our history, and we continue to work closely with the leaders of Mexico, as they face some of the challenges in their home country.

We train hard to execute our missions. We exercise those tasks routinely. I am pleased to say we now have a national exercise program that all the agencies of government participate in, and we have to ensure that we don't let a sense of security that we have not had an attack or a major terrorist event in our country since

September 11th let us lower our guard. We have to be ready to ensure that we never let the country down.

Those who wish us harm have not gone away. The threats still exist, and we have to be prepared. They only have to be lucky once; we have to be on guard 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to ensure that it never happens. We will keep the momentum going. We will remain alert. This mission is critically important to us, because it is to prepare for, to defend against, and to provide recovery for your families, your communities, our families and our nation.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to a number of questions this morning.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the Appendix on page 79.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

General James N. Mattis, United States Marine Corps.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION FOR NATO

General MATTIS. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and to update you on Joint Forces Command. I request my written statement be accepted for the record, and I will speak for just a couple moments, Mr. Chairman, and leave most of the time for questions.

As you know, sir, ladies and gentlemen, the command's primary missions have both joint and coalition, current and future aspects. We support the current military operations by providing combat-ready forces to combatant commanders, and you are seeing now the reduced force levels in Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan. And that is well underway.

We are also preparing for future conflicts, thinking ahead so that we are not caught flat-footed in the future. As you know, we are co-located with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Allied Command Transformation, which I also command. And that brings in a central coalition focus to Joint Forces Command.

We recognize that we can never predict the future precisely, and we must expect to be surprised in matters of national security, but we must plan so that surprise is minimized and it is not lethal. We purposely set out to create a shock absorber in our force to withstand the shocks that we know will come.

To this end, we have provided the committee with copies of the Joint Operating Environment, or what we call the JOE, and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the CCJO.

The JOE, the Joint Operating Environment, is our analysis, and it identifies the problem as best we can discern it about the future, a future of persistent conflict, of hybrid enemy threats, global instability, increasing access to weapons of mass destruction, the rise of regional state and non-state actors, and the unpredictability of security threats.

The Capstone Concept is Admiral Mullen's vision for how the joint force will operate in the future. That is our proposed solution

to the problem statement presented in the JOE, and it guides our force experimentation and, of course, guides our force development.

One thing is clear: We must make irregular warfare a core competency, and this is Joint Forces Command's top priority right now. By using the lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, the second Lebanon war, and applying them to our efforts, we are going to do this.

At the same time, we must have balance, as Secretary Gates has clearly articulated. And as we institutionalize irregular warfare capability, we must maintain our nuclear and conventional superiority, which brings great benefit to the international community.

And we also have to bring together this whole-of-government approach that we have gotten great support from this committee and other committees on, because it is going to be vital to maintaining the nation's security in the future when military means alone are not sufficient.

I would like to stop at this point, Mr. Chairman, and leave the rest of the time for questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 112.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General William E. Ward, known as Kip Ward. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. "KIP" WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General WARD. Thank you, Chairman Skelton.

Mr. McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to provide this overview.

With me today are Ms. Nory Fleffner from Department of Commerce and Mr. Jerry Lanier from the Department of State. And I am also honored to appear alongside my distinguished colleagues here.

Last year, we discussed the plan to establish a headquarters. Today, United States Africa Command is executing our mission of conducting sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs and military-sponsored activities to promote a stable and secure African environment.

We work in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners to ensure that our activities are harmonized. Our strategy is based on military-to-military efforts to enhance the security capability of our African partners.

In many engagements with African leaders during my time as commander of United States Africa Command and previously as deputy commander, U.S. European Command, the consistent message they gave me is that, for their intent, for America—for African nations to provide for their own security. Most welcome our assistance in reaching their goals for security forces that are legitimate and professional, have the will and means to dissuade, deter and defeat transnational threats, perform with integrity, and increasingly able to support international peace efforts.

We work as a part of the overall United States government effort. We work closely with the Department of State, the chiefs of mission and country teams, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Se-

curity, Agriculture, and others doing work on the continent. And like Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, I fully support enhancements to the capabilities of our interagency partners.

Similarly, we reach out to international partners, including Europeans, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private enterprise, and academia. Their perspectives on the situation in Africa are very valuable.

U.S. Africa Command is involved in military training, education, sustainment, and logistics support, amongst other activities, throughout our area of responsibility. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, conducts training, education, and civil military assistance that helps prevent conflict and promote regional cooperation among nations of Eastern Africa.

Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is a military component of the Department of State's counterterrorism partnership with North and West African nations. Africa Endeavor is an annual communications interoperability exercise that this year will include 23 African nations.

We support the State Department's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program that roughly trains 20 battalions of peacekeepers per year. The peacekeepers have been deployed on United Nations and African Union missions across the continent. Recently, we helped the Rwandans deploy some of their heavy equipment to the United Nations (U.N.) mission in Darfur.

Continuing deployments of the Africa Partnership Station provide training to the navies and coast guards of maritime nations in the Gulf of Guinea and in Eastern Africa, helping them better secure their own territorial waters.

Given the lack of infrastructure within Africa and the island nations, our sustainment infrastructure, forward operating sites, and en route infrastructure are vital. I endorse upgrade projects supporting these key infrastructure nodes.

The enduring presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti makes possible our engagement in East Africa and other parts of the continent and supports our U.S. strategic goals in that area of the world.

It is, indeed, my honor to serve with the uniformed and civilian men and women of the Department of Defense, as well as our interagency teammates, who are making a difference on the continent every day. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the spirit and determination of the American people and our commitment to contributing to the well-being and security of our nation and the people of Africa.

Again, thank you for this opportunity. Thank you for your support. And I stand ready to participate in the hearing.

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the Appendix on page 135.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Ward.

General Mattis, you said that irregular warfare should become a core competency for our military. History tells us that a country in particular, our country, prepares for the last war. How assured are you that irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts?

General MATTIS. Mr. Chairman, I am absolutely certain that irregular warfare will be with us in future conflicts. We need to only

look back to last summer's Russian incursion into Georgia, where we saw many irregular aspects in that war. Their combat units even had irregular forces in front of them as they went into the breakaway republics.

I think, too, that our study of the second Lebanon war shows how this hybrid threat in—it is being watched all around the world. And they recognize they cannot take us on at 15,000 feet right now; they cannot take us on, on the high seas; they don't want to take on the U.S. Army in open desert, mechanized warfare.

But there is an area where we are not superior. And we have seen the enemy play to those positions.

I think that the paradox of war is that America at this point in history cannot abrogate any aspect of the conflict spectrum. By that, I mean the enemy will gravitate to the area that they perceive to be our weakness, so we cannot give up conventional capability. We cannot give up nuclear superiority. But we must develop irregular, if we want to checkmate the enemy.

It is a balanced approach, as I think Secretary Gates has articulated very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me ask both Admiral Stavridis and General Renuart about Mexico. There is a great deal of concern in and out of the news media about that country and the drug-related violence that is there. Number one, describe how serious it is through each of your eyes. And, number two, what can America do to help?

General RENUART. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the media has given us many examples of how difficult that challenge is for the government of Mexico. President Calderon is courageously leading an effort. He has asked his military to play a principal role in that. And they are doing so.

And I would use as an example the presence of thousands of military into Juarez, the city that we have seen so many of the murders recorded over the last year and certainly in these last couple months. That presence has made a difference. We began to see the violence settle, and I think that is an indicator of the seriousness that President Calderon takes with respect to action here.

In terms of the drug challenges, Admiral Stavridis mentioned in his opening comments the challenge of the supply side. He leads—or hosts in his headquarters Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. I say in his headquarters, in his organization. They are located in Key West. That is an interagency process to get at the supply side.

We participate directly with his staff. The Mexican government also participates directly with his staff.

So I think the opportunity for us to share common operating pictures, share intelligence, share information not only between our headquarters, but with our Mexican friends is improving every day.

Finally, I would say that there certainly is the potential, as we have seen in many reports, for some of that violence to spill over. There is a relationship between organized gangs in the United States and the drug cartels in Mexico.

Our role in DOD is a small one, but it is to support law enforcement as they might need that along the border. I think the problem is real. Mexico is engaged. The United States is actively trying to

support and assist Mexico in any way that might be helpful. And we have a very good relationship with the Mexican military in that regard.

Jim.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I would echo what General Renuart said. I would add, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think there is a demand side component to this. If we ask what we can do to help Mexico, we could work on anything that reduces demand here in the United States, not really our lane in the Department of Defense, but I think we are mentioning the context.

Secondly, sir, I would enlarge Gene's comments to include Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The Merida Initiative, which I support—I know Gene supports, as well—looks at all of those regions as a whole.

In the end, this is a supply chain. We have to understand it, we have to reverse-engineer it, and we have to help kill it. Doing so will require international partners, as well as our interagency work together.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Ward, in your opinion, would you describe for us America's national security interests in what you do in the Africa Command on the African continent, please?

General WARD. Thank you, Chairman.

The continent of Africa is an immense geographical domain, as well as huge water space along its borders and its territorial waters. Resources, population, globalization, stability all very firmly point to that part of the world being integrally linked to the security, as well as the continued development of our country.

A stable continent of Africa with a population approaching 9 million, growing at a rate of 2.4 percent a year, expected to double by 2050, if left unchecked with the issues of illegal immigration, trafficking of various commodities, from weapons to drugs to people, undeveloped so that immigration becomes issues for not just the nations of Africa, but Europe, as well as America, having today programs in effect that assist those nations to provide for their own security that will, in fact, enable development, enable the growth of effective institutions of government, clearly in our national interest in today's globalized society.

Nothing goes on in a part of the world, clearly the size, importance of Africa, that would not have an ultimate effect on us, our security, and our well-being.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the activity of the United Nations help in regard to this? Or is it a paper tiger?

General WARD. Sir, I think the United Nations and the role it plays in coalescing nations and reaching the sort of consensus that is important to move forward with these sovereign nations is an instrumental activity.

I think we should look to ways to buttress those activities, because I think, in the end, it is that consensus, it is that degree of support that is, in fact, garnered by the world community that can be applied, that is what we need.

And so I would say that the United Nations has a role, as do the continental organizations there in Africa. The African Union, as it attempts to get its feet under itself, moving ahead in the areas of

stability, as well as development, translates also to the regional communities there on the continent of Africa that are now five in number, as they also attempt to move ahead.

Those activities that would coalesce, build, combine activity sets to address common shared problems I think can contribute to addressing those challenges.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, can I just add, from a SOUTHCOM perspective, on the United Nations question? The U.N. is doing a very good job in Haiti. The peacekeeping force there is 7,000 U.N. peacekeepers, 2,000 U.N. police, very, very small U.S. presence. They have done a very good job over the last three years in a security proposition there.

Sixty percent of those peacekeepers come from other nations in the Americas. So it is an example of what General Ward's talking about, that there is goodness in the United Nations' efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, General Ward.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Renuart, I want to go back to you for a moment. As you heard in my opening comments, I greatly share the deep concerns that the chairman and many others have with respect to the drug situation in Mexico. Reports I have seen, more than 6,000 killed in those cartel wars. That is a pretty stunning figure in one year, when you consider the loss of those brave American lives in the now going on six years in Iraq, for example.

But nevertheless, I think we have to keep reality in context. I have seen reports in recent days by organizations who claim they track these kinds of things who have listed Mexico as a potential failed state, along with Pakistan and such.

How close might Mexico be or not be to being a failed state? How deep a concern do you have in that regard?

General RENUART. Congressman, I certainly am not the expert at defining a failed state. I think there are certain characteristics, however, that, I guess I would say, Mexico does not exhibit.

For example, they continue to have a democratically elected government, and they are actively taking on this problem so that the core of government does not seem to be jeopardized, if you will.

Certainly, they have a strong trading relationship with the United States. They are our third-largest trading partner. That relationship continues, and it is important to both nations.

The Mexican natural resources are significant. Certainly, their oil industry continues to help keep the government moving strongly.

The economic decline that many of our nations have all suffered is not as significant at this point in Mexico. So many of the indicators of a very vibrant and active state continue.

I think it is certainly a challenge for the law enforcement aspect of the government. The drug cartels are certainly involved in a great deal of violence. Much of the violent deaths that you have talked about have been cartel-on-cartel violence. And while it should not replace or eliminate our concern, it is an indicator that the cartels are fighting each other for turf and for, if you will, market share.

So I think President Calderon understands that clearly. He has engaged aggressively. He is in the process of re-vetting his police forces. We have seen successes in places like Juarez, where he has put federal troops on the ground.

And I think, in our small role, we support the State Department and their efforts with the government. Certainly, the Merida Initiative is a huge, huge demonstration of American willingness to work with our Mexican friends to allow them to be successful in this effort. We need to continue that kind of support.

Our role is a direct military-to-military relationship with the Mexican army and air force and navy, and we do that on a routine basis. So I am comfortable that this country is really working hard to deal with the challenge.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, you mentioned the variety of challenges in your area of responsibility (AOR). And clearly the drug component of that is not insignificant. But I want to talk a bit about Venezuela.

I and many others have been deeply concerned about the reported arm purchases that Hugo Chavez has entered into, particularly with the Russians, reportedly 100,000 of the latest-generation AK–47, Russian fighter jets, et cetera, et cetera.

And when you couple those with recent reports of both Venezuela and apparently Cuba offering to bed down Russian long-range strategic bombers and talks of Hezbollah fundraising in Caracas and elsewhere, we wonder what to make of this very murky soup.

I wonder if you could just put your own perspective on the national security threats that Hugo Chavez's arms purchases, coupled with his seeming friendship in places like Iran and the support of Hezbollah, or certainly the blind eye towards Hezbollah, might mean for this committee and for your AOR?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, thank you.

Whenever I speak of Venezuela, I like to begin by pointing out that the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed an extremely good relationship for about 150 years. Over the recent past, there has been some political disagreement between the two countries, and to some degree that is the nature of democracy and in all the democracies in the Americas today, there is only one dictatorship, and that is in Cuba.

So every other country is a democracy. And democracies have a tendency to disagree with each other about political direction, in many cases.

In terms of a national security threat, I do not believe Venezuela poses a national security threat to the United States. You are absolutely correct: They have bought about $5 billion in weapons from the Russians over the last four years. They have contracts for at least $20 billion more high-performance jets, attack helicopters, AK–103s, the new generation of the AK–47, and so forth.

I don't believe that they, however, even with all of that armament, pose a significant threat, because I don't see the commensurate investment in training, in people, in building capability to really employ those weapons in a way that would be a threat to the United States of America.

Mr. MCHUGH. How about the—if not the active support, certainly the forbearance of fundraising for terrorists, listed act organizations like Hezbollah. Is that at a high level or——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I am concerned throughout the region of the activities of Hezbollah. And that really runs from the Southern Cone of South America to the Andean ridge to the Caribbean coast. We see Hezbollah acting throughout the region in proselytizing, fundraising, involved in the drug trade.

There is a fair amount to be concerned about with Hezbollah. And I would like to provide that for the record and give you some specifics.

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes. I would appreciate that.

And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back, but I would say, for the record, this is an area that I know leaders, as we have here today, are focused on and concerned about, but I think it would behoove all of us on this committee if we had the opportunity to delve into that a bit more deeply, perhaps in closed session.

But it is an important development that needs our urgent attention. And with that, I would yield back and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank all these gentlemen for being here.

Very quickly, General Mattis, your quote was something to the point of, "The enemy will gravitate to our weaknesses." Would you say it is a fair assessment that the enemy gravitated to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and underbody explosions to flat-bottom Humvees in Iraq, as one example of that?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. And, therefore, again, using the media, using computers, told the whole world that we have a vulnerability to attack from underneath, from flat-bottom vehicles?

General MATTIS. Sir, the attacks make even our heaviest tanks vulnerable. I would not confine it to the flat-bottoms. That is one aspect of it, but, in fact, war is a constant game of give-and-take. You know this, sir. I think as we adapt to the flat-bottom attack, they will adapt, and it is just the normal heave-and-ho of war.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, using your quote, using our experience in Iraq, I would certainly hope that you would weigh in, as we are making the decision on the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, that we, before we build it, make it resistant to mines, and not after the fact. And that is a very real debate going on right now, and I would hope, using your quote, that, you know, we could use that to our advantage.

General Renuart, I happen to live in coastal Mississippi. NORTHCOM was nowhere to be found after Katrina. That is water under the bridge.

But let's take a similar circumstance. And, God forbid, I don't want anything to happen to Pennsylvania, but I am only using them as an example, because a large percentage of their Guard is in Iraq right now.

Two simultaneously horrible events happen in Pennsylvania, one in Pittsburgh, one in Philadelphia. They don't have hospitals; they

don't have electricity; they don't have food distribution. What are the resources at your disposal now that we have learned the hard way—let's start with Philadelphia. Could—are you in a position to contact the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and say, "I want an amphibious assault ship and that floating hospital as close to Philadelphia as you can get right now"?

General RENUART. Congressman, I will tell you a short answer: Absolutely, yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. You have—okay, so you are the guy?

General RENUART. I am the guy. And, in fact, today, I have an amphibious ready group that is available to me. It is—we keep one on the East Coast, one on the West. They are doing other training missions, but they are identified for homeland security and homeland defense response, should that be required. And I have the authority from the secretary to ask and move those.

Similarly, the hospital ship—although she will be headed to Jim's world here in the south to do some great humanitarian work, but if she is available, absolutely. But I will also tell you——

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, sir——

General RENUART. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. One of the Seabee battalions is home. We won't say which one. You are in a position to say, "I need you to go to Pittsburgh and start building places for people to berth in"?

General RENUART. Again, Congressman, absolutely.

Mr. TAYLOR. And, General, the reason I am saying this is, I think yours is the most—we have the least understanding of your command. And I want to give you this opportunity to clear that up because, you know, again, I have sat in this room for a long time. I am convinced something bad is going to happen on American soil. As good a job as you do, somebody is going to get through.

And I think the point that we need—the Americans need to know is that you are the guy who is going to respond.

General RENUART. Congressman, I appreciate that. And I, too, share your view that we have to be prepared, because something untoward will happen, whether it is manmade or natural disaster. And we are the DOD command. We partner, as you know, with the National Guard. We are——

Mr. TAYLOR. Let's get a clarification. What is your authority with the Guard?

General RENUART. Congressman, the first authority with the Guard, as you know, is with—the governor will order those forces it needs into place. We have twice a day joint ops and planning meetings with the National Guard Bureau so that we integrate responses so that we don't duplicate and we complement each other in each event.

But certainly, in this case, the governor of Pennsylvania will want to have and should have access to those national guardsmen. As you said, many are deployed. Under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, additional guardsmen can come from other states.

We will also be in a position to support. And we do that in conjunction with our friends in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). And as you mentioned, an event occurs in one of those large cities that may be nuclear or biological or chemical, we have

a—today a fully equipped, fully trained, 4,000-plus-person consequence management and response force. It sits on a very short response notice.

I have coordinated with Transportation Command for the lift it takes to move that. And if an event occurs in Philadelphia or in Pittsburgh, and that capability is needed for the particular unique nature of the circumstance, I can move them and the Secretary of Defense is fully supportive of moving them, at the direction of the President, in there and would be in within 48 hours.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General.

General RENUART. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett, please.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

General Mattis, I would like to join Chairman Taylor in his appeal to you that you take a look at the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. There are options that would provide enormously more protection for our troops there, and I would be happy to join you and Chairman Taylor in a discussion of this problem and these options.

Admiral, I was impressed that twice you mentioned the need for reduction of demand on drugs. You mentioned it in your oral testimony, and you mentioned it in the answer to one of the questions.

What we are doing relative to drugs kind of fits Albert Einstein's definition of insanity, doing the same thing over and over again and hoping for a different result. We are really quite good at eradicating drugs and interdicting them, but it has had no effect on the availability of these drugs in our cities.

As a matter of fact, in Philadelphia—I am sorry, in Baltimore, in my state, in Philadelphia, too, the quantity and quality of drugs was such that we have people dying from overdosing because the drugs no longer had to be cut for street sale.

So, obviously, the roughly $3 billion that we spend a year in Colombia in eradication and interdiction has no effect on the availability of drugs in our country, and that is, of course, the reason we do that, to reduce drug use in our country.

Now, I applaud, sir, your concern that we need to spend more effort on education, on reducing demand. If nobody bought drugs, nobody would be selling drugs, would they? And I think we need to have enormously more attention on reducing the demand for drugs, because obviously we are not going to reduce the availability of drugs. We have tried that over and over again, and it is not working. We just have to own up to that.

General Mattis, you mentioned that the enemy gravitates to our weakness, and Chairman Taylor mentioned the potential weakness of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. There is another weakness that really concerns me, and it is a growing weakness.

We continue to field weapons systems that have little or no Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection. And every one of our potential enemies in their open literature and in their war games mention the use of EMP as an early event in any conflict with us.

The EMP Commission interviewed Russian generals who told us that the Soviets had developed—and they obviously have—EMP weapons, enhanced weapons, that would produce 200 kilovolts per meter at the center. That is 100 kilovolts per meter at the margins.

If that is true, sir, we never have built or tested anything to that level of EMP protection.

Why do we keep fielding these weapons systems that will not be available to us when we really need them? We don't need them for wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. We will really need them against a peer, and they won't be useful to us because the first thing he will do is an EMP laydown.

Why do we keep investing billions of dollars in these systems that have little or no EMP protection, therefore, little or no utility in a war with one of our peers? Why do we keep doing this?

General MATTIS. I cannot give you a good answer, sir. I can speculate. I think, for some period of time, there was a hope that this nuclear issue was going to go away. I think we saw some turning away from keeping focused on it. I will add that any concern about that in the recent past has been taken care of by the U.S. forces, but not when it comes to the acquisition.

I don't have a good answer for you other than to say that I believe that now thinking the unthinkable is no longer off-limits. And we will work it. I don't have a specifically satisfactory answer for you, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Several years ago, I called my friend, Tom Clancy, who has done several events for me. He had an EMP scenario in one of his books, and I knew he did very good research, and I asked him about EMP. He said, "If you read my book, you know all I know."

Let me refer you to—in his words, to the smartest man hired by the U.S. government, and that was a Dr. Lowell Wood in Lawrence Livermore in California. In those days, we didn't have cell phones, so I paged him. And I thought he was in California. An hour later, he was sitting at my desk in my office because he was here in Washington.

Lowell says that the reason that we don't address this is because it is just too hard. We don't want to face it, and so we ignore it. Do you think that is true?

General MATTIS. Sir, I will tell you, the physics of the problem probably make going to the moon look easy, so I think he has probably a good point. And when you talk about hard, you are talking about enormous cost. And in some cases—in, I think, most cases, we have not even done the Research & Development (R&D) that allows us to look at acquiring systems that have the capability—in other words, we still have to figure out how to do it.

But we are going to have to get on with it, sir. Again, I will not defend where we are at right now. I cannot.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And now we call on Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

General Ward, I am going to address my time with you. And, first, I want to just make a comment. I had to step out while you did your oral statement, but in your written statement, you referred to—have a brief discussion about the over-fishing off the coast of Africa.

And, you know, I applaud you for including that in a national security discussion about what is going on, because poverty and hunger and lack of economic vitality are huge national security threats. And I think probably most of us don't realize what the potential degradation of the fish off the coast of Africa means for a lot of nations and a lot of people and for stability in Africa.

On page four of your written statement, you say the following: "The greatest security threats facing Africa include enduring conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, rebel insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and illegal immigration."

The first one on that list was enduring conflicts. And would you describe for me, please, what you see the role of AFRICOM is in these enduring conflicts?

And I want to mention two specifically as examples. We have this ongoing dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia on that border, that—while there has not been active military engagement for some time now of any major amount, none of us would be surprised if it were to flare up again at some point. It is an unresolved border and an unresolved war.

The second one is the several—well, a couple decades long now dispute between the Polisario that are based on the Moroccan-Algerian border and the kingdom of Morocco.

When you look at those two threats, what you have referred to as enduring conflicts, what do you see as the role of AFRICOM in disputes like those?

General WARD. Thank you, sir.

First, the acknowledgement of the threats to the environment, I appreciate your noting that. To be sure, these threats to those resources that could be made available to a people of a nation to increase their lot, to increase their well-being, critical, very, very important. And when it doesn't occur where they are, then they will seek it elsewhere.

With respect to the enduring conflicts, they range, as you have noted—they are the borders of Eritrea, Djibouti, the borders in North Africa, with respect to the Western Sahara, also the central part of the continent, there in the Congo.

As it comes to the role that we play, the command, the military role, you know, where there are political agreement that talk to, one, creating stability, that talk to, two, the need to create a force, a security force that would, in fact, help the legitimate government of a nation provide that control or that stability, where there is a lack of training, a lack of equipment, a lack of interoperability, a lack of working effectively to some degree with its neighbors, where, again, there is the political will to do so, and a determination is made that we, in fact, can play a role in increasing the capacity to address those deficiencies, that is where we as a command, a military command come in to take a role to increase the capacity of those nations to do such.

For example, as the situation in the Congo was occurring and interoperability deficiencies were noted, our ability to work with those nations—Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic to a degree—to help information-sharing, to help with equipment interoperability, providing sometimes needed logistics support and enhancement, to cause those

governments to be able to have a better sense of what goes on inside their borders against insurgencies or the rebel factions, and then be able to work in some degree of commonality to address them.

But, again, those actions that we take, sir, come on the heels of a policy decision having been taken by the nations themselves, obviously, our national policy direction that supports the activities that we would, in fact, do to help in those instances.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, as someone who argued for the creation of Joint Forces Command 10, 12 years ago, I have become concerned over time that the command—that the focus on the future, which was part of the reason to create that command, has faded over time, and I recently read in a book by Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, where he said that, unfortunately, Joint Forces, established to identify emerging threats and support for the military's transformation to address them, has progressively moved away from that mission since Millennium Challenge 2002.

And, as you know, Millennium Challenge 2002 was a war game that was stopped in the middle because the good guys were losing. And they had to rearrange the deck in order to prevent an embarrassment.

Dr. Krepinevich makes three suggestions to help refocus Joint Forces Command on the future. And I would like to get your reaction to them.

One is, he thinks your—the tenure for your position needs to be lengthened, because nobody can occupy that job in the normal rotation and make the real difference with that futuristic orientation that you really need, because sometimes that goes countercultural to the services.

Secondly, he says Joint Forces ought to have a seat on a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). And, thirdly, he says Joint Forces ought to have a seat on the defense acquisition board so that you are there with a voice when acquisition decisions are made.

What is your reaction to those three suggestions?

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir.

In terms of our future focus, it is a balancing act. I will be the first to admit it. However, I will tell you that the joint training that goes on right now is critical to making the Goldwater-Nichols—the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols into reality.

The providing of forces—of prepared joint forces going out is so smooth that I spend very little of my time on it. There is a small section of the command that, when the Secretary of Defense approves our request for forces from one of the geographic commanders, it goes very quickly.

Not a lot of distraction there, is my point. Most of our effort, most of my effort with Joint Forces Command goes into the future.

In regards to lengthening the commander's tour, I think that there is a—if I remember right—around 50 percent of the total command, 27 percent of the command has got government contract

or contractors, civilian contractors. They provide continuity. There is also a fair amount of continuity from government civilians.

So although the commander's tenure is one consideration—and I wouldn't necessarily refute or come up with an argument against it—I don't think it is as bad as thinking that everything stops when a commander comes and goes. Some of us may think the world begins and ends with us, but I think the reality is, the command functions quite well.

We do have to get some institutionalization of this focus on the future that perhaps disappeared under the urgency of the active operations overseas. I think we have that back, and we are going in the right direction, and we are open to any kind of assessment that wants to come down and look at us on that.

On the JROC seat, I will tell you right now, sir, I can walk into the JROC any time, any combatant commander can, and I exercise that when necessary, but I do not feel inhibited. Plus, I can always do an end run on them, to put it bluntly, and walk into the Deputy Secretary of Defense's office, where I have a very close working relationship.

So I am not inhibited by not having a formal seat there. I can be in any meeting, and I can work with the deputy secretary and the vice chairman, if there is something I think is going off the rail.

As far as the defense acquisition board, there is an awful lot of folks who get involved in acquisition today, almost to the point that we have paralyzed the process. If I can bring something—bring an advantage to it, I am more than willing to do so.

Generally speaking, I would bring one more voice that is saying something that is already being considered, but if I think it is not being considered, I can always insert myself there.

I am not, as some of you know, I am not shy about inserting myself where I think I need to be, although there are some points that have been made by Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Taylor that I recognize, too, that in the normal scheme of things—and this is what you are talking about—in the normal scheme of things, I may not be in the room.

But if it comes down to command and control, I am in the room. That is my job. And on the other things, I somewhat defer to those who have the title 10 responsibilities, because I eventually—I hope that addresses your question, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is helpful. And I am very grateful you are where you are, because I think you have a real chance to focus the command more where it needs to be focused. And I would hope to visit with you more about that.

Just briefly, Admiral Stavridis, you talk about your mantra being joint, international, interagency, public, private. One of the suggestions is, as we grapple with this interagency issue, is that we ought to use the structure of the combatant commands to be the structure for the U.S. government in bringing all of these different agencies and instruments of power together.

What—just briefly, what lessons have you learned in your command that might be useful as all of us try to figure out how to get all of the tools in the toolbox available for us in all parts of the world?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, first and foremost, I think it is important that we don't militarize our foreign policy. That would be a tremendous mistake.

State Department must do diplomacy. Agency for International Development (AID) must do development. Defense must do defense. But the trick is, how do we do all of that in a way that we are mutually supportive?

And in general, in my region, I find that it is very much State in the lead on defense, AID in the lead on development, and where we can try and be helpful from defense, we try to be.

I believe that it is vitally important that everything we do ought to go through a filter that says: Have we approached this in an international way? Have we avoided unilateralism? Have we taken the transnational approach?

Because so many of the challenges we face in this region, in the Americas, in this home we share together are, in fact, transnational.

Secondly, the interagency has to work together. I think we have come a fair way at doing that over the last five years, but I think we have a distance to go.

I think there is a role for the private sector in all of this, and we are exploring how linkages can be established between government, private sector, in the defense arena, for example.

The other part of the whole equation that is so important is strategic communications. It is communicating these ideas in ways—particularly in South America and the Caribbean, Central America, in ways that show respect for sovereignty, take an approach of equality with the other nations in the region, and don't in any sense come at the problem with a sense that we have all the answers, because we don't.

So however we structure our organizations for national security in the future, those would be the points I would submit are the valuable ones that we have learned at Southern Command. I will leave it to others to decide what the best structure is.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of you for being here and certainly for your extraordinary service to our country.

This really follows up on the question that you just answered, Admiral, and perhaps the rest of you would like to expand. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is holding a hearing today, as you may know, which is exploring the Department of Defense's role in foreign assistance.

And there are concerns, of course, that the military's role has contributed in some way to the weakening of the State Department, its more traditional leadership role in managing U.S. foreign policy.

And, you know, a lot of what you just responded to, sir, and I appreciate that, I wonder if there are—there is really more to say in this area, because to a certain extent, you know, it is not clear that military activities are always vetted through the country team or understood.

And how are we really on the ground getting it done? I understand the goals, but what more should we be doing? How should we focus on this in a different way?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could quickly just add to what I said before, in a practical sense, we take all of the military-to-military engagement that we do—any activity that is done in Southern Command is always vetted through the country team.

And then we take our larger, what we call theater security cooperation plan, and we bring that here to State, to AID. We show it to them. We have complete transparency. We take all of their changes.

You are absolutely right: What happens on the ground in a country has to be the responsibility of the ambassador in that country. And I am very confident we are taking that approach fully at SOUTHCOM, and we will continue to do so.

General RENUART. Ma'am, if I could, I would like to add, first, echo Jim. Our numbers of countries that we deal with are much smaller, but certainly Canada and Mexico are partners that we work with very actively.

And, again, those—you have to have diplomacy in the lead when you talk about the relations with foreign nations that we deal with each day.

It is critical to have a partnership there because so much—and I will speak from my experience with Mexico—so much of what is done within the country is done by the military. That is the nature of their structure. So there is a natural relationship mil-to-mil that complements the ambassador's program in the country. And I think that is critical.

I would like to add one twist here in the homeland, because we have a unique interagency process in our headquarters that is a little different, in that we deal with the 49 nations, 3 territories, and the district. And so that requires a bit of a different private-sector and interagency approach.

We have 45 federal agencies that have assigned senior individuals to our headquarters. We incorporate them into our ops and our plans and our intelligence and that sort of thing. It allows a level of partnership and in an interagency way that I am very pleased and proud of. It allows us to be a contributing partner to each of those agencies.

So the interagency approach, the whole-of-government approach has got to be the best way—is the best way, has got to be the way of the future for us. And I think there are some models that can be helpful in other places.

Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. When you were working with our country teams, what role does the military necessarily play? How would you assess the public opinion towards the United States in your areas? And how do you merge some of that understanding? And what effect does it have on your operations?

General WARD. I think, Mrs. Davis, two things. First, I certainly echo all that has been said by Admiral Stavridis and General Renuart. We work very closely with the country teams, but not just in implementing the plans, also in developing the plans.

From the outset, the country teams are involved to include the public diplomacy aspect of those, because we rely on the public diplomacy section—what is inside the embassies—to help us assure that the effect that we want to create are understood by the populations with whom we are trying to serve.

And so that relationship is absolutely critical. It is cradle to grave, from the beginning of a plan to its execution, fully including and, in fact, taking the lead from the embassies' action plans, insofar as how what we do supports that overall process there within the country.

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could shift really quickly just to Mexico for a second, because there is a great deal of concern that some of the weapons being smuggled into Mexico are coming from the U.S. To what extent is that true and a problem? And should there be greater restrictions so that we can get a better handle on that?

General RENUART. Well, ma'am, it is for Congress to decide on restrictions, but I would say that, certainly, the quantity of weapons that have been captured or uncovered in Mexico that have been used by the cartels are predominantly either U.S.-made or trafficked through the United States dealers, not necessarily flowing through our borders, but there have been illicit dealers that have been working that.

The experts in our law enforcement agencies really are working this very hard, not truly a military role to be involved in that, although, interestingly, we have worked with the military in Mexico to help share that information with our law enforcement folks. It is a real problem, and we have to pay attention to it.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.

I want to continue with the discussion about Mexico, General Renuart, if I could for a minute.

In the news, the President has announced that he is sending federal agents to the border for reinforcement. And as you have heard here—and I know you know very well—there is fear that the violence is spilling over from Ciudad Juarez and Nuevo Laredo and others into the United States, in both those cases into Texas.

Periodically in this body, we debate and sometimes vote on whether or not we should be using U.S. military forces, to put the U.S. Army on the border. I wonder if you would address that very briefly to the wisdom of such a thing and—or the practicality of such a thing?

General RENUART. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. I think, first, militarizing our border should not be our approach at this point. We have a number of agencies who have that role and responsibility. There certainly is some modest assistance that DOD might be able to provide, and I think we ought to be in a position to provide that, should it be requested.

I do believe that there is a challenge with the—or the potential that violence south of the border could spill over. You have seen, I am sure, media reports of additional kidnappings or increased kidnappings in Arizona, for example.

But the military really has the role to provide assistance to law enforcement. Certainly, the National Guard has some legal authority to assist law enforcement in their role. But as the President has mentioned, Secretary Napolitano has mentioned, Secretary Gates has mentioned, we ought not to immediately move towards militarization of the border, but we ought to look at a collaborative effort.

And I think the planning efforts are ongoing now to come up with that kind of a solution.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. And I agree wholeheartedly. We should not be moving to militarize the border. There are other ways that we ought to address that.

And, clearly, the military can and has provided assistance. But the notion of putting armed infantry on the border is probably not a good one. And I just wanted to get that from you, and I am delighted to see that you concur.

General Ward, I want to pick up on two things, if the time allows. One, you talk about the value of United Nations forces and African Union forces. And I know you can reflect back to a number of years ago when we were much younger in—and, in fact, in Africa and looking at U.N. forces hunkered down in Mogadishu, for example, and not venturing off the airport.

And so I trust that either in African Union or United Nations forces—and I know that you are involved in the training of forces—I gather from your earlier answer, you are saying that that is not the case now or at least that those forces are more useful and more effective than in those long years past. Is that correct?

General WARD. Thank you for that, sir. Two things. First, it is a function of how well-trained and equipped they are and that they are clearly—even today, there are variances in that training and that equipment. And then, thirdly—correction, secondly—what authorities they then have to do a mission or not.

So I think it is a combination of those two factors, their training and equipping, and then what authorities that they have. When those align, then their use, their role can, in fact, make a difference, and there are instances where that, in fact, is the case.

It is not absolute, and so therefore, I think, to the degree that we can be of an assist in helping to provide trained and equipped forces from whatever contributing nation that would provide forces to those formations, either United Nations-sponsored formations or African Union-sponsored formations, then we have a role, I think, in helping those forces be better trained and equipped—clearly authorities commensurate with whatever mission they are assigned as they are employed.

Mr. KLINE. All right. Thank you.

I see my time is about to expire. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair thanks the gentleman.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

A couple questions real quickly. Admiral, you talked about we had this large joint force, 22 countries participated. Without nam-

ing them all, four or five of the major countries that we would look at as being stronger allies with us and that participated there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I will provide the entire list for the record, of course, but Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Panama. I could go on and on. It is literally every country that has a significant-sized military force in the Americas, with the exception of Venezuela and Cuba, obviously.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. And I was looking for, was it the larger countries or was it, you know, some of the smaller nations?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, it is both. It is both. And I will just make the point, last summer, we had a Brazilian admiral taking command of forces on one side of the Panama Canal and a Chilean admiral taking command of forces on the other side of the canal. It was extremely gratifying to see the nations working together.

Mr. KISSELL. And, General Ward, along the same lines in Africa, the military-to-military contact we have, what are some of the nations of Africa that seem to be the strongest in working and willing to work with us?

General WARD. Sir, I think, if we look at those nations that contribute forces to the peacekeeping missions, from Uganda to Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria, there are several that, in fact, have a capability.

They need assistance logistically predominantly to either deploy to one of these far-off places, to sustain themselves in one of those far-off places, but there is an increasing will that I see among many of the African nations to, in fact, do what many of them say they want to do, that is, provide for their own security.

And so the level of nations—Burundi is another example. Small, out just from a very severe internal conflict, but realizing that it can play a role in the future and attempting to do so.

So the range is quite broad, as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, but, again, most—many lack capacity, typically in logistics areas—manpower typically is not an issue. We work with them to help increase health situation within those nations, as an example, our program for HIV–AIDS to complement the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) through our defense HIV–AIDS prevention program, to help them get enough people that can, in fact, then be trained and then to deploy into a peacekeeping set, though those nations are, in fact, numbers are there.

Mr. KISSELL. What would you say in terms of our outreach to the countries of Africa? What portion of Africa? Are we reaching half, three-quarters? How far out does that outreach go?

General WARD. I think if I were to—and I will get a more precise number to you—but we are reaching nations throughout the continent, north, east, south, west, and central Africa.

We have probably 35 nations—and I would just hazard that guess—of the 53 on the continent that we have active programs with to some degree, as we—as we work with them and the various either counterterror programs, programs developed in their transportation of their militaries, and also in just basic logistic support, as they participate in U.N.- or African Union (A.U.)-sponsored peacekeeping operations.

Mr. KISSELL. And, General Renuart, I know I haven't got much time left, and one of the first—I think it was the first hearing and

being a new congressman I came to was former Senator Gramm gave a report on weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, said we weren't winning that fight, gave recommendations, had some predictions about what could happen within the borders of the United States in the next few years.

Do you all have in any involvement in trying to implement the recommendations that commission made?

General RENUART. Sir, I think—I will have to say I am not as familiar with the specific recommendations. However, I will tell you that we have taken a number of actions specifically regarding this challenge in the last three or four years to include growing and building and equipping a consequence management response force that can allow us to respond to a weapon of mass destruction.

We have also increased our capability to help prevent loss of, for example, a nuclear weapon or a nuclear device. So I believe we are moving down the road in that direction. But if you have a specific area, I would be happy to mention that.

Mr. KISSELL. Well, I would say, you know, the commission had some specific suggestions how we could, you know, avoid this happening and also towards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And I would simply that, you know, it would probably be good for everybody that has, you know, some time in this to really look at that commission's report.

Thank you, sir.

General RENUART. And, Mr. Kissell, I will get the report and provide you an answer for the record.

Mr. KISSELL. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Wittman, please.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and thank you so much for your service to our nation.

Admiral, in January of 2009, the Navy announced its decision to homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station in Florida. And Mayport's never homeported a nuclear-powered carrier and, based on previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions, no longer has the nearby air wing at Cecil Field to support carrier operations.

And, Admiral, as the COCOM for this region, I wanted to know, were you consulted in this decision? And if so, when were you consulted? And what was your position? And if you are not, are you aware of anyone within Southern Command that was consulted to provide strategic input into this decision?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as you know, it is a decision made by—well, a recommendation made by the Chief of Naval Operations, Gary Roughead, to the Secretary of the Navy. It goes to the Secretary of Defense. So I don't in any way participate in those conversations in any formal sense, no.

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, as a follow up, in April 2008, the CNO announced the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet in Mayport. And the commander of the Fourth Fleet, as you know, also serves as the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, the Navy's component command of SOUTHCOM.

And let me read you a recent statement from former Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Winter at the Current Strategy Forum in

June of 2008. And he said, "The Fourth Fleet demonstrates the Navy's commitment to the region by creating presence in support of combined training operations, humanitarian operations, and disaster response, and this can be done without using a carrier battle group.

"We should also remember that it is sometimes more effective to have a smaller combatant that can access many of the littoral areas where we need to go. Smaller platforms are also more suitable for training, as they are more compatible with the navies with which we will be operating. We must balance our present requirements with the missions and threats we are likely to face in the given region."

And my question is this: Given the fact that we know many of the existing facilities at Mayport—excuse me, existing frigates at Mayport will be retired soon and given the unique types of missions we encounter in the Fourth Fleet's operating areas, such as counterdrug operations, theater support cooperation, military-to-military exercises and training, do you agree with Secretary Winter's assessment that the Fourth Fleet can accomplish its objectives without a carrier battle group? Or do you believe that homeporting a nuclear carrier at Mayport is necessary to provide the right mix of assets to support the U.S. Fourth Fleet?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I am not going to address whether or not the Fourth Fleet—anything about homeporting, because I really don't have anything to do with homeporting.

And the way it works for a COCOM, sir, is, we just go to the Joint Staff and we tell them what kind of ships we need. And where they come from is really not my concern. They could come from Mayport. They can come from Norfolk. They could come from San Diego. A lot of the ships that work for me come from San Diego. So, in terms of where ships are homeported, that is really just not in my purview.

In terms of, what kinds of ships do we use in Southern Command? We are far more likely to use frigates, large-deck amphibs, hospital ships, innovative high-speed ships. Those are what we are more likely to use, but I can't rule out ever using any particular kind of ship. But I agree with Secretary Winter: It is more likely that we have used the type of ships he describes and I just mentioned.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good.

And, finally, the Navy identified strategic dispersal considerations, consistencies with the Navy's fleet response plan and operational readiness as the justification for its decision to homeport a carrier at Mayport. In the Navy's decision document, the record of the decision, however, failed to provide any real detail on why strategic dispersal considerations and consistency with the Navy's fleet response plan and operational readiness support moving a carrier.

Can you comment on whether moving a carrier is necessary to accomplish these objectives and the Navy's fleet response plan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I really can't. It is really not in my purview. I am a joint official. I could as equally be any one of these colored uniforms. I am not in the Navy chain of command at the moment, so I would really refer that question to Admiral

Roughead. I will take it to Admiral Roughead, and I will ask him to get back to you with an answer to that question.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Gentlemen, I joined the Army in 1993 and never had the opportunity to meet a four-star general, so to have four of you here at the same time is pretty awesome. And to spend the last hour-and-a-half with you has been educational.

I want to thank you for your service to our nation. We really do appreciate it.

I wanted to kind of focus my remarks on AFRICOM. So to General Ward, my brother is a major in the Air Force. He just came back from a deployment to Djibouti. And, you know, appreciate what you are doing in the early stages of what is going on with AFRICOM and the balance on your mission between, obviously, short-term counterterrorism operations and then long-term political and economic development.

I wanted to focus and get my arms around the fact that, when you look at Africa as a continent and your mission, you know, the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and India combined geographically is smaller than your mission in Africa.

And you look at the fiscal year 2008 budget for your operation, $350 million, which is approximately what we spend in Iraq per day, is there one function, you know, when you say, given your balance and the multiple demands on your command, is there one function within your budget that you need more help, that you need more funding, and that you think that we should be focusing on as a Congress and as an Armed Services Committee?

General WARD. Well, Mr. Murphy. I thank you very much. And thank you, too, for your service.

I wish I had an opportunity to have met you during those early times in the 1990s there. So I appreciate what you have done and appreciate where you are now, as well, sir.

I think, you know, my command, except for the work that we do—and we do accomplish counterterror work, to be sure—we do that as a part of a global counterterror effort—my command's predominant role is in doing our activities to help our partner nations increase their capacity.

It doesn't take a lot to do that. What it takes is something we call persistent and sustained engagement from the standpoint of our training. Our best method of doing that is when our nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can pair up with these nations who are attempting to transform and do things differently.

Given the commitment of those resources in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, very difficult. What we do now is work very, very closely with other potential sources of that type of support, our National Guard, as well as, as was pointed out, submitting requirements through the Joint Staff for forces that may be in some period of outside of dwell, but not actively employed in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, to cause that relationship to go on.

Huge continent, so getting things around is a big requirement that we have. So our mobility requirements are clearly there as another requirement that we have.

Resources to assist these nations and increasing their littoral—their maritime safety and security, so to the degree that we can—the sorts of vessels we have talked about here and, again, the range is a range that is quite wide, from frigates to large deck amphibian, we—the aircraft carrier—we just had an aircraft carrier visit South Africa, first time since apartheid, this past fall.

So we take all of these as we can to help, one, build relationships, two, provide some sustained-level security engagement, that, three, leads to a capacity increase in our partner nations that is reflective of integrity, that is reflective of legitimacy, that is reflective of military performing as we would like them to perform, as they wish to perform, and societies where they respect their people, are protectors of their people, and are—contribute themselves or act——

Mr. MURPHY. Sure.

General WARD [continuing]. As responsible members of that society.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, how was the population of South Africa—how were they toward the aircraft carrier being there? Were they—I mean, I think back when the USS *John Kennedy* was in Ireland. And, obviously, they loved it when our—that ship was there. But how about as far as, what was the local populace in South Africa?

General WARD. The reaction was very positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Perfect. Let me focus real quick, sir, on—you know, I also serve on the Intelligence Committee. You look at the real concern with Africa, with terrorist organizations, especially in Somalia, the Sudan, and I am trying to get a strong stranglehold. What about a potential widespread outbreak of a disease, really a continent-wide outbreak? And, obviously, that would—what would that do to the—you know, the spilling over to government and everything else?

Is there a focus, is there a preparation that you need that we need to assist there to counter that possibility?

General WARD. There are, sir. We pay attention to that. The threat of a pandemic disease is very real, and we do pay attention to it. And devoting resources to that is, I think, a very wise investment.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir.

My time is done. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, generals, admiral.

General Mattis, it is especially good to see you here. I am just very proud of you, sir, and what you have done. You are truly a warrior-leader. It was great serving under you in Iraq.

Admiral, my first question is for you. Could you talk a little bit about China and Russia's involvement in how the—maybe the Russian tentacles are back out there again where they were receded for quite a while and how China is there now, too, please?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. In—thank you for your service, and thanks to all the veterans. I know there are a lot of veterans of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, and others who serve on this committee. And we are proud of that part of the relationship, as well.

Congressman Hunter, as to China, I am not overly concerned about Chinese activities in the Americas. I believe they are here for economic reasons to find markets for their products, to obtain raw materials. I think it is part of the general pattern of global trade that is going on.

I do not perceive geopolitical or geostrategic interest. And I don't see a great deal of military-to-military activity between militaries of this region and the Chinese military. We watch it closely, but thus far I am comfortable with the Chinese engagement in the region.

In terms of Russia, much has been made of this recently, I believe stemming from four Russian ships that operated in the Caribbean this past summer. They operated with the Venezuelan navy. They made some port visits in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and in Cuba, as well as some flights of Russian strategic bombers that came down.

My friend, General Renuart, tracked them very assiduously. In all cases, as the Russian military forces were operating in this region, we kept track of them. That is our job.

But I don't perceive a military threat from Russia in this region. Nor do I become overly exercised by their deployments in the region, at least at this stage. They don't pose, in my view, a military threat to the United States.

And Secretary Gates said at his hearing when he was asked the question, "Hey, maybe next time, if they send ships, they will do a port visit in Miami."

I think there is an approach here which ought to be one of recognizing that the Russians have a global navy; it is going to operate around the globe. They have a global air force; it is going to operate around the globe. And in terms of Latin America and the Caribbean, I don't see a military threat from them.

Mr. HUNTER. That is good to hear. Thank you.

In the interests of time, let me move on here. Do you see—for General Renuart, do you see them taking advantage—anybody taking advantage of the chaos in Mexico right now? Because the enemy does gravitate to our weakness, and right now Mexico is a weakness, whether or not it is a threat.

But do you see other countries operating through Mexico in order to destabilize us?

General RENUART. Mr. Hunter, I—again, I share Admiral Stavridis' view that neither China nor Russia—and in my assessment, there is not another country that is actively working in Mexico to destabilize us. I think certainly there are——

Mr. HUNTER. Iranian influence in Mexico? You don't see that?

General RENUART. There is an Iranian presence in Mexico, for sure. The government of Mexico is working that themselves. We monitor it, but it is a relatively small presence.

Mr. HUNTER. Do they have a stabilizing factor?

General RENUART. I don't see that at this point, no.

Mr. HUNTER. So they have a destabilizing——

General RENUART. I am sorry. I misunderstood what you said.

Mr. HUNTER. Oh, I am sorry.

General RENUART. They do not have a destabilizing effect that I have seen, at least at this point.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much.

General Mattis, one last question for you, sir. Do you know that there is no golden hour in Afghanistan right now with the forces that you deploy to Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. Say again, the question, sir?

Mr. HUNTER. That there is no golden hour. That is the one hour that you have to get people up if they get hit back to a facility to get treated.

General MATTIS. Sir, we are working the deployment of the sufficient helicopter assets to make certain we get it down a golden hour. There are—you know the size of the country. You have served there. It is a challenge. But that is our goal. And the Secretary of Defense, I believe, has approved the request for forces that will get us there.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the—you realize that there aren't any Ospreys in Afghanistan. Is that true, there is no Osprey squadron?

General MATTIS. That is correct right now.

Mr. HUNTER. Did you know that they just deployed an Osprey with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. I am aware of that. And that——

Mr. HUNTER. Would the Ospreys have made it so that there is a golden hour if they were deployed to Afghanistan—the MEU?

General MATTIS. I would have to do the time-distance factor to give you a truly accurate statement.

Mr. HUNTER. But let me say, I have done it for you. And they would have. And I was wondering if you had any say whatsoever in having the—do we not trust the Osprey? Do they not want it in combat? Or are we doing it purely to put it with the U.S. Navy?

I understand that they might be going over there in the future, but they aren't there now. And I was wondering if you had any say in that when it came to the deployment of the Osprey?

General MATTIS. Sir, the commitment of the specific helicopter assets going into country will be part of the Marine contingent that the secretary has approved. I don't know what percent of that is Osprey and what is CH–53, that sort of—I can get that answer for you, though.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Generals, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. The members will notice that the public affairs—public relations—whatever you call it, the P.A. system is working much, much better. Complaining does help. You don't have to ask the witnesses nor the members to repeat their questions or their answers.

The gentlelady from New Hampshire, there are two votes pending. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, will assume the chair upon the return, and the hearing will continue.

And, gentlemen, we appreciate your patience.

But in the meantime, we will call Ms. Shea-Porter to finish up before the vote.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you so much for being here and your service to the country.

General Ward, I wanted to ask you about the humanitarian assistance programs on the continent of Africa. I wanted to know specifically how we are doing in comparison to other countries such as China. Are they more visible? Do we have a greater visibility? Is it enough? And what are your plans to make sure that the continent of Africa understands what our goals are there and our concerns for them?

General WARD. Thank you, Madam Shea-Porter.

Two things. First, the work that we do is work that complements the greater effort being done by our U.S. Agency for International Development, insofar as our humanitarian assistance effort is concerned.

We, working in concert with the chiefs of mission, the ambassadors, determine those areas that, one, are not being met by any other aspect of our government and then, two, support the military capacity of our servicemen and women who have skill sets in those areas, as well.

I think, from the standpoint of what others are doing—i.e., nations, China, India, and others—clearly, they are expending a great amount of resources in various humanitarian projects, programs, infrastructure construction, things that we are not matching, things that we are not doing.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Does that concern you?

General WARD. It concerns me from the standpoint of what the effect of what is being done by others has in the environment and the influence that they have based on that and how that is influencing how those nations who receive that support react and respond to it.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, thank you, General. I am going to interrupt because of the time, but I think that is exactly the problem that we have so often, that we come late to the game. And so, if I am hearing you correctly, you are concerned, as I think most of us would be, that we might be losing a little bit of the edge that we could have right now if we were more active and the Africans understood that we were a generous, good people concerned about their welfare.

So which country, can I ask you, concerns you in Africa? What other foreign countries do you feel is making greater gains than we are, in terms of winning hearts and minds?

General WARD. I would have to take a close look at that and get back to you. I think in a general sense, the reaction occurs throughout the continent of Africa. In today's economic situation, it is even exacerbated a bit because of the reaction or the reflection that what might have been already provided may be reduced—may not be as prevalent.

And so I think that is a concern that is there. I think African nations are meeting in Europe in a prelude to the G–20, expressing the same thought of concern about their continued development based on the economic situation.

But I am not sure I could name a single particular country that would concern me more than any other at this point in time.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So looking at the economic instability and the long history of problems that they are enduring, this might be an opportune time for us to raise our visibility through these kinds of efforts?

General WARD. I think anything that we do makes a difference. And I think it should be not episodic. If we can make it consistent, that is even better, ma'am.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And one last question, thank you.

Operation Objective Voice, getting our message, our ideology across, our goals for democracy, how strong a message are we delivering there right now? Is it—are you able to actually have an impact? Or is it still a challenge to communicate like that?

General WARD. I think the assessment that we get and how we see those pieces of information that are transmitted through Operation Objective Voice, when those things appear in other media on the continent, it lets us know that people are paying attention, the Africans are paying attention.

And then, as we get reactions from our embassies, because we do that in very close coordination with the embassies and the country teams, their public diplomacy sections, that we get the assessment that it is making a difference, they are listening, and it does cause them to see what goes on from a perspective that reflects that that we would intend our force to be.

So I think it is making a difference. And our partners, the ambassadors, the country teams, as well as the nations, think is a very good program that we are involved in.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will go vote. We have two votes, and Mrs. Davis will assume the chair. And as I read the list, Mr. Larsen will be the first batter up.

And, again, thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance.

[Recess.]

Mrs. DAVIS [presiding]. All right, everybody. Thank you so much for waiting. We appreciate your patience.

I am going to turn to Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. And it looks like I am the only one left. Unless someone else shows up, I will just take about 30 minutes, if you don't mind, Madam Chair. I will be very—try to be brief here.

General Renuart, I want to chat with you about the other border, the U.S.-Canadian border, obviously, and specifically with regards to the 2010 Winter Olympics, which will be held in Vancouver, British Columbia, obviously in another country, but only about 10 miles north of the U.S.-Canadian border and right across from what is my district.

And I know U.S. NORTHCOM and DOD has had a supporting role in some of the preparation for security for the Olympics. And I just wanted to ask you what you see the role and function of U.S. NORTHCOM with regards to the Olympics and what role you have played and missions you have played?

General RENUART. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that question.

Actually, there are—I have roles in two hats. In my NORAD hat, as you know, we provide for air security and sovereignty for both

the U.S. and Canada, and we have had a very close relationship with the security, the integrated security unit formed by the governor of Canada—government of Canada, to ensure that we have the pieces in place to provide for a safe, secure monitoring of the airspace in and around not just Vancouver, but, as you know, Seattle and the traffic and transit across the border back and forth each day, not just with the Olympics, is substantial.

And so we have been involved very actively through our Canadian air defense sector and my Canadian NORAD region to understand the challenges that the Canadian government feels it has with respect to a secure airspace.

We are partnering with Transport Canada, with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), with our NORAD regions both in the U.S. and in Canada to ensure that we have created procedures that will allow for safe transit flow of aircraft in and out of the area, and to monitor the area—the airspace around that area, low altitude to high, for any potential threat.

In my NORTHCOM hat, as you may know, we have a civil assistance plan that we have agreed to between my counterpart in Canada, Canada Command, and Northern Command, to allow us to have a framework that could provide military support, should it be requested by either of the governments.

And I would use a great example, Hurricane Gustav, where really the last evacuees we took out of New Orleans were on a Canadian C–17. So we have exercised that process already.

With respect to NORTHCOM support, really, we sit in a situation where the Canadians clearly need to lead and manage and are managing their support to the Olympics. There may be some unique capabilities that don't reside within the Canadian military.

The Canadian government is considering those potential needs and will provide that through a diplomatic note from the ambassador to the U.S. government. And then we are in a position and be prepared to provide whatever support may be required.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks.

General Mattis, good to see you again, sir. And hopefully the Zags will do a good job tomorrow night. We are all cheering for them and the Huskies.

Can I ask you some questions about NATO, your role with NATO transformation, if that is all right.

Last week, we had a hearing about the economic crisis and its impact on national security. One of the themes was that the economic recession globally would have an impact on our allies' ability to meet their own defense budget needs.

And are you running into a problem as your—with your NATO hat on, with our allies and their investment into their transformational capabilities?

General MATTIS. Sir, I am, but it is not a late-breaking thing that I can attribute directly to the economic turndown. This was a big enough concern for me when I arrived there at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Allied Command Transformation a little over a year ago, that we started the multiple futures project, in an attempt to try to harvest from the best think-tanks in Europe and North America what are the threats to the populations and come to some agreement on what is the threat to Europe.

Because if we don't come to an agreement on that, then to try and get them to perhaps carry a more equitable share of the load, I think, was going nowhere. And we continued to see declining defense budgets.

So I think there is a larger issue at stake, frankly. And it is something that we are going to have to engage upon through the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense—already going on, by the way—but we need to get the military appreciation of the situation sufficient that the political leadership know what we think is the threat.

And I should report that out to my boss in Brussels, the Secretary General, within the next 30 days, right after the summit.

Mr. LARSEN. Madam Chairman, just two questions for the record, and I will submit these for the record, one for General Mattis about perhaps a change in who is going to be sitting in as supreme allied commander transformation, the possibility—it is possible it might be the French, in their new role in NATO.

And, second, I will have questions for the record for Generals Ward and Stavridis on 1206 and 1207. And we will give those to you all relatively soon.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General Renuart, could you please provide an update on the security upgrades being made to building two at Peterson Air Force Base?

General RENUART. Certainly, Mr. Lamborn. It is good to see you.

And, Mr. Coffman, also, good to see the Colorado delegations almost the last two standing, so well done.

With respect to—and, Congressman Lamborn, you know we have been involved in a number of improvements in to expand the security protection, if you will, of our operations in so-called building two, our NORAD–NORTHCOM command center.

We have completed now about $4.5 million to $5 million worth of projects since we had the chance to chat last. They include improvements to the entry access procedures. We have created a dedicated Department of Defense security guard force now that is trained and equipped.

We have added additional fencing, access control, vehicle control, vehicle inspections to our security procedures so that we would reduce the potential for someone with a threatening intent to gain access to the building.

We have a couple projects that are just still underway, continuing to work. One involves the electrical access in the building. One involves the provision of electromagnetic hardening. I am sorry Mr. Bartlett's not here, but we are improving that electromagnetic hardening in the building.

And we continue to work with the wing to find additional security measures that the host wing can take to ensure that we don't have that kind of access to the building that might cause us a threat.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Now, what role do you envision for Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Base in the future?

General RENUART. Well, Congressman, as you know, we continue to use Cheyenne Mountain as our alternate command center. It has played an active role. As a matter of fact, while we were doing some minor construction in the primary command center, we moved our operation to the mountain and have conducted full-up operations out of the mountain, although, as you know, it is at a slightly smaller footprint.

We continue to have a rotating presence of assessors and command-and-control capability in the mountain. And we will continue to do that for the foreseeable future.

So I think Cheyenne Mountain will continue to have a principal role in our overall command structure, albeit principally as the alternate command site.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you for those answers. And I do look forward to continuing a dialogue with you on these important issues.

General RENUART. Absolutely.

Mr. LAMBORN. And thank you for the work that you do.

General RENUART. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General Mattis, it is—we obviously use a pretty large, conventional footprint when it comes to regime change and then nation-building and used the counterinsurgency strategy. But we also have insurgency capability in special operations and our ability to go in and align ourselves with an indigenous peoples that share our strategic view in terms of regime change or trying to influence a political situation in a given region.

Could you for us speak to an assessment of our capabilities, in terms of insurgents, on that side of insurgency?

General MATTIS. Mr. Coffman, it would be best if Admiral Olson, my shipmate at special forces, Special Operations Command, gave it. However, I can perhaps address at least some of the edges of this.

We have never had a more integrated special forces, general purpose forces effort in our history. They are so embedded now in each other, they have, in many cases, the same capabilities and, where they are not the same, the unique capabilities are used back and forth appropriately by the combatant commanders.

The special forces are heavily used right now. And the result is, we have to come up with a better allocation of resources, of enablers, for example, from the general purpose forces that enable the special forces to operate.

At the same time, we have a very well-defined division of labor, having sat down with Admiral Olson of Special Operations Command, chief of staff of the Army, commandant of the Marine Corps, myself, and we look at when we are going to try to do these things before we have to send in large footprints of general purpose forces, who should do it?

And let me tell you what the breakout is, in general terms. If we are going to set long-term relationships with indigenous forces, with other nations, that is going to be special forces. It will remain

there. The Army A-teams, the kind of people who are trained to do this.

Where it is going to be teaching skill sets—marching, marksmanship, first aid, basic infantry tactics—the general purpose forces will pick those up so that we free the special forces to do what they only alone can do best, if that gives you somewhat of an answer, I hope.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Mattis.

General Ward, in AFRICOM, what is your role or the role of AFRICOM—is there a role in Darfur, indirect or direct, potentially direct, obviously, no direct role right now, but maybe you could speak to that?

General WARD. Well, thank you, sir.

Clearly, our role in Darfur today is that—of an indirect nature, as we support those African Union and United Nations forces that are there, that have been designated to go there, enabling them, training, equipping to a degree, as well as providing logistic support.

I mentioned, you know, in January, February timeframe, we provided lift assistance to the government of Rwanda to move outsized cargo—essentially, trucks—that they would use in the mission they are in, in Darfur.

And so we are involved with those nations. We are involved with the African Union, as they endeavor to put their plans in place for addressing the situation in Darfur.

Clearly, you know, whatever we would do would be a result of a policy decision having been taken with respect to the role that we play. And, as you pointed out, to this point, that is purely a role from the military point of view of providing assistance to those peacekeeping forces that have been earmarked for peacekeeping activities in Darfur.

Mr. COFFMAN. Would a correct assessment be that things have deteriorated recently in Darfur?

General WARD. I think, from the standpoint of the indictment and the reduction in the nongovernmental organizations that are allowed to operate in Darfur, it would certainly indicate a degradation of what goes on there.

Not been there, obviously, so I can't speak to it directly, but clearly the indications are that is the case.

I think, at this point in time, you know, the pipeline distribution issues are there, with respect to supplies, foodstuffs, water, et cetera. So I think it would be fair to say that there has been a degradation of the humanitarian relief efforts there in Darfur.

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, I think it was expressed during the discussion about a Hezbollah presence in your battle space. Could you speak to that and assess the threat level?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. I will afford myself, if it is appropriate, the opportunity to provide for the record classified portions of this.

But as a general proposition, I am concerned about the presence of Hezbollah throughout the Americas, in the Southern Cone of South America, in the Andean ridge, and in the Caribbean. Their primary activities are proselytizing, recruiting, money laundering,

drug selling, and using the profits from that to conduct a variety of the other activities that I mentioned.

It is of concern. I do not see operational terror cells in the region, but I do see that kind of support mechanism. It is of concern. And I will, again, provide some more detail to the committee on that.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General Renuart, I have been hearing lately that you have been quoted—I think very accurately—as saying that our missile defense capability, as it is now, our present capability, is—that you have confidence that it is an effective defense against the present threat from North Korea. And it is a perspective that I share.

One of the concerns that some of us have is that—I think, what, we have 26 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) now in the inventory, and there is a question related to the 18 remaining that we are hoping to put in inventory soon. And because I am—like a lot of other people—concerned about the need to have as many GBIs in inventory as possible related to potentially, you know, a growing North Korean threat and even, at some point—I know it would be more for the East Coast for the time being, but if the Iranian missile threat continues to grow.

And so just from a strategic perspective, what do you think the strategic implications are of not fulfilling the inventory or filling the inventory to a total, I believe, that would be of 44? What do you think are strategic implications of either delaying that or failing to follow through with those 18 additional GBIs?

General RENUART. Well, thanks. I think it is—as you say, I have expressed confidence in the capabilities that we have today against the threat that we see.

Mr. FRANKS. Right.

General RENUART. I think it is important for us to continue the robust testing regimen that General O'Reilly has laid out. That will allow us to grow the level of confidence we have against a variety of capabilities that might develop in the future.

I have been supportive of that—as you mentioned, the planned buy of 44 interceptors. I think that makes very good sense to allow us to not only maintain a capability against growing threats, but also to refresh missiles as they may need to be upgraded, in terms of software and the like.

So I continue to be supportive of that initial plan. I think there is still quite a bit of discussion ongoing now with respect to European basing sites that I am really not in a position to have an expert opinion on.

And so I would—my advocacy, if you will, is to keep the current testing program, the regimen on track, to continue to make it a complicated, sort of all-aspect testing program so that we continue to be comfortable that, as threats may develop, as other nations, rogue nations might expand their capability, we have an ability to answer to that.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. I guess, you know, I had the privilege of being present last night at the Missile Defense Agency

when one of these tests was conducted, when we had—down in the Pacific, they shot a missile about 200-plus kilometers into the air, and they sent from our Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system two interceptors. The second one was not necessary.

And I just thought it was a great moment for America, as so many of these things are, and yet a lot of times the Armed Forces don't get the credit that they deserve, so—you know, so nobly deserve in these situations.

Even when there is not a war going on, you guys are always out trying to make us stronger and more capable of defending this country. And I honor you for that with all of my heart.

And I—again, you don't get the credit. I think that should be all over the news today, that, you know, we no longer hit, as General Obering says, a bullet with a bullet. We hit a spot on the side of a bullet with a bullet on a consistent basis. And that is an accomplishment, and I think that that means that my two little babies are going to be safer. And I appreciate you for protecting them.

So I got about one last shot at you here.

General RENUART. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. Given the fact that we have—essentially, our firing doctrine is three on one, related to the Korean threat, or at least we want to be prepared for that, that would give us, really, right now, a chance to only effectively engage eight missiles. And, again, that is, I know, a rough analyses.

But is there anything else that you would say related to the strategic necessity of having additional interceptors? Do you think that that is important? What emphasis would you put on that?

General RENUART. Well, Congressman, I am glad that you, first, had a chance to see that THAAD test. It really was a great success. And I think what that does is it also underlines the fact that missile defense is not just about the ground-based midcourse interceptors. It is a comprehensive approach, from the warning sensors that we must use, air-, sea-, space-based sensors, radars, if you like, in simple terms, to both a long-range and a theater capability to defend.

And, certainly, the Navy's SM–3 aboard our Aegis cruisers, the THAAD system that you saw tested so successfully, as well as the ground-based midcourse interceptors provide us a comprehensive capability.

And I think it is important for us to continue that integrated approach. How that translates to numbers of missiles, I think we don't know yet, because as the capabilities of each system mature, you may see trade space amongst each of those systems to allow you to have the most efficient capability to defend the nation.

I think, as you said, the capability against the limited threat we see today, we are in good shape. I would not tie to a particular shot doctrine, because, as the system matures, the system will actually do some analysis to determine how best to intercept one of these incoming missiles.

So I think, again, we have a good commitment to this production rate. My sense is the department is supportive of that, so I don't—I am not worried about that at this point. But I think we need to let this testing regimen complete itself before we tie ourselves to

some number that may not actually be needed or maybe there is more. Hard to say.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Madam Chair, thank you.

I know that they don't put four stars on the shoulders of these individuals casually. So I thank all of you for your—really, committing your whole life to the cause of human freedom. And I wish we could really see more of what you do sometimes. I think it would mean a lot to the country.

Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Franks.

And, as we wind up, and I want to thank you very much, as well.

Can I just go back to a second—to comments earlier about irregular warfare? And I am wondering if you have any message to the Personnel Committee in what we should be focusing on, in terms of the recruiting, retention, and training of our military that will continue to support the goal of having a superiority in irregular warfare, as well as superiority in conventional and nuclear technology?

Can you respond quickly? Anything——

General MATTIS. Yes, ma'am, just very quickly, none of us can predict the future, and we all have certain modest expectations about whether or not we will really know where the next threat comes from, but we know this.

If we keep a very high-quality force, officer and enlisted, if we keep recruiting the kind of folks who can think on their feet, the kind of folks who can integrate high technology, but not lose sight of the fact that human factors in war remain the dominant reason for success or failure, then we will make the adaptations, for example, in language, training, cultural training, and these sorts of things.

But it really comes down to one fundamental premise, and that is that we get the best and the brightest for their jobs. We are decentralizing decisionmaking. And as we look at the cyber threats, and the EMP note that was made earlier, we are going to have to continue to decentralize decisionmaking.

That means we need, at the very youngest ages, young folks who can use initiative and exercise good judgment, both tactically and ethically, because of the nature of these fights. It is all about quality, ma'am.

General RENUART. Ma'am, if I could add a point——

Mrs. DAVIS. Go ahead.

General RENUART [continuing]. One of the keys to, if you will, preventing irregular war is the ability to build partnership capacity among our friends around the world. And while certainly Jim is right that today's young men and women are eager to serve and they understand the technical nature of the business, I think it is important for us to continue that capability to build partnership capacity among our friends so that countries can manage those irregular threats that may develop without it requiring a large U.S. presence.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And—oh, I am sorry, Kip, go ahead.

General WARD. And just not to let that one—not go without another strike. In that whole regard of building the capacity of our partners, clearly our cultural understanding is critically important.

The language programs within my command, my director of intelligence and knowledge development, whereby we try to have our best understanding of our partners, their culture, environment, history, traditions, et cetera, et cetera, those things help with those relationships, helps with the partnerships that we build, increases the trust and confidence between us, and therefore helping—to get to the point that was made—create the type of environment that would, in fact, prevent the irregular requirements from even existing.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Admiral.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will just close, if I could, by underlining language and culture very specifically. And I believe there are enormous second-order effects having 2 million people in the Department of Defense studying and learning language and culture. It is a ripple effect, both in the world and in our own country.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We will look forward to working with you, as we all face those difficult decisions and choices. And we hope to put more of our resources in that direction.

Thank you very much for being here. Again, we applaud your service. And thank you for your time and attention today. Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 18, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 18, 2009


Jim Stavridis
Admiral, US Navy
Commander
U.S. Southern Command
2009 Posture Statement
United States
Southern
Command
Partnership for the Americas
UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN COMMAND

AREA OF FOCUS



CARIBBEAN

Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Kitts and Nevis
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Netherlands Antilles

CENTRAL AMERICA

Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

ANDEAN RIDGE

Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela

SOUTHERN CONE

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Paraguay
Uruguay

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

BIOGRAPHY

James Stavridis
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander
United States Southern Command

Admiral James Stavridis assumed command of the United States Southern Command on October 19, 2006. Admiral Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South Florida.

A Surface Warfare Officer, Adm. Stavridis commanded Destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52) from 1993-1995, completing deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, and the Arabian Gulf. Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his command.

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

From 2002-2004, Adm. Stavridis commanded Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Ashore, the admiral has served as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the start of the Global War on Terror, he was selected as the Director of the Navy Operations Group, DEEP BLUE. He has also served as the executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Adm. Stavridis earned a PhD and MALD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a 1992 distinguished graduate of the National War College.

He holds various decorations and awards, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is co-author of four books on naval shiphandling and leadership, including *Command at Sea* and *Destroyer Captain*.

HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

THE POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE 111TH CONGRESS
2009

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command and our area of focus in Latin America and the Caribbean. I am happy to report that 2008 was a productive and positive year for the United States Southern Command, and we appreciate the support that Congress has shown us over the last year. With your assistance, we were able to help address challenges and benefit from opportunities in this dynamic era. With your continued support, we are already on track to have a similarly productive year in 2009, and anticipate reaching new milestones of security cooperation with our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean.

We are living in an age of rapid change facilitated by advancing technologies and increasingly networked systems, societies, and economies. In order for security agencies to be successful in this complex environment, those organizations must be flexible, open, and forward-thinking. As globalization deepens and threats emerge and evolve, security organizations will need to continue fostering and building relationships with willing and capable partners to face transnational challenges. The security of the United States and that of our partners depends largely on our capacity to leverage joint, international, interagency, and public-private cooperation, all reinforced by focused messaging and strategic communication.

The old adage that "change is a constant" should instead read "change is constantly accelerating". Yet, our core mission has been left unchanged. We remain a military organization conducting military operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

Last year was a hallmark year for U.S. Southern Command. Fortunately, we saw the completion of many important milestones:

- Safe return and repatriation of three U.S. hostages in Colombia after five and a half years of captivity;
- Groundbreaking for our new U.S. Southern Command headquarters in Miami, Florida;
- PANAMAX 2008, our largest and most comprehensive joint, multilateral exercise to date with 20 nations involved;
- Harnessing of innovation and new technologies in our operations and exercises, from unmanned vehicles to high speed vessels;
- Supporting valuable Humanitarian Assistance and Training operations;
- Disaster relief support in a dangerous hurricane season;
- Numerous medical training missions to include a combined seven-month deployment of two uniquely-crewed amphibious ships called Continuing Promise 2008 with over 210,000 total patient encounters;
- Interdiction of over 228 metric tons of cocaine;
- A robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program and numerous international exchanges, including 21 major military-to-military exercises; and
- Excellent training and information exchanges on human rights for armed forces.

These milestones were only made possible through the help of the Congress and the hard work and dedication of our service components, and their motivated civil servants and service members from the active, reserve, and guard force – Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard and Special Operations, the professionalism of our Joint Task Forces, and the cooperation of numerous partners inside and outside U.S. government.

This is my third posture statement as Commander of U.S. Southern Command. My first testimony highlighted the diversity of our assigned region and outlined the powerful linkages we share with Latin America and the Caribbean. In last year's statement, I gave an update of our region and described some innovative approaches that we were planning to fulfill our mission more effectively.

Today, I would like to update you again on the region, as well as discuss the threats and challenges that we still face in Latin America and the Caribbean. Also, I would like to report on the positive results that we are seeing from the innovative approaches and initiatives outlined in last year's testimony.

Economics: a driving factor

The first few years of this millennium saw world economic activity at a healthy and robust level, "with high growth rates, low inflation, low interest rates, fluid financing, and buoyant international trade."[1] This economic climate allowed Latin America and Caribbean economies to grow at a level unseen in almost half a century. A key contributor to this growth – in much of the region – was high global demand for commodities, such as energy, metals and food staples. This growth, coupled with improved economic policies, allowed many countries to make inroads into the challenges of poverty and income inequality that have long bedeviled economic and political stability.



Modern Santiago de Chile with the Andes Mountains as a background. (Patrick Coe/2007)

The economies in Latin America and the Caribbean are increasingly tied with the global economy – with very close linkages to the U.S. Now, Latin American economies are beginning to feel the negative impact of the current economic downturn in the United States and Europe. Although the duration and impact of these economic problems are difficult to predict, any global or regional slowdown or reduction in demand and prices for commodities will naturally have an adverse effect on this region. Economic data from late 2008 showed commodity prices that had risen until mid-July 2008, have recently fallen. Wheat and corn futures are down 70 percent. Oil prices are down 55 percent, and several metals are down 50 percent.[2]

The fall in commodity prices will ease some inflationary pressures, but combined with other economic factors, will negatively impact the region's growth and cause near and long-term challenges for the region's leaders. Near term, they will have to cope with the economic slowdown and its inherent challenges: reduced exports, tighter

[1] Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy: 2008 Trends, October 2008.

[2] IBID.

"To solve the economic crisis, we need investments and to have investments we need security." — Musician and founder of Yéle Haiti Foundation, Wyclef Jean, on the crisis in Haiti, 1 July 2008.

access to financing, stock market devaluation, less foreign direct investment, and reduced migrant remittances. Long term, if these economies continue to falter, they will have to deal with the electorate's disappointment, and in some cases reduced overall security and stability. They will also face a challenge in fully implementing positive economic reforms that many of the region's governments have attempted to implement over the last two decades.

Although 2009 is forecast to be a much more difficult year economically in our region, each country will vary in performance depending on its own situation, policies, and political leadership. Many of the larger countries in our region are well prepared to weather this adverse economic situation due to recent economic reforms and an increased integration with the global economy, particularly the U.S. economy. Our interdependence with the region should, over time, dampen individual economic shocks, and foster sustained economic growth.

Democracy, liberty, and human rights: desired common ground

Today, every country in our hemisphere is a democracy, with the notable exception of Cuba. We are fortunate to be united by democratic principles, the inspiration of liberty, and our populations' desire to have human rights respected by their governments. Of course, there are differences in form and style between our governments, and the democratic scorecard may differ greatly from nation to nation. However, compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the majority of the countries was not democratic, our region's similarities outweigh the differences.

"'The U.S. can make an enormous contribution in this new stage of global development by helping deepen hemispheric cooperation and political dialogue. If successful, this will lead to a better future for our peoples." — President of Chile, H.E. Michelle Bachelet

Culture: an integrator

As seen with our economic interdependence, the Americas are an interconnected system – a very diverse, yet interrelated, community. This important region is unfortunately sometimes referred to as the "backyard" of the United States. That terminology reflects an inaccurate and inappropriate picture of a region so vitally important to the future of the United States. It is in every sense not our "backyard," but rather, a home that we share together. We have tremendous geopolitical, economic, and social linkages that unite us and act as a foundation for this home. These ties range from our shared economic activity to our comparative democratic ideals, as well as from mutual social and cultural appreciation to similar geography and climatic systems.

A clear indicator of this interdependence is the mixing and interaction of cultures here in the United States that we see reflected in the Americas. Currently, about 15 percent of our population traces its heritage to Hispanic origins. By mid-century, this cultural influence will increase to almost one third of our total population – a population of increasing diversity. [3]



Colombian army units deployed in support of US/UN forces during the Korean War (National Archives/U.S. Army)

Military: a robust linkage

Historically, we have had very close military ties with our partners in the region. For example, Brazil fought with us during World War II – The Brazilian Expeditionary Force, numbering over 25,000 troops, fought with U.S. forces in Italy from 1944 to 1945. During the Korean War a Colombian infantry battalion and warship served with the U.S. led United Nations (UN) Command. Beginning in the 1950s, several Latin American countries contributed military units to UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Recently, in Iraq, troops from El Salvador served as part of the multinational presence and have now completed a noteworthy 11 rotations with over 3,000 total troops. The Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Honduras also dispatched troops to Iraq.

These are all examples of our partner nations fighting side-by-side with us in times of conflict. However, we also engage with these nations continuously during peacetime through various bilateral and multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements. One example of this is the daily interaction the U.S. military has with future senior military leaders from throughout the region at our military institutions such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed among our military officers at these institutions and the schools' strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights are critical to creating military establishments capable of effective combined operations.

"At the Organization of American States, we remain grateful for the Command's invaluable cooperation in humanitarian demining throughout the years." — Secretary General of OAS, José Miguel Insulza on SOUTHCOM support of a Humanitarian Demining seminar.

---

[3] Source: Pew Research Center, *U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050: February 2008.*

US Army South

Headquarters: San Antonio, Texas

Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **US Hostages in Colombia** – Reintegrated three US Citizens that had been held hostage five years by the FARC Terrorist Organization.
- **Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias** – Disaster planning and operations exercise in four countries with over 700 participants.
- **PANAMAX** – Multinational exercise with 20 countries, 31 ships, and 7000 personnel to exercise protection of the Panama Canal.
- **Beyond the Horizon** – Deployment of over 4000 personnel to Honduras, Trinidad & Tobago, and Suriname for humanitarian assistance exercises.
- **Peacekeeping Operation North (PKO)** – Computer-simulated exercise of over 20 countries providing peacekeeping training.

Clockwise from top left: Army Maj. (Dr.) Klein, 185th Med. Co., works on a local Honduran boy during Beyond the Horizon. Thomas Howes, Marc Gonsalves and Keith Stansell celebrate their release from 5 years of being held hostage by the FARC Terrorist organization. Students at the opening ceremony of their school built during Beyond the Horizon 2008. Multi-national forces training.

US Naval Forces Southern Command

Headquarters: Mayport, Florida

Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Continuing Promise** – Humanitarian training mission to nine countries delivering medical/dental/engineering support and disaster relief
- **Haitian Storm Relief** – USS KEARSARGE delivered 3.3 million pounds of food, water and other aid to communities devastated by hurricane storms
- **PANAMAX** – Multinational exercise with 20 countries, 31 ships and 7000 personnel
- **Southern Partnership Station** HSV Swift deployed on a seven month security cooperation tour, to seven US Partner nations
- **Southern Seas TSC Deployment** – USS FARRAGUT, USS FORREST SHERMAN, and USS KAUFFMAN deployed to 20 Partner nations, and included Multinational Exercises UNITAS Atlantic and Pacific, EJAS Norte, and Silent Forces 2008; with more than 30 ships from 6 countries participating
- **George Washington Carrier Strike Group** – A deployment around South America, providing maritime interaction three partner nations



Clockwise from top left: U.S. service members assigned to the USS KEARSARGE and Haitian civilians move supplies during a humanitarian assistance mission to aid Haitians. A PANAMAX sign. Locals in Marose, Haiti rush to retrieve meals donated by Project Handclasp left by a USMC helicopter embarked on the USS KEARSARGE. The USS BOXER from Continuing Promise. The HSV SWIFT from Southern Partnership Station.

CHALLENGES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

U.S. Hostages in Colombia: a success story

It is with great pleasure that I can report the safe return to the United States of the three American hostages held by a narcoterrorist group in Colombia. To quote **last** year's testimony, "Unfortunately, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) are extremely capable and experienced at holding and hiding hostages in the dense Colombian triple-canopy jungles. We are hopeful that our efforts and those of Colombia and the international community will soon see Marc, Keith, and Tom returned to U.S. soil alive and well."



Left to right: ADM Stavridis, Keith Stansell, BG Cleveland, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas Howes. (U.S. Army)

Those hopes were realized on July 2nd, 2008. The Colombian military deserves complete credit for the final daring raid that freed our hostages and twelve others. However, it is fair to say that their brilliant tactical operation was the culmination of almost ten years of effort shared by our Congress, Colombia, U.S. Southern Command, and other U.S. Agencies responsible for resources and capacity building of the Colombian military. One of the happiest and most satisfying moments of my career was the moment I received word that Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes had been safely rescued. Seeing the much sought after freedom of these three United States citizens, after five and a half long years of captivity, was certainly a highlight of our year.

Marine Corps Forces South

Headquarters: Doral, Florida



Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Tradewinds** – Multinational exercise with 17 Caribbean nations training for disaster response and regional security.
- **Southern Exchange** – Multinational peacekeeping and amphibious training exercise in South America, training over 600 personnel from seven partner nations.
- **Partnership of the Americas** – Multinational/regional training exercise with 5 partner nations. Supported humanitarian mission to 3 countries delivering medical/dental/engineer support and disaster relief with 302 flight hours moving 4,321 passengers and lifting 49,500 lbs of cargo.
- **New Horizons** – Provided Peru, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago with engineer platoons and a civil affairs detachments on a rotational basis and supported Surinam with a civil affairs detachment.
- **Continuing Promise** – Supported humanitarian mission to 7 countries to include Haitian relief operations delivering medical/dental/engineer support and disaster relief while lifting 11,000 passengers and 1.3 million lbs of cargo.

Left to right: Staff Sgt. Jarrad Demster, a Marine instructor works with Caribbean Soldiers and police officers, in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic during Tradewinds. Marine embarked aboard the USS KEARSARGE interacts with children at the St. Jude's School for Girls during humanitarian mission during Continuing Promise 2008

US Southern Command Air Forces

Headquarters: Tucson, Arizona



Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Operation Southern Partner** – Experts and specialists exchanging ideas and information with counterparts in four countries.
- **Beyond the Horizon Peru** – Almost 1000 personnel providing Humanitarian Assistance and medical care
- **Medical Deployments for Training and Medical Readiness Training exercises (MEDRETE)** – Provided medical help and training to 11 countries, over 100,000 patients and 650 surgeries
- **Regional Air Space integration (RASI)** – an Initiative to improve and integrate Central American capability to detect and monitor aircraft in a predominantly unmonitored airspace, for a common operating picture
- **Regional Aircraft Modernization Program (RAMP)** – initiative to modernize the aviation capability of our partner nations to respond to transnational threats

Clockwise from top left: A New School built through New Horizons and a SOUTHCOM facilitated partnering of Rotary Club Doral with Rotary Club Ayacucho Peru. Lt. Col. Alger Rodo, a Chilean Medical Officer, intubates the throat of a practice patient as USAF Capt. Mark Gosling instructs during Operation Southern Partner. Senior Airman Davis with Andrea Letiria Yupari Gozmie during New Horizons.

THREATS

The current challenges and security threats that we face in this hemisphere fortunately do not involve any imminent conventional military threat to the United States, nor do we foresee one in the near-or mid-term future. For the foreseeable future, we also do not see any major military conflict developing among nations in Latin America or the Caribbean. Communication has been a strength in our region, and has proven itself over the last year during some of the region's political tensions. This is evidenced by the peaceful mediation and resolution by regional leaders of the crisis between Ecuador and Colombia that occurred in March of 2008. The creation of the new South American Defense Council is yet another indication of the tendency to create fora to encourage dialogue and reduce tension.

> *"Multidimensional threats to security call for a joint, coordinated response from institutions such as Defense Ministries, Foreign Affairs Ministries, Ministries of Security and Local Government Ministries." — OAS Secretary General Insulza Remarks at Defense Ministerial in Banff, Canada; September 4, 2008.*

Despite this "peaceful" state of the region from a state-on-state violence perspective, security challenges undoubtedly do exist. Narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, crime, gangs, and natural disasters pose the principal security challenges to the region and to the United States from the region. Also, the specter of transnational Islamic terrorism are of concern and bear due vigilance on our part.

Underlying conditions: poverty and inequality.

Despite the economic gains of the past decade, poverty and income inequality remain grave concerns for many people in Latin America and the Caribbean. These concerns drive social unrest and provide fertile soil for many of the region's public security challenges. Although poverty rates have been modestly reduced over the last 15 years – from 48 percent living in poverty in 1990 to an estimated 35 percent in 2007 – with increases in population over the years, the absolute numbers of people living in poverty have risen slightly overall in the region. The number of people living in indigence – or extreme poverty – has also climbed, affecting an estimated 12.7 percent of the population. [4]

Combined with this poverty is a disproportionate wealth distribution that is second only to Sub-Saharan Africa. The richest 20 percent of the Latin American population earns 57 percent of the region's income,

[4] ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2007.

A Nicaraguan child and her mother await delivery of food and water from the U.S. Navy in the wake of a hurricane. (U.S. Navy photo)

earning 20 times that of the poorest 20 percent. By comparison, the richest 20 percent in high-income regions of the world earns only 7.7 times that of the poorest group.[5] The cumulative effect of poverty and income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean serves as a catalyst for insecurity and instability. Although these figures vary from country to country in the aggregate, poverty and inequality make whole regional populations vulnerable to the influence of illicit activity – such as drugs, crime, gangs, and illegal immigration.

Earlier, I discussed how our region is united by democracy. Unfortunately, this continued widespread poverty and inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean energizes potential political instability. In fact, recent surveys in the region underscore the current fragility of democracy. As of 2006, 26.4 percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean would justify a military coup in the case of high inflation, and 20.9 percent would justify one in the case of high unemployment.[6] These percentages tend to be highest among countries recovering from recent conflict and instability. With the present economic slowdown, this trend might only continue and lead to further autocratic problems to the detriment of democracy in the hemisphere.

Public security challenges: narcotics, crime, and terrorism

Narcotics. The global illicit drug trade remains a significant transnational security threat as its power and influence continues to undermine democratic governments, terrorize populations, impede economic development, and hinder regional stability. The profits from this drug trade, principally cocaine, are an enabling catalyst for the full spectrum of threats to our national security, and present formidable challenges to the security and stability of our partners. Our success – or failure – to address this insidious threat will have a direct and lasting impact on the stability and well-being of both developed and developing countries of the world. Innovative approaches and partnerships are needed to successfully confront this dangerous

[5] The World Bank, *2008 World Development Indicators, April 2008.*
[6] *AmericasBarometer, 2006.*

threat. It will take a coordinated multi-agency and multinational strategic approach that brings to bear the strengths and resources of diverse, capable groups to stem the rising tide of the illicit drug trade.

There is also a crucial demand-side effort that is continuing here in the U.S. For example, programs to treat addicts, convince and deter our children and youth from using drugs, and create community solutions are supported at a national level.

In U.S. Southern Command's assigned region, the Andean Ridge of South America is the world's only significant source of coca cultivation and cocaine production. Each year, cocaine from the region directly contributes to the deaths of thousands of U.S. citizens, and has spread its toxic effects to many countries in this hemisphere and abroad. Narcotraffickers are intrinsically transnational, and they continue to develop fresh markets, explore alternative routes, and refine current tactics. They are highly innovative and keep investing in relatively low cost and unique conveyance and concealment technologies to counter our detection systems. A vivid example of this is the self propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) – low riding, low profile vessels that narcotraffickers use to skim along the water line to avoid visual and radar detection. These relatively new vessels now bring tons of illicit cargo to market.

In 2008, we interdicted 11 SPSS vessels at sea on their way to market, and anticipate roughly 60 similar vessels in 2009 will ply the waters of our region – with a potential cargo capacity of over 330 metric tons of cocaine, or other illicit and dangerous material. In 2008, we observed that traffickers had expanded their presence in West Africa as a springboard to Europe, while also exploring new Middle Eastern and Asian markets. We also noted that traffickers have shifted from high seas routes to multi-staging tactics along the Central American littorals, attempting to evade international interdiction efforts.

One specific area of increasing concern is the nexus of illicit drug trafficking – including routes, profits, and corruptive influence – and terrorism. In the Western Hemisphere, the illicit drug trade historically has contributed, and continues to contribute, significant financial resources to known terrorist groups like the FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru. Another threat to the United States is the nexus with Islamic radical terrorism. In August of last year, U.S. Southern Command supported a Drug Enforcement Administration operation, in coordination with host countries, that targeted a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking organization

in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Last October, we supported another interagency operation that resulted in the arrests of a several dozen individuals in Colombia associated with a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking and money laundering ring. Identifying, monitoring, and dismantling the financial, logistical, and communication linkages between illicit trafficking groups and terrorist sponsors are critical to not only ensuring early indications and warnings of potential terrorist attacks directed at the United States and our partners, but also in generating a global appreciation and acceptance of this tremendous threat to security.

Since Colombia is the major global source of cocaine, as well as home to the FARC, a narcoterrorist group, the Colombian government and people remain pivotal in the fight to stop illicit traffickers at the source. As traffickers adapt their product movement tactics, every effort to interdict them within Colombia or just as they depart Colombian territory will pay tremendous dividends, as opposed to dispersing limited interdiction resources across the 42 million square miles of the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. Providing resources and investments to improve the Colombian military, along with enhancing our interagency capabilities, will build the capacity to integrate and share information with U.S. and international counter-narcotic organizations. Our interagency support efforts will directly improve regional and hemispheric security.

Although not part of U.S. Southern Command's regional focus, the situation in Mexico is also of serious concern with regards to drugs and narcotrafficking. With over 6,000 violent killings and thousands of kidnappings in Mexico in 2008, the Mérida Initiative (which links to the rest of Central America and parts of the Caribbean) deserves full support.

U.S. Southern Command's unique counter-narcotic task force located in Key West, Florida, is a role model for the kind of innovative cooperation and fusion of capabilities needed to counter this forceful and perilous threat. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) combines efforts of international partners, the U.S. armed services, and numerous U.S. and international departments and agencies to combat the illicit drug trade stemming from Latin America and the Caribbean. Last year, this task force stopped more than 228 metric tons of cocaine from entering the United States or from reaching foreign markets and helped facilitate the capture by law enforcement or partner nations of 317 drug traffickers.

In 2009, JIATF-S will expand on the 35 planned and successful operations it conducted last year, and integrate efforts with various hemispheric initiatives to include interagency, international, and public-private efforts. With an eye toward innovation and integration, JIATF-S continues to be a model for the future and will position itself to tactically identify, engage, and counter asymmetric and dynamic threats more efficiently across the current and emergent spectrum of threat conveyances, routes, and concealment techniques. We will continue to fight this international threat with all available resources.

Joint Interagency Task Force South

Headquarters: Key West, Florida



Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Seized over 228 MT of Cocaine** estimated wholesale value of $4.58 billion.
  - Assisted in the disruption of up to 11 Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles, with approximately 24 MT of cocaine seized and an estimated 45 MT of cocaine scuttled.
- **Interagency Partnering Model** – Established full integration of the French commander in Martinique into the JIATF S Command & Control structure as Commander, Task Group 4.6. Enhanced information sharing and coincidental operations with Mexico in first named coordinated operation. Expanded International coalition partnerships by conducting first coordinated operations with the Brazilian Navy.
- **Off Shore Vessel for Replenishment at Sea** – Developed concept to employ commercial ship replenishment, maximizing operational time and saving approximately $5 million a year.
- **Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs)** – 44 analysts assigned to 20 countries. CY-09 anticipated expansion into Chile, Portugal, Spain and Belgium.

Joint Task Force Bravo

Headquarters: Soto Cano Airbase, Honduras

Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Honduran Floods** – Conducted lifesaving operations and delivered over 1000 gals of water.
- **Panama and Costa Rican Floods** – Conducted lifesaving operations and moved over 300,000 lbs of supplies.
- **Counter-NarcoTerrorism Operations** – Seized over 460 kgs of cocaine and destroyed over 150 acres of poppy and marijuana fields.
- **Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias** – Supported US Army South in disaster planning and operations exercise providing medical help to over 1600 people.
- **Beyond the Horizons** – Multinational exercise that evaluated over 6800 patients and built or renovated five schools.



Left to right: Air Force Major Paul Miller examines a Salvadoran girl at a school near Comasagua, El Salvador during Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 2008. Army Staff Sgt. Jose Gutierrez and Specialist Robert Hunt carry an injured man from a MEDEVAC helicopter Dec. 1 in the relief for Costa Rica

Crime and Violence. Over the past decade, about 1.2 million deaths can be linked to crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. United Nations data places the homicide rate for this region at 27.5 murders per 100,000 people – five times that of the United States and three times that of the world average. A recent study lists Latin America with the highest global homicide rate for people between 15 and 24, with a rate 30 times greater than that of Europe.[7] Moreover, every year, approximately one-third of the population falls victim to a criminal act – either directly or indirectly.

Guatemalan gang members. (USAID photo)

These statistics are underscored by the growing influence of gangs in several countries and of delinquent youth in general. Gang populations have reached over 100,000 in Central America alone, and there are possibly similar numbers in major South American cities. In recent surveys of the region, closely aligned with economic concerns, delinquency and personal security rank as top social ills for the majority of countries in the region.[8] This insecurity and its associated costs – not just human costs, but, on the order of $250 billion annually in economic impact – have become major threats and a destabilizing factor in many nations in the Western Hemisphere. Organized crime and some of the more structured gangs routinely cross borders and operate inside the United States, including near our nation's capital, in Northern Virginia and of course in Los Angeles.

The primary responsibility for helping our hemispheric partners solve these challenges resides with the Department of Justice, Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. We seek to be supportive and helpful where appropriate. The complexity of the challenges facing these government entities only reinforces the need for coordinated interagency solutions.

---

[7] Latin American Technological Information Network, *Map of Violence: The Young People of Latin America*, November 2008

[8] Latinobarómetro.

Colombia. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial anchor for security and stability in this hemisphere. This beautiful and diverse country is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere.



Bogotá, 4 Feb 2008: Mass demonstrations by over 5 million Colombians against the FARC and for the freedom of the more than 3,000 hostages held by the guerilla organization. (Javier Casella - Mindefensa)

Since the United States and Colombia started working together to help secure peace, with the Clinton Administration's Plan Colombia, a great deal of progress has been made. In the late 1990s, Colombia's democracy was on the verge of failure. The country was embroiled in an internal conflict that, by any objective measure, was tearing it apart. Drug cartels had wide reign and violence was rampant. Today's Colombia is a completely different story. There is a real sense of hope and pride in the country and its accomplishments. The Uribe administration – now leading the follow-on to Plan Colombia, the "Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development" and with support from the United States – has brought the country "back from the brink" and has it poised for stability. Since 2002 homicides have dropped by 40 percent, kidnappings by 83 percent, and terrorist attacks by 76 percent.[9]

The FARC narcoterrorist group has been beaten back with key leaders at the strategic secretariat level eliminated and more than 50 percent drop in their numbers. Their communications have been disrupted. Desertions continue to accelerate, and, morale is at an all-time low. In addition, most Colombian drug cartels have been significantly impacted, and Colombia has extradited over 700 drug traffickers to the United States. Nonetheless, the FARC remains a serious challenge to the Government of Colombia.

Although cocaine production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of cocaine headed to the United States and abroad have more than doubled over the last ten years. This increase indicates improved state control, successful governmental strategies, and an overall better interagency and international coordination and collaboration.

---

[9] US State Dept brief. Charting Colombia's Progress, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93761.pdf

"We've been passing through a difficult situation for more than forty years, and now with this new government of Alvaro Uribe my country seems in better shape. People are positive, our economy is getting better. We still have problems because the drugs business is still so strong and all the terrorist groups still own these businesses. In any case, Colombia is in a ten times better situation than it was before – the eighties and nineties were a hard time for us. Now Colombia is a very different country. I'm positive about the future."--- Colombian musical artist, Juanes, in an interview by Tom Knight, January 24, 2007.

I highly encourage Members of the Committee to visit Colombia, as many of you have already, to experience first-hand the tremendous overall improvements in this country, and, to gain the sense that "this is the moment" for Colombia. This is the time for Colombia and its friends to make the final push to win true peace in this country – a peace that will be of great benefit to the region and the United States. As Colombia wins its peace, narcoterrorists will lose capacity to grow, process, and transport illicit drugs – directly saving U.S. lives and resources. Human rights compliance and training are key to all this.

Over the next two years, support for the Colombian armed forces' campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC is essential. Paramount to this support will be training, mobility, and continuation of key infrastructure and human rights programs to provide long-term self-sufficiency. Continued U.S. commitment over the next two years will be critical through a "nationalization" period, as the Colombian government assumes responsibility for funding the majority of current programs through the development and institutionalization of carefully planned resource management processes. With U.S. help, a stable and secure Colombia is very achievable in the near term, and will serve as a democratic model for the region.

Additionally, the U.S. needs to continue supporting counter-drug and counter-terrorism programs in Colombia's neighboring countries, especially Peru.

Terrorism. Terrorist networks are active throughout our hemisphere. These networks include domestic narcoterrorists, such as the FARC, who mainly reside in Colombia, as well as the Shining Path Maoist-style narcoterrorists of Peru. Islamic terrorist networks are also active, primarily involved in fundraising and logistical support for parent organizations based in the Middle East, such as Hizballah and Hamas. Individuals with terrorist training and experience who could support or conduct terrorist attacks in our hemisphere may be present in the region, and our intelligence has demonstrated that pre-operational and operational activities have indeed occurred, as exemplified by the attempt to blow up fuel pipelines at the JFK airport in New York in 2007.

Islamic terrorist networks are present in the Tri-border Area, as well as present in several other locations in the region. A robust Hizballah financial support network exists in the region, as well as an active group of sympathizers and supporters of Hizballah. Also present are Sunni groups, including Hamas, whose members possess operational backgrounds. Moreover, known al-Qa'ida members have journeyed to Latin America and the Caribbean and other terrorist-inspired Islamic radicals have been arrested in the region.

As with all of the Department of Defense and other U.S. departments and agencies, U.S. Southern Command dedicates significant effort to remaining vigilant in the global struggle against violent extremism. We have a regional plan to combat this threat through multiple avenues. This plan includes shaping the strategic environment through support to interagency humanitarian operations that impede radical organizations from gaining a foothold in the region, as well as building partner nation capacity to detect and defeat threats in a cooperative environment. These efforts will help ensure the forward defense of the United States and increased security for our partners. We thank the Congress for providing the dedicated resources necessary for this mission and for providing flexible funding sources to help us rapidly address emerging capability gaps of our partners as the strategic situation develops. U.S. Southern Command will continue to work closely with our interagency and our regional partners to ensure our nation and those of our friends remain secure.

"And various initiatives are under way that will better integrate and coordinate U.S. military efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage the expertise of the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations and academia." — Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates

Marketplace of ideas

The Americas are a marketplace of ideas where security, economic, and political models compete amidst all the linkages and challenges detailed above. The ideas of personal liberty, electoral democracy, fair and open markets, and political transparency – are competing against a variety of other models, some of which are dramatically different.

"Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multi-polar world that is forming. We will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy." — Russian President, Vladimir Putin at the start of his talks with President Hugo Chavez,



Our job at U.S. Southern Command is simply to build cooperative security relationships and to promote U.S. military-to-military interests in the region. Unfortunately, some trends in a few countries hinder security cooperation, and a few leaders have adopted a vocal anti-U.S. stance making it more difficult to cooperate on security matters.

"Barricades of ideas are worth more than barricades of stones." — Cuban author and leader of Cuban independence movement, José Martí, "Nuestra América" (1881), first published in La Revista Ilustrada de Nueva York (1 January 1891), translated as "Our America."

To compete in this marketplace, we engage proactively in the region and counter anti-U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill, competence and professionalism. The U.S. government, through our interagency, needs to be capable of assisting our partner nations by addressing the underlying conditions of poverty and inequality; while U.S. Southern Command needs to help build security relationships and create innovative security initiatives with cooperative partners to confront transnational security threats.

INITIATIVES

To confront the challenges and embrace the opportunities of this century in the Americas, U.S. Southern Command has shaped its initiatives to cultivate innovative ideas and harness integrated effort. Our mantra has been "joint, international, interagency, and public-private." The changing global and regional conditions of the 21st Century require more of an integrated approach. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Southern Command has realigned our internal headquarters structure to better support our interagency partners and to be more agile and comprehensive in our approach to engagement in the region.



In 2008, we witnessed numerous positive results from integrating many initiatives that began in 2007. The following three examples typify the direction our command is taking.

PANAMAX 2008

A group of U.S., Peruvian, Colombian, and Chilean Navy ships during Fuerzas Aliadas (FA) PANAMAX 2008. (U.S. NAVY photo)

Building confidence, capability, and cooperation among partners is essential to confronting today's security challenges. Our exercise Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) PANAMAX has matured over the last five years and has become one of our flagship programs. PANAMAX is a multinational and interagency exercise that focuses on defending the Panama Canal from traditional and non-traditional threats. The exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval exercise with just three participating nations. Due to past successes and efforts to expand partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than 20 nations, several U.S. departments and agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multiple military branches of service.

Co-sponsored by Panama, Chile, and the U.S., this year's exercise formed a truly integrated multinational force – Multinational Force-South. The force was led by U.S. Southern Command's Army component, U.S. Army South, but had significant international representation at all levels of command and control. Each of the Service components included significant command-level team members from other countries and agencies. For example, the maritime components were headed by Admirals from Chile and Brazil.

While the exercise scenario focused on the security of the Panama Canal, this type of integrated multinational training certainly would benefit any response to real-world threats in our region – conventional and unconventional. From responses to catastrophic disasters to United Nations mandated multinational forces, this type of collaborative training has already proven to be indispensable.

In addition to the security scenario focused on the Panama Canal, PANAMAX also included a multinational humanitarian training and assistance/disaster-relief training mission, a multinational peacekeeping battalion training event, and an interagency Proliferation Security Initiative training event focused on the shipment of weapons of mass destruction.

This was also the second year that we assisted the Government of Panama with integrating their interagency homeland security exercise, PANAMAX ALPHA, with PANAMAX and facilitated for the first time the involvement and support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Joint, international, interagency, and public-private is the essence of PANAMAX. The collaborative integration of participants and helpful lessons learned this year were exceptional. The increased participation and scope of PANAMAX over the years underscores the significance the international community places on cooperative efforts and strong partnerships as pillars of worldwide security and stability.

Continuing Promise 2008

"Some of you say that this was an invasion. Sure, the United States invaded us, but they invaded us with medicines, with surgical equipment, with medical care, and with cooperation."
--- Peru's Minister of Defense, Antero Flores Araoz. On Continuing Promise 2008.

In 2007, for the first time, we sent a U.S. hospital ship – USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) – on a four-month tour of Latin America and the Caribbean to conduct medical training and to treat patients in 12 countries. It was a tremendous success. Over 385,000 patient treatments were completed, along with 1,170 surgeries, more than 20 community-improvement projects, 17,700 livestock vaccinations, and more than 25,000 dental patients treated. Throughout the deployment, our personnel received vital training, and our message of positive commitment to the region and to its peoples penetrated deep and touched millions. This effort combined multiple military services, multinational integration, and medical professionals from the private sector.

A medical augmentee from the Canadian Air Force embarked aboard USS KEARSARGE, listens to the lungs and heartbeat of an ill Haitian child. (U.S. Navy photo)

The success of the mission, combined with uniquely integrated medical and construction training for our personnel, spurred the conception of Continuing Promise 2008. Since the Navy only has two dedicated hospital ships, the Navy sourced our request to repeat USNS



A medical augmentee embarked aboard USS KEARSARGE, listens for the heartbeat of a village woman's unborn child during a health assessment visit. (U.S. Navy photo)

COMFORT mission in 2008 with two large amphibious ships. Building upon the lessons learned from USNS COMFORT, we increased the mission duration from four to seven months, increased contact time in each port, and integrated more partners for the undertaking.

"I was particularly proud to see the involvement of Southcom through the relief efforts on the USS KEARSARGE. The USS KEARSARGE has provided assistance on medical and engineering projects, as well as the continued logistical support to remote areas of Haiti that were heavily damaged by the recent tropical storms. This kind of support is invaluable due to the extreme difficulty in providing these coordination efforts." — Rep. Kendrick Meek from his statement for the hearing before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on Haiti Hurricane Relief Efforts, September 23, 2008.

The two ships carried a mix of military, interagency, multinational, and even nongovernmental medical and health specialists. Along with this diverse medical team, we embarked military engineers, construction experts, Navy and Marine Corps helicopters and crews, and military training experts. This uniquely designed team was tailored to training and humanitarian missions, but had the flexibility to easily transition to disaster-relief efforts should the need arise – which it ultimately did.

One of the ships, USS BOXER (LHD 4), completed the Pacific phase of Continuing Promise with superb results: over 65,000 total patient treatments, including 127 surgeries, 4,000 optometry patients treated, 14,000 dental procedures, medical and military training for thousands of host-nation students, and construction projects at almost a dozen sites. The second ship,

Helping Dominican Republic Service Members load food and supplies for distribution to isolated communities after a tropical storm (U.S. Army photo)



Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega welcomes USAID OFDA representatives and US Service Members following hurricane relief efforts. (U.S. Air Force photo)

USS KEARSARGE (LHD 3), completed the Atlantic Phase in November, and its joint, international, and nongovernmental medical professionals worked alongside host nation officials to treat more than 145,000 patients in six countries. The crew also dispensed more than 81,000 prescriptions, provided veterinary care to nearly 5,600 animals, and completed various construction and renovation projects in each of the countries visited during the mission.

As an example of the flexibility of this type of venture deployed in our region, after Haiti was struck by successive tropical storms and Hurricane Ike in September, USS KEARSARGE diverted from its planned stop in Colombia to respond to this emergent humanitarian crisis. Supporting relief efforts led by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USS KEARSARGE and its crew delivered 3.3 million pounds of food, water, and other relief supplies to Haitian communities devastated by the storms.

Continuing Promise is a perfect complement to our already established medical readiness training exercises that treated nearly a quarter of a million patients at 64 remote inland locations throughout the region. It also complements our humanitarian and civic assistance programs, as well as our engineering training exercises. Overall, Continuing Promise 2008 was an incredibly successful mission that further advanced our strategic messaging and built confidence, capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the region serving as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-U.S. messaging.

Southern Command Service member takes direction from USAID representative on where food rations and water need to be delivered. (U.S. Army photo)

74

Self Propelled Semi-Submersible Capture

On September 13th, 2008 USS McINERNEY (FFG 8) was on a nighttime patrol in the Eastern Pacific Ocean some 350 miles off the coast of Guatemala. Unlike during the Cold War, they were not in search of Soviet submarines. They were, instead, in search of a different type of threat – a possible SPSS that was detected by a Navy maritime patrol aircraft. Embarked aboard this U.S. Navy ship was a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment that has the authority to make arrests – another example of an interagency approach to combating illicit trafficking. This integrated team enables Department of Defense assets like USS McINERNEY and crew to search for illicit traffickers, and then pass off law enforcement actions to Coast Guard personnel.



A self-propelled semi-submersible craft seized Sept. 16, 2008 in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. The vessel can travel from Ecuador to San Diego, Calif., without having to stop for replenishment. (U.S. Coast Guard)

USS McINERNEY was one of several assets – air, land, sea, and space – that were coupled with interagency operatives and partner nation agents throughout the hemisphere and Europe who were "on duty." In our JIATF-S headquarters in Key West, 24/7 operators were fusing intelligence and surveillance information, tracking numerous potential threats, and vectoring and monitoring interdiction assets onto probable threats.

USS McINERNEY was vectored onto a faint contact that was trying to evade detection and head north towards Mexico or the United States. During this nighttime intercept, the crew came across one of the most sophisticated SPSS vessels to date -- capable of carrying a seven-ton cargo in near silent and radar invisible routes with non-stop ranges from South America to California. On that night, the payload was a crew of four and seven metric tons of cocaine. Following deception tactics, this SPSS crew was traveling at night, far off the coast, and at low speeds to avoid detection. This pitch-black intercept against an unknown threat was described by one of the Coast Guard boarding team members as the "scariest event" of his entire career.

Fortunately, the intercept was executed flawlessly, and the traffickers did not have time to scuttle the vessel fully by using built in fast-acting drainage valves that allow incoming water to rapidly sink the vessel to avoid evidence collection. Once again, I must thank the Congress for the passage of the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008 that allows law enforcement legal indictments against operators of any Submersible or SPSS vessel without nationality – an act that will certainly reduce risk for boarding teams and result in greater intelligence gathering and trafficking convictions.

The story of USS McINERNEY is a successful one. But as described earlier, we believe other SPSS vessels get through, accounting for approximately 30 percent of cocaine movement in the drug trafficking transit zones. As we continue to fight extremism around the world, we are alert to connections between narcotraffickers and Islamic radical groups. SPSS tactics and payloads could one day represent an extreme threat to the United States and our partners.

These three examples illustrate our integrated approach and demonstrate commitment to our motto: "Partnership for the Americas." PANAMAX underscores the importance of partnership at the traditional military level, but with a focus towards supporting multinational, interagency, and even limited public-private efforts. Continuing Promise highlights the effectiveness of integrated medical/humanitarian training missions and of their benefit from a strategic messaging perspective. The self propelled semi-submersible seizure shows the importance of an around-the-clock, collaborative effort to stop specific transnational security threats that could have extreme consequences if left unchecked.

US Special Operations Command South

Headquarters: Homestead, Florida





Clockwise from top left: Teams line up with their respective flags during opening ceremonies of Fuerzas Comando. SOCSOUTH Marine trains Dominican Republic Counter Terrorism Armed Forces

Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **OPERATION WILLING SPIRIT** – Five year operation to recover three American hostages Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves and Thomas Howes from the FARC.
- **Southern Star/Estrella Austral** – A Special Operations Task Force exercise designed to foster alliances, regional relations.
- **Fuerzas Commando's 2008** – Military skills competition with over 300 military, law enforcement and civilian personnel from 17 nations.
- **Fused Response Field Training Exercise** – Designed to improve time sensitive crisis action planning.
- **Gatoraide 08** – Exercise that promotes Interagency relationship building and coordination with Other Government Agencies.
- **Operation BIRDSTRIKE I-II** – Deployment of partner nation counter-narcoterrorism forces trained by US forces.
- **Operation NUEVA ALIANZA I and II**- Combined task force that apprehended six highly valued, wanted criminals, eradicated over 600 hectare and seized over 390 MT of marijuana with a combined street value over over $800 million.
- **Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program** – builds partner nation counter-narcoterrorism capacity.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo "JTF-GTMO"

Headquarters: Housed on Naval Station Guantanamo, Cuba

Major 2008 Accomplishments:

- **Legal and Transparent Operations** – Continued International Committee of the Red Cross visits with access to all detainees. Over 1700 commissions and Habeas attorney visits, over 700 visitors, 375 domestic and international media.
- **Safe and Humane Care & Custody** – Joint Medical Group conducted over 1800 provider encounters (includes specialty and dental care), over 3400 sick call visits. Upgraded medical equipment, including purchase of cardiac catheterization suite. Expanded recreation for detainees, increased library to 13,000 items, added classroom space in Camp 4 & 6 for more language and literacy classes; began art classes. Weekly feast meals.
- **Logistic Support to Office of Military Commissions (OMC)** – 70+ sessions. Opened Expeditionary Legal Center, including media center, work & living space for OMC staff, prosecution/defense teams, etc.
- **Migrant Operations** – Significant construction and improvements to expand Leeward side migrant facilities and capacity



Counter-clockwise from top right: Camp 6, Detainees in Camp 4, Detainee attending literacy class

LOOKING AHEAD



Artist's conception - New USSOUTHCOM HQ complex

This year is already shaping up to be a good one for U.S. Southern Command and our efforts to confront the challenges of this dynamic era. We have numerous initiatives, programs, and exercises scheduled to build on the momentum of the last two years. The hospital ship USNS COMFORT will return to the region with a program crafted from lessons learned from our previous training and engagement. Construction of the new headquarters facility – designed to be a fusion center of integrated effort – is progressing and is on schedule. We have planned numerous bilateral, multilateral, and interagency exercises; programmed several valuable medical and construction training missions; and resourced exchanges and conferences. We continue to improve upon our model of interagency, international, joint, and public-private support. With the ongoing help of the Congress, we hope to make 2009 another positive and productive year for U.S. Southern Command.

"But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit."
— Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates: Foreign Affairs, Jan 2009.

As we chart our way into the next decade of this century, we will hold steady to our course of persistent engagement, partnership building, enabling understanding, and positive strategic messaging – all propelled by our interagency-support approach. I take great pride appearing before you today to represent the tremendous efforts of the men and women of U.S. Southern Command. I believe our efforts are making a difference in our hemisphere and for the security of the United States. I truly feel that our superb Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, – active, reserve, and guard – as well as our talented civilians are daily living up to the trust the American people have placed in them. They are all volunteers to serve their country, and I am honored and blessed to serve with them every day. Our people are our greatest strength, and I thank you for your continued support to programs that improve their lives and support their families.

Once again, I appreciate your support to U.S. Southern Command and am prepared to answer your questions.

U.S. Southern Command
3511 NW 91st Ave
Miami, FL 33172-1216

U.S. Southern Command
Washington Field Office
1919 S. Eads St, Suite 109
Arlington, VA 22202-3028
(703) 602-9898

www.southcom.mil

UNCLASSIFIED
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

AND

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

18 MARCH 2009

UNCLASSIFIED
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Skelton, Congressman McHugh, and distinguished Members of the Committee:

Homeland defense is the preeminent mission of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our Commands are vigilant in protecting our citizens from threats that exist in the air, space, land, maritime, and cyberspace domains. As we look to the future, our aim is to secure our environment by deterring and, if necessary, defeating those who threaten our way of life. Today, it is my honor to report on the state of the Commands.

Our Missions—Protecting What You Value Most

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate Commands; neither is subordinate to the other. However, the Commands have complementary missions, operate within a common security environment, and share an integrated headquarters staff. USNORTHCOM is committed to the defense of the United States and NORAD, a bi-national command, is committed to the air defense of both the United States and Canada.

USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and civil support operations within its assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. The USNORTHCOM area of responsibility encompasses North America, Bermuda, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Caribbean region inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles. We execute an active, integrated, layered defense that allows us to rapidly deploy military assets needed to defend the United States.

USNORTHCOM provides assistance in support of civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters and pandemic events. Incidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the State or local level; however, some incidents require Federal support. When requested and approved by the Secretary of Defense or directed by the President, Federal military forces will contribute to Federal support. On behalf of DOD, USNORTHCOM employs forces at the request of civil authorities when approved by the Secretary of Defense or the President. That said, USNORTHCOM does not wait for that call to action. Sweeping improvements in pre-event coordination with interagency partners, the National Guard, and the Reserves have led to an anticipatory, forward-leaning operational sequence for expeditious DOD support when requested by civil authorities.

NORAD, a bi-national Command formed by a partnership between the United States and Canada, provides aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning for North America. For more than 50 years, NORAD has defended the skies of the United States and Canada. Across our two countries, armed fighters are on alert and ready to fly air patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. NORAD ensures U.S. and Canadian air sovereignty through a network of alert fighters, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, and ground-based air defense assets cued by interagency and defense surveillance radars.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD work together in defending our nation's airspace. While NORAD provides aerospace warning and aerospace control, USNORTHCOM is responsible for air operations, such as evacuation and movement of people and high-value cargo via military airlift, within our assigned area of responsibility. In addition, USNORTHCOM has the capability to accept control of U.S. air defense alert aircraft to conduct unilateral operations, as required and directed.

Homeland Defense is Our Number One Priority

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. USNORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations within our area of responsibility and Hawaii, to protect the homeland from potentially hostile acts. During 2008, we enhanced our missile defense capabilities with th incorporation of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar.

USNORTHCOM is very active in the Missile Defense Agency's ground and flight testin programs to ensure the tests are operationally sound. USNORTHCOM missile defense crews ar trained and routinely exercised to ensure we meet the high standards required to defend the nation.

To fully ensure USNORTHCOM can perform our missile defense mission as assigned, our focus is threefold. The first is sustainability and reliability of the current Ground-Based Interceptor fleet. Secondly, USNORTHCOM requires realistic training simulations that accurately depict Ballistic Missile Defense System operational behavior. In order to train as we fight, we must develop operationally viable Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for new capabilities. We continue to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Strategic Command on this issue. Lastly, we need a more robust architecture that enables day-to-day operations to continue concurrently with ongoing research and development activities. The Missile Defense Agency's CTTO and STO (Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and Operations) will help bridge the gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.

The Colorado Army National Guard and the Alaska Army National Guard are integral parts of our nation's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system. The 100th Missile Defense Brigade at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion at Fort

Greely in Alaska are under our operational control as USNORTHCOM defends the homeland from long-range ballistic missile threats. DOD has cooperative agreements with the States of Colorado and Alaska for manning this homeland defense mission with their Army National Guard units. When National Guardsmen enter a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense site or otherwise commence operational duties, their duty status automatically transfers from Title 32 to Title 10. Command and control of these National Guardsmen requires designation of dual-status commanders when performing their missile defense mission for USNORTHCOM.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Since the attacks of September 11th, NORAD has supported the air defense of the United States and Canada through Operation NOBLE EAGLE with airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, and the unique National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. Over 50,000 sorties have been flown in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, with the Air National Guard conducting more than 70 percent of these sorties. In support of NORAD's missions, Air National Guard units have been successfully employing instantaneous Title 10 orders for several years. These orders allow an individual to volunteer, with the consent of the governor, to be federalized for specific missions prior to execution.

In the National Capital Region, NORAD continues to improve robust air and ground-based air defense systems. Working closely with the Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration, the National Capital Region airspace has been codified by rule to protect our nation's Capital. This interagency effort meets one of NORAD's long-term goals to secure the skies over Washington. In addition to the alert fighters at Andrews Air Force Base, the U.S. Coast Guard provides NORAD with alert helicopters to intercept low-and-slow aircraft in the National Capital Region.

NORAD provides tailored air defense for designated National Special Security Events. Recently, NORAD completed support of the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. Working with our interagency partners, NORAD provided continuous air defense of the National Capital Region during the event.

Northern Sovereignty Operations. In 2008, the resurgence of Russian Long Range Aviation flights on NORAD's northern flank continued at the heightened pace initiated in 2007. In 2008, pairs of TU-95 Bear-H aircraft flew into the Air Defense Identification Zone on seven separate occasions. All but one of these flights were unannounced. These bomber aircraft were detected and identified by fighters from the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD Regions, with critical support from U.S. E-3 surveillance aircraft and air-to-air refueling aircraft. While foreign aircraft never violated U.S. or Canadian airspace, expectations for continued activity and growing international interest in the north demand sustained vigilance and allocation of resources. NORAD remains vigilant to ensure no unauthorized, unwanted or unknown aircraft enter North American airspace.

U.S.-Canadian cooperation in northern air operations is the embodiment of the intent of the NORAD agreement. In 2008, Canada relied heavily on our U.S. aerial refueling tankers to deploy fighters to Forward Operating Locations and extend their patrols; E-3 AWACS supported operations on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border to expand surveillance; and fighter aircraft of both nations met the needs of each tactical situation.

In the future, pursuit of natural resources and the potential increase in traffic of northern waterways will demand increased air and maritime surveillance, security, and defense in the Arctic Region. A bi-national evaluation is underway to improve the quality and coverage of northern surveillance systems; and Canada is investigating the expansion of facilities at Resolute

Bay, which may provide a more northern Forward Operating Location than any currently available. Collectively, we will remain vigilant and continue to monitor the Arctic approaches to the North American continent.

Southern Sovereignty Operations. During September 2008, NORAD's integrated air defense assets in and around the Continental United States and Canada detected and identified a pair of Russian Tu-160 Blackjack heavy bombers participating in Russian Air Force activity transiting over the Atlantic on their way to/from Venezuela. Russian air assets at no time violated U.S. or Canadian airspace. This NORAD operation, in concert with similar responses by our NATO allies, demonstrates our continued vigilance and readiness to defend North American air sovereignty.

Aircraft Recapitalization. Our ability to maintain air sovereignty in the future is at risk. Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain reliability and capability as we move into the 2013-2025 timeframe. Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a challenge given DOD's post-9/11 long-term mission requirements.

NORAD's ability to accomplish its missions will be impacted if legacy fighters retire without a designated replacement being fielded in adequate numbers to maintain NORAD's air defense response capability.

The tradeoff between modernization of legacy airframes and transformation to fifth generation aircraft could limit efforts to keep pace with emerging challenges. Currently, legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. Recapitalization of legacy aircraft is critical to the future success of the NORAD mission set.

At this time, the Elmendorf AFB F-22s are tasked with air sovereignty alert missions and future Hickam Air National Guard F-22s should expect similar taskings. F-22s are also key participants in Operation NOBLE EAGLE sorties from Langley Air Force Base. The F-35 will play an even larger part in our homeland defense mission due to their increased numbers and widespread bed down locations of the aircraft they will be replacing. In light of this, I fully support the current Air Force program for the F-35. Program numbers will be reviewed in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review.

Civil Support Operations—Supporting Americans in Crisis

CBRNE Consequence Management. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents will pose a great challenge to the security of the American people for the foreseeable future. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil, an accidental CBRNE incident, or one caused by a natural disaster could create catastrophic conditions likely to overwhelm response capabilities of civil authorities. As a result, the Secretary of Defense has established a requirement for three CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRFs) to be trained and ready to respond to requests from civil authorities. The DOD, through USNORTHCOM, currently has one CCMRF trained and ready to support the Federal response to a CBRNE incident. USNORTHCOM will have a second CCMRF in 2009 and a third CCMRF by 1 October 2010. Each CCMRF is designed to provide robust command and control and consequence management capabilities that include aviation, medical, and general logistics support.

On 1 October 2008, the Secretary of Defense assigned CCMRF 1 forces to the Commander, USNORTHCOM. In September 2008, prior to mission assumption, CCMRF 1

participated in a Command Post Exercise at Fort Stewart, Georgia during Exercise VIBRANT RESPONSE to verify operational capability. The assigned CCMRF will participate in USNORTHCOM-sponsored joint exercises, and conduct unit training to sustain CCMRF readiness and requirements, as well as follow-on missions.

While CCMRF 1 is comprised mainly of active duty forces, the second and third CCMRFs will be comprised predominately of Reserve and National Guard forces. We are working closely with the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the National Guard Bureau, the military Services and the States on sourcing solutions, training, equipment, readiness, and exercise of those forces identified to fulfill CCMRF requirements.

2008 Hurricane Response Operations. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2008 Hurricane Season Recap, there were 16 named storms, of which eight became hurricanes and five became major hurricanes (Category 3 or higher). There were a record six consecutively-named storms, from Dolly to Ike, which made landfall on the United States coastline. The majority of DOD support occurred in the short timeframe of August and September as a result of the hurricane stream of Gustav, Hanna, and Ike. This severe impact to several States resulted in civilian agency requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations by DOD. USNORTHCOM's support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency was extremely successful across all areas. Here are just a few vignettes:

In August 2008, through a collaborative effort between USNORTHCOM and U.S. Transportation Command, DOD and National Guard personnel evacuated 723 critical care patients out of Louisiana during the aeromedical evacuation effort for Hurricane GUSTAV. During Hurricane IKE, DOD and National Guard personnel moved another 400 patients out of Beaumont, Texas. In crisis situations such as these, hospitals release many of their less serious

cases, but it is a more complex challenge to move the seriously ill and injured. We worked aggressively and quickly to ensure the right capabilities were in place to move patients to the appropriate receiving hospitals.

Immediately after Hurricane IKE made landfall, USNORTHCOM conducted an Incident Awareness and Assessment mission using the U.S. Navy's Global Hawk system to demonstrate its usefulness for support of civil authorities. The unmanned aircraft took off with a mission set of 299 locations and was dynamically re-tasked during the mission to add imagery requirements from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The radar imaging sensor was used to cut through the prevalent cloud cover. These medium-resolution images were sufficient for general damage assessments to infrastructure. Conducted in accordance with applicable laws and DOD regulations intended to protect the civil liberties of American citizens, these missions provided vital situational awareness for DOD forces planning Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. The DOD made the imagery available to the wider interagency hurricane response forces via dissemination on the Homeland Security Information Network, thus, enabling DOD to plan better and provided added benefit for our partners.

Our goal for the 2009 Hurricane Season focuses on anticipating Federal and State requirements to ensure timely and efficient DOD assistance. We are working closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve USNORTHCOM authorities and capabilities in the Joint Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities Execute Order. We continue to engage our Federal, State, and local partners to enhance DOD augmentation of civilian disaster response efforts.

Additionally, we are identifying gaps and seams in mass fatality management between current mortuary affairs capabilities in DOD and local, State, and Federal capabilities. Our

activities have been geared toward integrating efforts that will enhance civil-military understanding and collaboration.

Our mission remains to ensure DOD is prepared to support a timely and effective response to catastrophic conditions. We continue to work with the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response to develop a mass fatality concept of operations in accordance with the National Response Framework's Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services. These efforts will develop fatality management awareness, prevention, preparedness, and recovery operations strategies among Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and non-governmental agencies/associations.

Additionally, we have consulted with Scotland Yard in London, England, to ascertain how the British plan and prepare for mass fatality incidents. Closer to home, we partnered with the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner on a regional mass fatality management plan, which leverages the expertise and assets currently existing in the New York City metropolitan area to ensure maximum coordination among relevant stakeholders.

Wildland Firefighting. During wildland firefighting operations, DOD, through USNORTHCOM, supports the National Interagency Fire Center and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. USNORTHCOM provides a variety of capabilities including Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS)-capable C-130s, rotary wing aircraft capable of water bucket operations, ground crews for fire fighting operations, and incident awareness and assessment capability. There are a total of eight MAFFS; six are National Guard assets and two are assigned to Reserve units. The new MAFFS II capability will be used by the C-130H/J aircraft beginning this year and will provide greater capability to distribute fire suppression

retardant. I am particularly pleased that the C-130Js of the California Air National Guard have been added to the MAFFS fleet this year.

USNORTHCOM is also working with the National Guard Bureau to create a trained cadre of National Guard ground fire fighters that is pre-identified and ready pre-fire season to rapidly respond around the country.

Civil Support Operations. Beyond disaster response, USNORTHCOM provided DOD support to five National Special Security Events over the past year: The President's 2008 State of the Union Address, 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions, the 2008 G-20 Global Financial Summit, and the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. For each of these events, USNORTHCOM provided unique Secretary of Defense-approved DOD capabilities to enhance the security of the event.

Support to Law Enforcement Agencies. Through our subordinate unit, Joint Task Force North (JTF North), we continue to sustain important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies and National Guard counterdrug task forces engaged in securing our nation's borders against drug traffickers and their associated activities. JTF North collaborates with operational-level leaders in U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Coast Guard; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; National Guard Bureau; and State Joint Force Headquarters leadership in the States where JTF North operates. These relationships foster timely and responsive military support to law enforcement and provide greater interagency synchronization to deter and prevent drug trafficking and associated transnational threats.

JTF North coordinated 55 missions in support of Federal law enforcement agencies during fiscal year 2008. In accordance with applicable law and DOD policy for supporting law enforcement's counterdrug efforts, JTF North employed joint air, ground, and maritime sensors along the nation's southwest and northern borders and coasts; conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats; provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies; supported the U.S. Border Patrol's requests for enhanced tactical infrastructure along the southwest border; and provided Federal law enforcement with other support such as transportation, tunnel detection capabilities, and basic military skills training.

Counter-Tunnel Initiative. More than 99 cross-border tunnels have been identified by U.S. law enforcement agencies, in many cases with DOD support. While illegal drugs constitute the vast majority of illicit cargo transported through these tunnels, they could also be used to smuggle terrorists and Weapons of Mass Destruction into the country.

USNORTHCOM is examining enhanced tunnel detection capabilities with the lead Federal partner, the Department of Homeland Security, other Combatant Commands, and international partners. Among these enhanced capabilities are seismic-acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, other technologies, and robotics. The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) is the technical lead for these capability development efforts. ERDC has worked on tunnel detection in Iraq and provided subject matter expertise to USNORTHCOM in support of U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Northern Border Security Operations. During fiscal year 2008, USNORTHCOM, through JTF North, conducted twelve counterdrug/counter-narcoterrorism missions along the northern border including aviation reconnaissance, ground-based radars, mobile training teams

and intelligence analysis support. During fiscal year 2009, USNORTHCOM has nine counterdrug/counternarcoterrorism missions scheduled through JTF North. These missions, in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, will employ aviation reconnaissance, ground and maritime radars, and mobile training teams in Washington, Vermont, Montana, and New York against illicit trafficking along the northern border. In all these operations, JTF North works with Canadian law enforcement and military via U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as the U.S.-Canada Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. JTF North also participates in military-to-military activities to foster greater security cooperation between the United States and Canada to improve our collective security situation along our northern border.

The National Guard and Reserves—Vital Components of Our Nation's Defense

The National Guard and Reserve forces are fundamental to the total force and essential to our homeland security and defense. USNORTHCOM is committed to working with all stakeholders to implement the Secretary of Defense's 24 November 2008 direction in response to recommendations in the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves.

USNORTHCOM seized the opportunity and responsibility to advocate for the Reserve Component in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. Leveraging opportunities to fix National Guard and Reserve shortfalls is critical to the success of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions. In an environment of constrained budgets and multiple priorities, we need to determine where these requirements converge and give equal deference to materiel and non-materiel solutions alike.

USNORTHCOM is a strong advocate for Reserve Component resourcing for the capabilities needed by National Guard and Reserve forces in support of USNORTHCOM missions. In each of our annual Integrated Priority Lists and Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, USNORTHCOM and NORAD advocate for and support National Guard and Reserve capability shortfalls. We also advocate for and support National Guard Bureau efforts to validate key initiatives such as Joint CONUS Communications Support Environment and Beyond Line of Sight communications for our Air Sovereignty Alert fighters.

In June 2008, USNORTHCOM hosted the second Reserve Component Advocacy Conference wherein over 50 senior leaders discussed how best to advocate for the capabilities needed by Guard and Reserve forces in support of USNORTHCOM missions. We are advocating for change to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel, and training for homeland defense and civil support operations.

Since testifying last year, we have successfully partnered with the National Guard in support of several planned and unplanned civil support and homeland defense events. Every operation strengthens our ability to collaborate effectively and I am proud to report that while we still have work to do, our relationship with the National Guard continues to mature and has never been better. Today, my senior leaders meet regularly with their National Guard Bureau counterparts to identify and resolve issues in advance of an emergency. Additionally, our action officers coordinate daily on a variety of deliberate and crisis action planning requirements. Our watch centers are in constant communication with one another to ensure shared awareness. Finally, USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau partner to conduct training and exercises for all State Joint Force Headquarters Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs.

USNORTHCOM directly supports the National Guard Bureau initiative to establish the Defense Readiness Reporting System in all 54 States and territories. This is a five-year effort and once completed, asset availability, capabilities, and readiness information will be available to Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD for all homeland defense and civil support operations. To date, initial assessments are complete in 45 of the 54 States and territories and are currently visible in the Defense Readiness Reporting System.

It is notable that nearly 10 percent of USNORTHCOM's current full-time military manpower is drawn from the Reserve Component. This is the highest percentage of Reserve Component manning of the ten combatant commands. We have benefited from the full-time National Guard and Reserve expertise and look forward to full manning of our authorized full-time positions. I am very pleased to have ten flag officers from the National Guard and Reserves among my 21 total flag leaders in Headquarters NORAD and USNORTHCOM and our subordinate commands.

Plans—The Foundation of our Response

USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to the nation's ability to deter, prevent and defeat threats to our security, and support civil authorities when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense. They provide a template for USNORTHCOM responses and are continuously updated to reflect evolving national security requirements. NORAD's plans similarly ensure timely, effective responses to threats to the security of the United States and Canada.

With regard to homeland defense and civil support, the Department of Homeland Security and the interagency community use the 15 National Planning Scenarios as a vehicle to

shape nation-wide planning efforts for terrorist attacks and natural disasters. USNORTHCOM plans, such as Concept Plan 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, address all of the National Planning Scenarios that may require USNORTHCOM support.

With the recent development of the Department of Homeland Security's Integrated Planning System, there is now a formal process to link and integrate Federal plans across departments and agencies and in the future with State governments and local partners. Leveraging the Integrated Planning System will allow USNORTHCOM planners to gain fidelity on Federal planning, refine potential support requirements, and advocate for essential capabilities and resources.

USNORTHCOM civil support planners work closely with their counterparts at the National Guard Bureau. In addition to formal coordination at every stage of plan development, and regularly scheduled meetings conducted with web-based conferencing tools, USNORTHCOM and National Guard Bureau planners have begun meeting during planning conferences every six months. In December 2008, National Guard Bureau planners, and several State National Guard planners, met to discuss the status of USNORTHCOM plans and National Guard Bureau initiatives. In February 2009, interagency planners attended the USNORTHCOM Civil Support and Homeland Defense Planners Conference where USNORTHCOM component planners presented their supporting plans to USNORTHCOM overarching strategic plans. These meetings foster the working relationships that are so vital to synchronize our national response in times of crisis.

In September 2008, I signed our USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan, a first for the Command. This campaign plan synchronizes day-to-day operations, placing strong emphasis on three focus areas: anticipating threats to our continental security, improving our homeland

defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission partners, including the interagency community, Canada Command and the Mexican military.

Interoperable Communications

USNORTHCOM communications efforts are focused on ensuring a prompt, coordinated response with our mission partners in the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Guard, States, and local organizations. In partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Guard, we maintain a combined total of 25 Deployable Cellular-Based Suites which include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices for emergency responders. Several of these systems were deployed during Hurricane IKE and supported the response efforts in Galveston, Texas. We have also worked to upgrade DOD Satellite Communications Facilities within the United States. These upgrades enable DOD units to provide much sought after Internet and telephone connections to civil authorities during a crisis.

Exercises

Each year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD sponsor two large-scale exercises (ARDENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD) and participate in over 30 smaller regional, State, and local exercises, along with exercises with Canada, such as exercises in preparation for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. We continually review lessons learned from past exercises and real-world events (such as Hurricanes GUSTAV and IKE) and take corrective action by incorporating identified best practices. These actions are an integral part of our exercise program.

Over the last several years we have collaborated closely with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, other Federal departments and agencies, and States to develop and refine the National Exercise Program. Our civil support exercises are now fully integrated with the National Exercise Program and are often linked with the Tier I National Level Exercise and several Tier II or III Federal-level exercises, mutually supporting our own exercise objectives and those of our partners in the Federal government, State and regional organizations, local and tribal governments, and the private sector.

In conjunction with the National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM sponsors VIGILANT GUARD, a joint regional exercise program for the 54 State National Guard Joint Force Headquarters and their Joint Task Forces and Field Units, to improve command and control and operational relationships with internal, regional civilian, Federal, and other military partners. The VIGILANT GUARD team works side-by-side with our NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercise planners to coordinate and synchronize our training efforts. Two of the four annual VIGILANT GUARD exercises are linked with major NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercises, like ARDENT SENTRY and VIGILANT SHIELD, or the annual National Level Exercise.

To date, 14 VIGILANT GUARD exercises have been conducted, with participation from 39 States and territories (representing more than 8000 National Guardsmen) and scores of Federal, State, and local level government agencies and first responders. The VIGILANT GUARD program exemplifies the successful partnership among uniformed defenders of the homeland—NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and the National Guard Bureau—and helps assure the American public that we are ready for the mission.

Partnerships

Canada. The NORAD bi-national defense agreement is a tremendous example of the closeness and richness of our defense relationship with Canada. The bilateral relationship between USNORTHCOM and Canada Command also continues to mature. On 14 February 2008, I joined my counterpart, Lieutenant-General Dumais from Canada Command, in signing the United States-Canada Civil Assistance Plan. The Civil Assistance Plan is the framework under which military forces of one nation support the military forces of the other nation to provide timely, effective, and efficient support to their respective civil authorities.

Since then, the Civil Assistance Plan has been used once during real-world operations and several times during exercises. Following the appropriate exchange of diplomatic notes, we successfully executed this plan during the 2008 hurricane season when a Canadian C-17 aircraft assisted us with aeromedical evacuation operations during Hurricane GUSTAV. As we look to the future, the Civil Assistance Plan provides a framework for collaborative planning, training, and exercises in preparation for events such as the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

Last year I reported that USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and Canada Command initiated a study to examine future roles, missions, and relationships for the three Commands, with a desired end state of strengthening North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between Canada and the United States. The study continues, and we have made significant progress in maturing our relationships and promoting enhanced military cooperation among the Commands, including work on a proposed framework which will assist in clarifying how the three Commands operate and interact, highlight fundamental relationships, and underscore individual command responsibilities concerning mutual support and cooperation.

In an effort to advance our partnership with Canada Command toward enhanced continental defense and security, our Commands are also jointly developing various plans to provide a strategic framework for the bilateral defense and security of the United States and Canada, building on the existing U.S.-Canada Basic Defense Document and NORAD Agreement. These plans will, if required and authorized by our respective governments, provide a bilateral construct for employing the military forces of the United States and Canada in coordinated or combined operations, when not already covered by the NORAD Agreement.

Mexico. Our relationship with Mexico has never been better and continues to strengthen every day. Over the past year, we have advanced our relationship from one of introductions and orientation visits to one of open, frequent, and frank discussions on how we can improve our collective security from common threats. The government of Mexico is engaged in a difficult campaign against organized violent criminal networks that claimed over 5,000 lives in 2008. Your support of the Merida Initiative and DOD Counternarcotics Programs is helping to build the Mexican military's ability to counter threats to our mutual security. We especially thank Congress for approving our request for critically needed equipment under fiscal year 2008 Section 1206 authority. This enabled us to coordinate the first U.S. military equipment support to Mexico since the Command was activated in 2002. This equipment, all of which is non-lethal, includes personal protective equipment, digital media forensics equipment, night vision devices, and equipment needed to board suspect vessels at sea. We are now finalizing the requirements for delivery of transport helicopters and maritime surveillance aircraft to the Mexican military under the Merida Initiative.

USNORTHCOM has teamed with the Department of State, the U.S. Geological Survey, Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the

Environmental Protection Agency to execute Building Partnership Capacity and Humanitarian Assistance programs within our area of responsibility. One example of our efforts includes cooperation exhibited by Mexico's first acceptance of large-scale, DOD-provided civil material assistance consisting of 100,000 personal protective ensembles from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency excess property program. Because Mexico is our neighbor and disasters do not respect national boundaries, we are focused on developing and improving procedures to respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza outbreak, mass exposure to dangerous chemical and materials, and natural disasters. It is important to note that some of our international partners in these endeavors include domestic agencies such as Proteccion Civil in Mexico, who is responsible for consequence management response.

USNORTHCOM representatives recently participated in a Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Board of Visitors curriculum review; the first such participation by USNORTHCOM. Our review helped ensure WHINSEC training supports Mexican efforts against Drug Trafficking Organizations while simultaneously emphasizing human rights. In both areas, WHINSEC has performed superbly in support of our Theater Campaign Plan. Last year, Admiral Stavridis and I wrote a letter of support to Congress expressing the importance of safeguarding the privacy of WHINSEC students and staff.

Caribbean Islands, The Third Border. The 2008 Unified Command Plan shifted the USNORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command boundaries in the Caribbean. USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility now includes Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and the sovereign islands of the Bahamas, and two dependencies of the United Kingdom (the Turks and Caicos and British Virgin Islands).

Admiral Stavridis and I proposed this change for a number of reasons. First, it simplifies the homeland defense and civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Second, because the Bahamas are just 90 miles from the United States and considering its close relationship with our Federal interagency partners as well, we enhanced our capabilities in this critical sector.

As we have with Canada and Mexico, we will develop a theater engagement strategy for our "Third Border" with the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, and the British Virgin Islands. Our strategy will build on existing relationships established by U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force South to strengthen our nation's counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities in the Caribbean.

Interagency Community. For USNORTHCOM to be successful in protecting the United States and its interests, we must support other agencies in working toward common objectives and building the capacity of partners. Our USNORTHCOM and NORAD Interagency Coordination Directorate and the Commander's Joint Interagency Coordination Group integrate and synchronize information and activities among multiple civilian, Federal, State, and private sector organizations. This interagency Group is comprised of full-time professionals representing 40 agencies resident at USNORTHCOM Headquarters or in the local area. Some of the Federal departments and agencies represented are the Department of State; the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency Management Agency), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Coast Guard; Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Transportation; Federal Aviation Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U. S. Geological Survey; and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

USNORTHCOM's planning and operations staffs collaborate with our interagency partners to integrate and synchronize plans, security and emergency response activities. We host an informal Interagency Planner Synchronization Working Group at the national level on a bi-weekly basis. This type of collaboration has enabled us to execute a "whole-of-government" approach to planning, and has significantly improved cross-agency collaborative planning between the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM and component command planning staffs. We continue to see this collaborative effort expand as additional agencies choose to join.

USNORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center North invests heavily in the Intelligence Community networks established to improve analysis and warning of international terrorist threats to North America. Working with the Defense Intelligence Agency, we have assigned a senior terrorism analyst to work in the National Counterterrorism Center Defense Intelligence Unit. The Defense Intelligence Unit serves as a critical information-sharing advocate for all Commands and DOD stakeholders. Defense Intelligence Unit analysts work within the National Counterterrorism Center with full access to both widely disseminated and more sensitive Intelligence Community information on terrorism.

We also continue to grow our critical information-sharing partnership with the FBI. The focal point for this relationship is our intelligence liaison officer assigned to the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force. Additional analyst-to-analyst collaborative efforts regarding specific threats of mutual concern are robust and growing. In a step that will immeasurably benefit our preparedness and collaboration on shared threats, the FBI embedded one of their

experienced terrorism analysts within USNORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center North Terrorism Analysis Division in February 2009.

DOD liaison officers from USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the National Guard Bureau are assigned to Headquarters, Federal Emergency Management Agency to facilitate information sharing, coordination, and planning efforts for contingency response. These postings help to maintain effective coordination of plans and activities, enhance exchange of knowledge and advice, and facilitate effective relationship building. We maintain visibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's logistical preparations and Defense Logistics Agency-sourced deliveries. This improves situational awareness, helps reduce the need for short-notice airlifts, and improves our ability to anticipate and rapidly respond to emerging requirements during defense support of civil authorities missions.

USNORTHCOM has assigned Defense Coordinating Officers, supported by Defense Coordinating Elements, to each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions to ensure close coordination in planning and operations. USNORTHCOM and the Federal Emergency Management Agency also co-sponsor an annual Federal Coordinating Officer–Defense Coordinating Officer Conference designed to maintain and enhance civil-military understanding and support for disaster response planning activities.

USNORTHCOM has made considerable progress in developing appropriate planning relationships between the Department and Private Sector/Non-Governmental Organizations (PS/NGO) entities (business, non-profit, non-governmental, faith-based, and academia). We teamed recently with the Federal Emergency Management Agency Private Sector office to co-host a first ever "Public/Private Sector Collaboration in Disaster Preparedness and Response" Conference. This conference significantly enhanced DOD and USNORTHCOM collaboration

with PS/NGOs who own or manage some 85% of our nation's critical infrastructure and play a major part in disaster response. It's important to note that we are not attempting to take over or direct the Private Sector; however, we do believe we should be an active member of the overall preparedness and response community.

In coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM continues the deliberate development of relationships with State governments and organizations that represent constituencies. As a primary example of our State engagement efforts, we have teamed with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Guard Bureau to develop and execute internal and tailored training for requested States. We continue to work in partnership with the National Guard Bureau, with State Adjutants General, and State Joint Force Headquarters to identify gaps and shortfalls, specific all hazard events, and other critical issues. Our State engagement outreach also includes the Adjutants General Association of the United States and National Governors Association.

U.S. Coast Guard. The operational relationship between USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard provides a flexible, time-critical response, and immediate access to the full spectrum of capabilities and forces to ensure maritime security and defense of the United States. USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard coordinate for operations in multiple national defense mission areas: maritime intercept operations, rotary wing air intercept operations, mine countermeasures operations, maritime security and defense, counterdrug operations, migrant interdiction, theater security cooperation, and military environmental response operations.

U.S. Coast Guard personnel are fully integrated within the USNORTHCOM staff, and the USNORTHCOM staff is fully engaged with U.S. Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic Area Commands in maritime planning and execution.

Enhancing our Capabilities

United States-Canada Defense Surveillance Gapfiller Strategy. USNORTHCOM and NORAD lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain surveillance and command and control capabilities for North American defense. Wide Area Surveillance capability is critical to development of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense of the Homeland; however, existing surveillance assets are inadequate and aging.

Gapfiller is the USNORTHCOM and NORAD Family-of-Systems strategy to improve command and control and wide area surveillance of the North American continent and enable the engagement and defeat of missiles prior to impact in the homeland. Current gaps in the Joint Engagement Sequence (i.e., kill chain) leave our countries vulnerable to attacks in multiple domains. To address these gaps, we are conducting two technology demonstrations.

Gapfiller will integrate currently disparate Command and Control surveillance systems including those of other agencies and will integrate an advanced surveillance capability for initial improvement of homeland defense and security initiatives. Doing so will provide ground truth information to DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and other civilian organizations.

The second effort is a Technology Risk Reduction Initiative for the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar. Leveraging existing U.S. and Australian collaboration, this Technology Risk Reduction Initiative should greatly improve our ability to surveil the approaches to the homeland. The command and control JCTD will provide the Over-the-Horizon Radar picture to all mission partners. Together, these initiatives lay the foundation for improved integrated wide area surveillance around North America and a coherent, shared

operational picture that allows us to detect, respond to, and prevent asymmetric attacks against the homeland.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). During 2008 in response to requests from U.S. law enforcement agencies, USNORTHCOM employed UASs along the U.S. southwest border. A Global Hawk was employed during the Southern California Wildfires to provide State and local officials with imagery to assist in firefighting efforts. As previously stated, USNORTHCOM employed a Global Hawk to obtain pre- and post-landfall imagery of coastal areas in the path of Hurricane GUSTAV.

USNORTHCOM is fully engaged with the UAS community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence Advisory Council and our participation on the Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS Subgroup. We are eager to team with our partners at the Department of Homeland Security as they expand their UAS operational capabilities to achieve synergy with our homeland defense and homeland security efforts. We will be hosting a National Summit for UAS stakeholders this spring to help determine the best way forward on employing UAS capabilities in the National Airspace.

Arctic Policy. The law of the sea, as reflected in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, is the foundation of the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Although all other nations bordering the Arctic are parties to the Convention, the United States has yet to join the treaty. Becoming party to the Convention would protect and advance U.S. interests in the Arctic by bolstering our national security (including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable natural resources they contain), and giving the U.S. a seat at the table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.

The State Department leads U.S. Arctic policy and, together with a number of Federal agencies, implements the policy through the Arctic Council and bilaterally with other Arctic states. National Security Presidential Directive-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25) advocate for increased United States regional presence, maritime domain awareness, freedom of navigation, and the ratification of 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. NSPD-66/HSPD-25 also states that the United States "is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states" to safeguard its Arctic interests. Through NORAD, we have an opportunity to work closely with Canada in enhancing aerospace and maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. There is also potential for significant bilateral cooperation with Canada, through collaboration with Canada Command.

Transformational Communications. NORAD requires survivable, protected, and dynamic satellite communications capabilities throughout our area of operations and among all of our assets. At the same time, USNORTHCOM requires dynamic satellite communications for capacity and coverage throughout the entire area of responsibility that will support real-time joint force networking, battle space awareness and land-, air-, and sea-borne command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. For both Commands, the current and emerging missions within the Arctic region require the expansion of current and planned polar satellite communications capabilities. Our networks must seamlessly bridge with Federal, State, and local agencies. In my view, transformational satellites continue to offer the most viable course of action to satisfy our requirements for high-speed, secure, protected, dynamically-allocated and efficiently-utilized communications.

Biometric Access Control Enterprise. Biometrics is increasingly important in many areas of security. USNORTHCOM plans to capitalize on this technology by fielding a

networked, interoperable, biometrically-enabled installation access control enterprise for military installations in the United States. Biometric access control systems are already in use overseas and we believe now is the time to apply the same vigilance here at home to protect our people, installations, and critical infrastructure from obvious threats.

Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense. One of the more stressing challenges USNORTHCOM and NORAD will face in defense of the homeland in the near future is emerging air threats to include low flying aircraft, cruise missiles, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and Short and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. The United States lacks an integrated air and missile defense capable of defending against these threats. As the threat of terrorism looms and the proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, it becomes increasingly important to develop a truly integrated air and missile defense system-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the homeland.

In the past year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made significant strides toward protecting the homeland against these threats by developing a viable Integrated Air and Missile Defense Concept of Operations. To prepare for future homeland threats, USNORTHCOM and NORAD worked closely with the Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland Joint Test Team and participated in the Defense of the Homeland Against Asymmetric Missile Attack experiment. As the operational sponsors of Joint Air Defense Operations-Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD assisted in developing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for a Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense capability. This mobile capability could be used to protect a particular venue or city which may be threatened or at risk. Participation in the Defense of the Homeland Against Asymmetric Missile Attack experiment provided an excellent opportunity to

test the draft Integrated Air and Missile Defense Concept of Operations and to validate the command and control relationships.

Wind Farm Interference. NORAD faces a unique challenge as the United States seeks greater energy independence. We must continue to work closely with the Department of Energy laboratories and the alternative energy industry to ensure our technologies do not render each other's technology useless. We need to identify mitigation techniques that will allow wind turbines and radars to coexist.

Cyberspace Infrastructure. Cyberspace attacks on our information infrastructure can adversely impact our national security posture. Our opponents in this domain are sophisticated, well-resourced, and persistent. Their objectives are to disrupt operations, deny service, and exploit information and technology. To effectively execute assigned missions, USNORTHCOM and NORAD must ensure the uninterrupted use of the Internet as well as commercial and DOD communications systems. We partner with U.S. Strategic Command, the military Services, DOD Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security to reduce cyberspace vulnerabilities and defend against information infrastructure attacks. While this partnership is sufficient, more coordination and cooperation is required to ensure we operate effectively during major cyberspace incidents.

Maritime Domain Awareness. The maritime domain enables our nation's growth. In order to ensure freedom of movement for all law abiding entities while identifying threats prior to realization, it is imperative that we have a picture of the maritime domain and its relationship to activities in other domains. Maritime Domain Awareness represents a global challenge requiring focused efforts. USNORTHCOM has a fundamental requirement for maritime domain awareness in order to execute our missions. However, we need to develop a common

operational picture based on a common system architecture between the United States and Canada. This will result in enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness to predict, identify, and intercept vessels of interest as well as enhance and formalize information sharing between partner agencies and departments. In this regard, we will continue to work closely with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, as well as our Canadian and other international partners.

USNORTHCOM has also partnered with U.S. Pacific Command to develop a Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept. It describes how the joint force will conduct future (2016-2028) maritime operations to understand the maritime domain and will help identify requirements to achieve maritime domain awareness. This document will be completed in summer of 2009 and will lead to the development of processes necessary for Maritime Domain Awareness, a key enabler for the range of military options in the maritime domain across the Department of Defense. It will help shape DOD's contribution to global Maritime Domain Awareness.

Finally, Maritime Domain Awareness is a critical enabler for the execution of NORAD's maritime warning mission. A major milestone occurred in November 2008 during Exercise VIGILANT SHIELD when NORAD issued its first series of Maritime Warning Messages which validated procedures and confirmed the ability to provide strategic warning of a maritime threat to the governments of the United States and Canada. Despite this success, seams and gaps in process, policy, documentation, classification and releasability, as well as technical impediments to cross-border information sharing in the maritime domain, persist.

Conclusion.

Today, our team of active duty members, Reserve Forces, National Guardsmen, Canadian service members, and civilians are trained and ready to defend the United States and Canada and support civil authorities in times of crisis. With Congress' sustained support, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to anticipate our nations' needs and be ready to protect and defend our fellow citizens and the freedoms they enjoy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY until released by the House Armed Services Committee

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MARCH 18, 2009

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY until released by the House Armed Services Committee

This page left intentionally blank.

Statement of

General James N. Mattis, USMC
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command

Before the House Armed Services Committee

March 18, 2009

Thank you for the opportunity to report on United States Joint Forces Command. As one of 10 combatant commands in the Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) oversees a force of 1.16 million Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. The command is uniquely structured to provide agile forces to geographic combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense to prevail in current operations and to ensure we are not caught flat-footed in future battles. The command works closely with other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and allied and coalition partners. We are as focused on coalition issues as we are on joint issues, and we provide a critical link to NATO through our co-location in Norfolk, Virginia with NATO's Allied Command Transformation, the only NATO Headquarters on U.S. soil.

My testimony will focus primarily on the future following a short update on accomplishments over this past year. I will do so with a dose of realism and a sense of urgency. I will present the way forward for Joint Forces Command as it supports the current fight and prepares the nation's military for future operations. The forward-looking emphasis of my remarks reflects the command's mission statement: ***To provide mission-ready, joint-capable forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.***

Today, our nation is involved in major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it faces a number of threats and opportunities around the globe. For Joint Forces Command, we are focused on the current threat environment for two reasons. First, we are the Joint Force Provider for the Department of Defense. We must do as much as possible to support current military operations. The second reason addresses the focus of this statement: *"the future of the joint force."* Simply put, much of what we see in the cities of Iraq, the mountains of Afghanistan, and the foothills of southern Lebanon, I believe we will see again in the future. I say this knowing there is much we do not know about the future, and there is much more that will surprise us no matter how well we prepare. How many people expected a conflict in Georgia would keep cartographers busy in 2008? That said, the conflicts in Afghanistan other locations will sharpen USJFCOM's activities as we give traction to Secretary Gates' principle of balancing our force to fight conventional, irregular, and hybrid threats of the future.

We know the *nature* of future wars will not differ from current wars. History teaches us that the *character* of each individual war is always different and most certainly will change, but the enduring *nature* of war as a human endeavor will remain largely unchanged. Just like today, future enemies will force us to adapt as they adapt—and they will attack our vulnerabilities when and where they can. Just like today, they will attack our values and misrepresent our intentions in the "battle of competing narratives," theirs versus ours. Thus, in many respects, today's warfare *is* the future of warfare as demonstrated over the past 25 years since militant extremists first attacked our embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon. The "irregular" methods our enemies use today will be employed against us tomorrow. We are already facing many of the threats prognosticators once labeled as "future" threats - cyber war and economic terrorism being just two examples.

In the near term we have few direct threats in the realm of conventional warfare, but we must ensure that we maintain our current conventional superiority – and address our vulnerabilities to indirect attacks. Right now, no one can match the United States Air Force in aerial combat, the United States Navy on the open seas, or the United States Army and Marine Corps in conventional land warfare. Our forces remain dominant in conventional and nuclear warfare. Enemies in the future, however, need not destroy our aircraft, ships, or tanks to reduce our conventional and even nuclear effectiveness. A well-timed and executed cyber attack may prove just as severe and destructive as a conventional attack. As technology becomes less expensive and more available, enemies have the ability to easily acquire increasingly lethal types of conventional and unconventional weapons. Overall, our future enemies are likely to confront us much as we are challenged by today's enemies—through indirect methods in wars of a "hybrid" nature that combine any available irregular or conventional mode of attack, using a blend of primitive, traditional and high-tech weapons and tactics.

As Secretary Gates emphasized, the defining principle for defeating both current and future threats is *balance*. At Joint Forces Command, we must balance doing what is required to prevail in the current fight while simultaneously preparing for an uncertain future. We must have balanced and versatile joint forces ready to accomplish missions across the full spectrum of military operations—from large-scale, conventional warfare to humanitarian assistance and other forms of "soft" power. Without balance, we risk being *dominant* but *irrelevant*—that is, superior in nuclear and conventional warfare, but poorly equipped to prevail in irregular contests.

So the question becomes how will joint forces achieve and maintain balance in the coming decades? What capabilities are required? During the last year, Joint Forces Command examined some of these questions in *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2008*. The *JOE* is the

Command's "historically informed, forward looking" effort to assess trends, discern security threats and determine implications. While the JOE is not meant to reflect or be a statement of U.S. Government policy and is fundamentally speculative in nature, it provides a starting point for discussions about the future security environment. It concludes that we can expect a future of persistent conflict and global instability, greater adversary access to weapons of mass destruction, and the eventual rise of regional state and non-state competitors. It serves as the "problem statement" for the future joint force. Its companion document, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, or *CCJO*, articulates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision for how the joint force will operate and prevail in the future threat environment. Thus, the *CCJO* is a proposed "solution" to the *JOE*'s "problem statement." The Chairman participated extensively with the writing team, emphasizing that the military's mission is to win wars, but also noting the requirement for a whole-of-government approach in our campaigns.

USJFCOM has already embarked on a fast-track series of limited objective experiments to test the validity of, and refine the methods outlined in the *CCJO*. The effort culminates this June in time to inform the Quadrennial Defense Review and subsequent budget decisions designed to carry forward Secretary Gates' direction for balance in our forces.

Historically, every military that has transformed successfully has done so by clearly identifying a specific military problem as we have done in the *JOE*, and then set out to solve the problem, as we have presented in the *CCJO*. Joint Forces Command recognizes that it cannot predict the future with certainty but it must do a better job than potential adversaries. We don't think we can forecast the future precisely, but we cannot afford to get it completely wrong either.

Based on current needs of the joint force, the findings of the *JOE*, and the guidance provided by the *CCJO*, Joint Forces Command will focus on six key areas during the next year:

making irregular warfare a core competency of the Joint Force; enhancing joint command and control; improving as a joint force provider; accelerating efforts toward a "whole-of-government approach; building and improving partnership capacity; and joint training and education.

Making Irregular Warfare a Core Competency

USJFCOM will move swiftly to make irregular warfare (IW) a core competency of our military without losing conventional or nuclear superiority. Joint forces must develop a mastery of the irregular fight on par with our conventional and nuclear capabilities. Our forces must be flexible and adaptable enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict – this is not an "either/or" proposition. While we will maintain cadres of specialized forces (i.e. special operations and nuclear forces), we will aggressively and deliberately work to build IW expertise across our general purpose forces, making them adaptable to however the enemy chooses to fight. Many efforts are underway, yet much remains to be done.

As mentioned earlier, the changing character of warfare puts our nation's joint forces at risk of being dominant, but irrelevant to the threats we will most likely face. While we are superior in conventional and nuclear warfare, we are not yet superior in irregular warfare. Throughout history, the "paradox of war" reveals that thinking adversaries avoid strengths and gravitate towards areas of perceived weakness. In this tradition, our current enemies clearly voted "No" to conventional military operations in which they are unprepared to confront us. Instead they attack in ways we consider irregular or asymmetric, but are anything but asymmetric to them. If we do not develop a culture where leaders and capabilities are well suited for irregular or hybrid warfare, while simultaneously maintaining our conventional and nuclear prowess, then we

embolden our enemies and our forces must improvise on the battlefield to make up for any failure to anticipate changing challenges.

To that end, we are working closely with U.S. Special Operations Command and the services to export traditional Special Operations Forces (SOF) expertise to our general purpose forces. Specifically, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a role well-suited to general purpose forces and transitioning significant portions of the mission their way will help relieve pressure on our over-extended SOF.

These SFA capabilities are required to deal with the emerging security challenges and the growing number of weak or failing states. By increasing SFA activities and capabilities, we may be able to preclude or minimize conflict, or increase our own security, by providing weak or failing states with the tools, capabilities, and knowledge to protect themselves. The old adage, "give a man a fish - he eats for a day, but teach him how to fish - he eats for a lifetime" applies here. By strengthening indigenous security forces of like-minded partners and allies, we improve our collective security against future threats and security challenges. The ethical challenges inherent to this mission are understood and considered as we dispatch well-trained teams on these missions.

There is a clear need for general purposes forces to operate in a disaggregated fashion to checkmate and destroy our nation's irregular enemies. Flexible, adaptive organizational structures and training environments are required to unleash the power of these high-performing small units. In IW, our military units need freedom of action to take advantage of fleeting opportunities under stressful conditions. This requires agile, configurable C2 systems that push decision making to the lowest appropriate level. These forces must retain the capability to rapidly aggregate for conventional operations when needed, and then disaggregate into small

teams with the tactical cunning to confound small groups of enemy. To prepare our forces for these new realities, we must replicate the fast-paced, chaotic conditions of future battlefields in our training environments.

To meet this need, USJFCOM is developing the Future Immersive Training Environment (FITE) to provide ground units from all services the same level of realistic training we provide in our aviation and maritime simulators in those domains. Today, our ground combat forces suffer more than 80% of our casualties and we can provide them with high quality live, virtual, and constructive simulation capabilities to reduce this risk. Mixing brick and mortar surroundings with live actors and interactive virtual tools will provide unprecedented realism for our ground troops and better replicate the chaos of the "first fights" so our youngest warriors are prepared for the tactical and ethical demands of combat among non-combatants. Because FITE is also an approved Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, the outputs from this initiative will be highly visible to the services and positioned for rapid transition to their programs of record. While the FITE initiative has a broad focus, it is just the first step in a larger small unit decision making initiative.

The irregular threats of today and tomorrow require a different approach to how we recruit, educate, and train leaders. The Small Unit Decision Making (SUDM) initiative will bring national-level attention to the problem and enlist the help of social scientists, psychologists, leader development experts, small unit leaders, and first responders. A series of forums hosted in 2009 will address performance under stress in small unit scenarios and culminate in a long-range plan to improve small unit performance.

Established in October 2008, the Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) is the command's catalyst and driving force behind establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. The

JIWC will work relentlessly across the DoD, interagency, and our multinational partners to increase interoperability and integration between our special operations and general purpose forces. The center is spearheading the FITE and SUDM initiatives and also is tasked with developing an IW professional development program for next generation military leaders and identify IW shortfalls across the joint force.

As we create a stronger competency in IW, we must capture enduring battlefield innovation and lessons learned to apply them after swift and rigorous evaluation. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) leads the command's efforts in this area, and its observations are improving the quality of the mission rehearsal exercises that prepare joint force headquarters for duties in the Horn of Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan. USJFCOM also maintains deployed teams in Iraq and Afghanistan to harvest lessons learned and best practices from the front lines, and then shares them with our allies and coalition partners. USJFCOM also has a close working relationship with the service lesson learned centers and constantly works to strengthen and improve its relationship and information sharing with NATO's Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre under my command as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation.

Above all, we must continuously assess the threat environment and work to maintain a proper balance between conventional and irregular competency and avoid overcorrecting to match the crisis of the day. We cannot afford a lack of vision or misinterpret our enemies' capabilities in an era where advanced technologies and weapons of mass destruction are increasingly available to an array of state and non-state actors. The recent Georgia-Russia conflict is a reminder of how quickly conventional war can come out of hibernation.

Enhancing Joint Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is foremost a human endeavor. U.S. military C2 must be leader-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision-making at the lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and engineering can enable decision making, command and control is not synonymous with network operations or the employment of advanced technology. Rather, it maintains the flexibility to exploit both. Consequently, our commanders must be skillful at crafting their commander's intent, enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in the heat of battle, vice centralizing decision-making at high levels. This is particularly important in fast-paced conventional force-on-force warfare and during highly dynamic and decentralized operations that characterize irregular warfare.

As Admiral Mullen stated in the *CCJO*, the United States must be capable of projecting power globally in an environment where access to forward operating bases will become increasingly limited and our uncontested superiority in space will be challenged. Therefore, success of future operations will become more dependent on increasingly vulnerable space-based capabilities and sophisticated global networks. To compensate for these increased risks, it is imperative that the joint force develop and promote integrated, interoperable, defendable, robust, and properly structured command and control systems enabling joint forces to fight effectively in an increasingly hostile operating environment, including when our technical systems are degraded.

The United States currently enjoys unmatched technological advantage over our adversaries in the area of C2, but we also must recognize that our space, aerial, surface and

subsurface communication, computer, and ISR networks represent tremendous vulnerabilities as they most certainly will be subject to attack in the future by an adaptive and technically adept enemy. As such, we must ensure our C2 systems, and their associated networks, are resistant to attack and are robust enough to reconstitute quickly in the event of a successful attack. Additionally, we must ensure our disparate C2 systems can interface seamlessly across the network to continue moving information during periods of degraded communications. We must guard against over-reliance on increasingly vulnerable space-based systems in favor of a "triad" blend of space, air, and surface capabilities that provide redundant and survivable C2 systems. Likewise, despite access to sophisticated and ubiquitous C2 systems, our leaders must still be able to execute missions using decentralized decision-making consistent with their commander's intent in degraded information environments, so we are not paralyzed when network degradation occurs.

In May 2008, in our role as the Command and Control Capabilities Portfolio Manager (C2 CPM), USJFCOM promulgated a Joint C2 Vision outlining elements that make up an effective C2 network and describing the execution of responsibilities for joint command and control integration assigned to USJFCOM in the Unified Command Plan. This vision guides and directs our actions both within the command and on behalf of the Department of Defense as we promote an integrated portfolio of joint command and control capabilities. Many of the ideas and guiding principles contained in this vision are incorporated in the Defense Department's recently released Command and Control Strategic Plan that guides C2 transformation for the services and DoD agencies. In the coming year, USJFCOM will work with the Department to ensure these tenets of effective joint command and control are carried forward and expanded in the C2 Implementation Plan to be published later in the year. The command also is partnering with the

Department's Chief Information Office to find and replace outdated and redundant C2 policies with unambiguous and coherent documentation. These new policies will foster enhanced information sharing among joint/coalition partners and better align existing policies with advances in technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The USJFCOM C2 Vision emphasizes and promotes further investment in the professional military education and training of all leaders to improve their ability to operate effectively in complex, chaotic, and hostile combat environments. USJFCOM will act as the central coordinator for creating and delivering effective training and education to support "leader-centric" C2. We will emphasize the fundamental interdependency between commander's intent and subordinate initiative; we will ensure the tenets of effective joint C2 are embedded in JPME courses and reinforced at the Capstone, Pinnacle, and Keystone Courses for Flag/General Officers and senior enlisted personnel. We teamed with the U.S. Strategic Command to develop new doctrine for cyberspace operations, and are continuing to evaluate and accredit standards for the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) training courses.

Under our C2 Capability Portfolio Manager responsibilities, USJFCOM will continue its operational sponsorship during the planned migration of the current joint and service Global C2 System (GCCS) family of systems into a service-oriented architecture through the evolving Net-Enabled Command Capability (NECC) program. Our overarching objective is to "do no harm" to warfighters by ensuring required C2 capabilities are not lost or reduced during this migration. However, delays in the fielding of NECC and cuts in funding are producing capability gaps placing the modernization of our C2 systems at risk.

To solve this problem, USJFCOM is working collaboratively with the services to address these shortfalls through the PR-11 and POM-12 budget process. Concurrently, USJFCOM is

working with the services to accelerate the migration to a service-oriented architecture underpinned by a comprehensive data strategy that makes all data visible and accessible to all users. Lastly, we will continue to leverage capability enhancements by integrating our efforts across the entire doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) spectrum. By taking this holistic approach to C2, we will avoid focusing solely on technological solutions. In the end, war is a human endeavor that requires we emphasize that *human* dimension over technology and ensure C2 capabilities are leader-centric and network-enabled.

Improving as a Joint Force Provider

As the joint force provider, USJFCOM is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of current operations and global contingencies. This critical mission area is the most relevant and has the most immediate and visible impact on joint force operations. During the past year, USJFCOM responded to more than 200 requests for forces from combatant commanders resulting in the sourcing of more than 437,000 personnel supporting several global missions. Likewise, in the coming year, USJFCOM is prepared to provide forces to support the recently announced troop increases in Afghanistan and continue to satisfy requirements in Iraq and elsewhere. To mitigate unpredictable events like those outlined in the *Joint Operating Environment*, USJFCOM, working with the Joint Staff and services, established a Global Response Force designed to respond to unforeseen crises either at home or abroad. This capable force provides the Commander-in-Chief with flexible options to respond to a variety of crises while simultaneously fulfilling our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world.

Despite its successes and demonstrated responsiveness, the dynamic nature of Global Force Management (GFM) creates an enduring need for continuous process improvement. For example, we must improve our ability to respond quickly and efficiently to requests for joint forces and enabling capabilities by improving our information technology tools and data bases. We also need to establish common training and readiness reporting tools and data bases that are transparent, accurate, and accessible to all involved in the Global Force Management process. To accomplish this, USJFCOM teamed with OSD, the Joint Staff, service headquarters, and DoD to establish the Force Management Improvement Project (FMIP) providing process improvement across the GFM enterprise. Efforts to date have yielded the development and fielding of the highly successful web-based Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM) tool that provides senior DoD decision makers with the first consolidated database of all force requirements (Rotational, Emergent, Exercise, Individual Augmentation and Contingency Planning) generated by geographic combatant commanders. Improvements during the next 12 to 18 months include the seamless interface of this requirements tool with the adaptive planning tool (Collaborative Force-Building Analysis, Sustainment and Transportation) and the deployment execution tool (Joint Operations Planning and Execution System) to achieve a significant improvement in deployment process efficiency. The end result of this FMIP-driven accomplishment, and others like it, will be to provide combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense with accurate and timely information to facilitate risk-informed force allocation decisions.

A companion effort to the FMIP is development of the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) process that focuses on closing the gap between planning and execution processes, creating valid operational plans that can transition rapidly to execution with little or no

modification. The APEX system, when coupled with the FMIP, will assist commanders in developing operationally and logistically feasible plans and execution decisions across the spectrum of conflict.

The cunning and adaptive enemy we face today is forcing us to change the way we do business and is placing unusual stress on "high demand, low density" assets which often requires unplanned or accelerated force structure changes, and in some cases new capabilities to be developed. You are aware that the demand for certain types of forces or capabilities outpaces supply. Persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The demand signal for these capabilities is expected to continue growing as we build a balanced force to confront conventional and irregular threats. In the short term, these shortfalls are mitigated by prioritizing requirements, assuming acceptable risk in certain areas, reaching deep into the National Guard and Reserve, use of ad hoc and in-lieu-of force options, and use of USJFCOM Joint Enabling Capability Command (JECC) enablers. Concurrently, new capabilities are being developed by the services to reduce reliance on ad hoc and in-lieu-of forces and to increase the physical numbers of existing capabilities that are in high demand. It is envisioned that these actions combined with the improved Global Force Management processes outlined above will help ease the stress on the force and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the process.

Accelerating Efforts Toward a Whole of Government Approach

As armed conflicts rarely require purely military solutions, security concerns continue to demand the attention of multiple facets of our national power. It is critical that our military

leaders connect with civilian counterparts to leverage the diverse powers of our government before, during, and after times of crisis. We must employ to our advantage the power of both inspiration and intimidation, each in the appropriate measure, to confound our enemies.

Essential to a whole-of-government approach for applying all aspects of national and international power is the ability to share information and situational awareness among all partners. Interagency shared situational awareness is an FY09 USJFCOM experimentation project to create an interagency common operational picture. The effort is addressing technologies, processes, organizational structures, and policy change recommendations necessary for creating, visualizing, and sharing information across the military and civilian branches of the United States Government.

USJFCOM is prepared to support the recent DoD establishment of an expeditionary civilian workforce. Working with military forces when needed, expeditionary civilians will provide new perspectives and expertise to complex challenges our military leaders are tasked to solve. This visionary effort is the most direct application of the whole-of-government approach to date, and it hopefully will spread to other departments. Sourcing of expeditionary civilians over extended periods through multiple rotations requires the attention and support of our civilian government counterparts.

To encourage interagency participation in military efforts, USJFCOM publishes the "Partnership Opportunity Catalog," a listing of DoD exercises and training events that provide our government and non-government partners with opportunities to integrate and train. The FY09-10 catalog contains summaries and contact information for more than 300 service and combatant command exercises, training events, and demonstrations supporting interagency integration.

Building and Improving Partnership Capacity

In this emerging threat environment, it is clear America's endurance will be reinforced with support from nations that share our vision and our values. No nation can go it alone and our friends can provide critical support. Mitigating risk will require building and maintaining relationships with capable partners – including our North American neighbors, fellow NATO members, and other nations. U.S. Joint Forces Command is working to strengthen partnerships through engagement with DoD and NATO, via Allied Command Transformation, and representatives from 24 other nations assigned to the command. USJFCOM directly supports DoD's Building Partner Capacity Portfolio Manager by leading the Building Partner Senior Warfighter Forum. As intended, this forum helps partner nations counter terrorism, promote stability, and prevent conflict. This effort has also increased information sharing capability among respective U.S. combatant commands - an unintended but positive outcome.

The USJFCOM-led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a two-year, multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition capabilities against irregular threats through a whole-of-government, or comprehensive approach. Participants include: military and civilian sectors of 16 NATO and non-NATO nations; NATO's Allied Command Transformation; and U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 builds upon the whole-of-government work in MNE 5, completed late last year, and seeks to further integrate civil and military engagement in areas of information strategy, strategic communications, assessment, and coalition logistics.

In addition, whole-of-government approaches, military level cooperation, and shared education and training develop bonds in peace that become invaluable in time of war. For example, USJFCOM is working to add a Foreign Liaison Officer from Pakistan with the intent

that this relationship will improve our nation's ability to conduct operations in southwest Asia. At present, the command has permanently-assigned liaison officers from 22 different nations. In addition, through Allied Command Transformation, the command has access to the 31 National Liaison Representatives from NATO nations and Alliance partners.

The sustained efforts of a balanced, cohesive coalition force have historically proven more effective than a single nation's efforts to erode an enemy's support base among local populations. U.S. Joint Forces Command remains committed to gaining increased representation from coalition and partner militaries to grow balanced relationships founded on mutual understanding, trust, and common operating concepts. This will assist us in better integrating international partner capability and capacity in our fights against common enemies.

Training and Education

A military is only as capable as its professionally-trained and educated officers and senior noncommissioned officers allow it to be. A trained warrior may perform acceptably in a conventional operation, but irregular and hybrid wars demand highly-educated warriors to prevail. We must continually educate our leaders to think, and not just to do. Special emphasis must be placed on human, cultural, language, and cognitive skills. A "cognitive" warrior knows how to acquire knowledge, process information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments.

We must place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture, and language. These three elements are being more broadly incorporated into training and exercise scenarios, including those employing the latest modeling and simulation technology. It is not enough to know your enemy or the culture of a region in which you are engaged. One also must inculcate understanding and respect for our partner nations as well.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that joint education must be incorporated at the tactical level among junior officers and our senior NCOs. These extended campaigns also revealed the need to translate "lessons learned" more quickly from the battlefield to the classroom. To accomplish this, USJFCOM routinely incorporates battlefield lessons learned into Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) and senior leader education programs like the Pinnacle, Capstone, and Keystone Courses. However, more must be done to institutionalize this example into the broader education and training process. Right now, it takes almost three years to bring lessons learned from exercises and operations through the doctrinal process and curriculum certification period. This delay is unacceptable and we are taking specific steps to translate battlefield adaptations into institutional change more rapidly. Outdated PME does not prepare our forces and hurts the credibility of our schools.

To improve JPME and ensure it is aligned properly with current realities and future challenges, USJFCOM is partnering with the Defense Science Board, National Defense University, and service schools to conduct a thorough evaluation of the entire JPME program. From this analysis, we will generate recommendations to transform JPME, making it more efficient and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and future operating environments. The *JOE* and *CCJO* will help frame our way ahead in this area.

USJFCOM also continues to improve its Joint Knowledge Development & Delivery Capability (JKDDC) that provides distance and distributed education programs for joint and coalition forces. The Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Portal hosts more than 170 courses, including 80 developed by coalition partner nations to build partner capacity through sharing information and security related training. The portal also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment training for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners

participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resources found on the JKO Portal also are available to interagency, international and non-governmental organizations.

In our role as Joint Force Trainer for the U.S. military's joint force headquarters, MRXs continue to improve and stress the decision making skills and cultural awareness of our deploying command elements. The recent MRX for the 82d Airborne Division, for example, incorporated 12 partner nations and a record level of interagency participation. The exercises remain tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and operational problems that train and evaluate deploying commanders and their staffs.

USJFCOM has a unique responsibility in managing the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) which provides a nationally interconnected training environment, through the U.S. Joint Training and Experimentation Network JTEN, linking together 42 Combatant Command and Service training programs. This capability enables Joint Forces Command, in coordination with the Services and COCOMS, to establish joint context at the tactical level so we train exactly like we fight today in theater. We have also established a national Information Operations (IO) Range connecting over 40 sites. The IO Range provides a dynamic new capability to fully test and train on computer network and influence operations. Additionally, USJFCOM is managing the establishment of the Virtual Integrated Support for the IO Environment (visIOn), which provides a planning and assessment capability that brings people, processes, and technology together to continually enhance warfighter IO capability.

As part of a larger initiative to increase collaboration with Allied Command Transformation, USJFCOM is working closely with our NATO partners, specifically the Joint Warfare Center, Joint Forces Training Center, and the NATO School, to prepare forces enroute to the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. USJFCOM also is working with NATO to connect the JTEN with the NATO Training Federation. This link will improve the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of training by providing a common core of realistic training capabilities to all Alliance nations.

Conclusion

On behalf of the military and civilian men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I thank you for the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continued security of this experiment in democracy we call America.

As we move forward, we will face tough choices. Our resources are not unlimited and there are inherent risks and tradeoffs in everything we do. As we expect persistent conflict in the coming decades and complex threat environment, we also can expect our enemies to continue challenging us where *they* believe we are vulnerable. So, we must be prepared to think the "unthinkable," using our study and imagination to help us defeat the enemy. In times of economic stress, there is a temptation to step back from world affairs, to focus on the pressing issues at home. History shows that this is a mistake – isolation did not work in the 20th Century and it is unlikely to work today or in the future. We must remain active and engaged with the world, and our military must be prepared to do so effectively and efficiently.

As Secretary Gates made clear, the guiding principle behind our efforts to prepare for an uncertain future will be *balance*. Balance will enhance the agility and capabilities of our joint forces as we work to make irregular warfare a core competency. War remains fundamentally a human endeavor that will require human solutions. Technology is a key enabler, but it is not the solution. We will embrace a whole-of-government approach to bring all of our nation's

resources to bear, while continuing to build alliances and enhancing our international partnerships. And finally, we must remain focused on the long-term security of our nation, and avoid being captivated by short-term distractions. As General Omar Bradley said, *"We need to learn to set our course by the stars, not by the lights of every passing ship."*

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL WILLIAM E. WARD, USA

COMMANDER,

UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

18 March 2009

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE - WRITTEN STATEMENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

- Political Geography
- Demographic Trends
- Transnational Threats and Crime
- Other States and Organizations Operating Within the AOR

AFRICA COMMAND STRATEGY AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- Interests, Endstates, and Objectives
- Continent Wide Africa Programs, Activities, and Plans
- Regional African Programs, Activities, and Plans

COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE COMMAND ACTIVITIES

- U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)
- U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)
- U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA)
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)
- U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)
- Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS

- Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements
- Theater Command, Control, Communication, Computer (C4) Systems
- Quality of Life Programs

INTERAGENCY INITIATIVES

- Building Partner Capacity
- Support for Regional Programs

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege as Commander of United States Africa Command to present to Congress our Posture Statement for 2009. The men and women of U.S. Africa Command have ensured the successful, rapid, and on-schedule activation of our nation's newest Unified Command--the sixth geographic command within the Department of Defense (DOD). The establishment of U.S. Africa Command provides a single focus for all DOD activities in Africa, and today we conduct sustained security cooperation programs in support of U.S. foreign and national security policy on the African continent and its island states.

Unified Command Status (UCS) on 1 October 2008 was possible due to the extraordinary efforts of our impressive team. By UCS, a total of 172 missions, activities, programs and exercises were effectively transferred to U.S. Africa Command from U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. I am grateful for the sustained congressional support to U.S. Africa Command during its formative time, and I thank you for your continued support as we prepare to meet future challenges.

Development, diplomacy, and defense programs are integrally linked, and U.S. Africa Command is implementing the National Defense Strategy's vision of a *new jointness* by supporting and improving collaboration with other agencies and departments across our Government, as well as improving coordination with international, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. We achieve the greatest effect for our nation when we coordinate and harmonize our collective efforts in support of our common objectives.

Africa is on a positive course in reducing conflict, building democratic institutions, and promoting sustainable livelihoods for its people, but in each of these areas, the hard-won gains are fragile. Strengthening African security, both in individual nations and regionally, is necessary for its communities to flourish. I am convinced that building African security capability and capacity is the best path to assisting the people of Africa to achieve long-term stability and security.

In the months since UCS, U.S. Africa Command has been serving the interests of our nation, while also addressing the security and stability challenges confronting our African partners. In this report, I provide a brief overview of the strategic environment in Africa, explain our strategy, and underscore how our coordinated security assistance efforts are promoting stability in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility (AOR) presents difficult security challenges that should be viewed along with the opportunities available to the people of Africa. These challenges are juxtaposed against abundant natural resources that, if properly managed by African states and institutions, can provide great economic and social benefits to all Africans. Our task is to assist our African partners so that

they can provide for their own security in ways that permit realization of their capacity and potential.

Africa is a complex environment requiring a new and different approach. Its unique challenges demand a long-term rather than a near-term focus. For example, two of the most demanding challenges for African coastal nations are the security of their territorial waters and the regulation of their fishing industries. Today, the waters off Africa's west coast are being over-fished at an alarming rate by a variety of entities aware of Africa's inability to monitor and regulate this activity in their economic zone. If this continues, some forecasters predict that the ecological system that supports the fish population, the primary source of protein for many African states, could fail by 2045. Without the ability to secure their maritime spaces and regulate fishing, the nations of Africa will lose this important source of food and revenue for their people. The United States must adopt a long-term view towards creating programs that will help solve such problems. Failing to do so today means our activities will only produce short-term effects.

Political Geography

The greatest security threats facing Africa include enduring conflicts, illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, rebel insurgencies, violent extremists, piracy, and illegal immigration. While rich in both human capital and natural resources, many African states remain fragile due to corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, natural disasters, and widespread poverty. Compounding these challenges, difficulties imposed by geography, climate, and a lack of infrastructure are hindering states' efforts to develop in an ever-globalizing international environment.

Despite these difficulties, a holistic picture of Africa taken over time shows some progress and significant promise. Six major wars have ended in the past seven years (Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and the North-South conflict in Sudan). Democracy is growing in Africa, with more than 60 elections in the past six years. Almost three-quarters of Sub-Saharan nations are now classified by Freedom House as "Free" or "Partly Free"--up from less than half in 1990. Though the global economy is enduring a down-turn, previous economic growth on the African continent was at an eight year high, and 20 countries have registered positive growth for each of the past five years. Growth in real per capita income was over 3 percent in 2008--a marked change from the declines in growth across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the amount of human suffering directly attributable to conflict on the African continent is unacceptably high, and the 2009 Freedom House report on Sub-Saharan Africa notes that, "[O]verall, Africa has seen notable increases in freedom over the past generation, but has experiences some troubling setbacks in recent years."

In addition, African states are working hard to develop their own ability to deal with security challenges. Today Africans are sharing the burden of international peace and security by supplying 32 percent of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces worldwide. As of March 2009 there are more than 33,000 African peacekeepers deployed in support of UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions. Five African countries--Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, and South Africa--rank amongst the top 15 UN troop contributing nations.

Although Africa is on a positive trajectory, progress remains fragile and easily reversible.

Demographic Trends

Africa has the world's highest birth rates and the largest percentage of projected population growth. The continent's population of over 900 million is growing by approximately 2.4 percent annually and is projected to double by 2050. Today, 43 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's population is below the age of 15. Rapid population growth and this "youth bulge" exceed most governments' ability to provide basic services and the capacity of their growing economies to provide jobs. This pool of undereducated and unemployed youth present a potential source of social and political instability.

Africa has experienced large migration flows in recent decades, often in response to economic problems, civil unrest, or natural disasters. Africa generates 49 percent of the world's internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many migrants settle in urban slums, further straining government services and contributing to the spread of infectious disease. Rapid urbanization also increases competition for limited jobs, housing, food, and water.

Transnational Threats and Crime

The United States and many of our African partners face a number of transnational threats in Africa. Violent extremism, piracy, and illicit trafficking are enabled by or directly contribute to instability. Somalia, Sudan, and vast open areas of countries across the Sahel region provide sanctuary for violent extremists. Al-Qaeda increased its influence dramatically across north and east Africa over the past three years with the growth of East Africa Al-Qaeda, al Shabaab, and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At the same time, the general level of support for violent extremism among most Muslims in Africa remains very low.

Other trends pose serious challenges to U.S. interests. Foreign fighter recruitment and support networks are present across northern and eastern Africa, assisting extremists fighting coalition and government forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Vast coastal areas provide havens for smuggling, human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, oil bunkering, and poaching of fisheries. For example, large-scale oil theft by disparate

groupings of armed militants in the Niger Delta is a significant problem. Observers estimate that Nigeria's oil exports have been reduced by 20 percent due to banditry fostered by lingering societal and political grievances. Theft of oil within the country costs the state untold revenues that could be used to improve services for the population.

Africa is a piracy flashpoint, with incidents occurring in Somali waters, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. In the first nine months of 2008 alone, paid ransoms may have exceeded $30 million. Maritime security will remain a challenge, particularly along the Horn of Africa, Swahili Coast, Mozambique Channel, and, to a lesser extent, in the Gulf of Guinea, where littoral nations continue to lack the ability to patrol and protect their waters.

According to a recent U.S. Department of State (DOS) report, trafficking in persons is a significant and widespread problem throughout Africa. Especially prevalent are trafficking in children (including child military conscription), women for commercial sexual exploitation, and males for forced labor. As of 2008, there was only one African country in compliance with the U.S. Trafficking Victim's Protection Act of 2000.

Illicit trafficking of narcotics poses a significant threat to regional stability. According to the DOS International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Western Africa has emerged as a critical trans-shipment point for South American cocaine destined primarily for European markets. The presence of drug trafficking organizations in West Africa as well as local drug use create serious security and health challenges. The strong Euro currency, increased European cocaine demand, and successful interdiction in the Americas contribute to West Africa's place in the narcotics trade. The UN estimates that 27 percent of all cocaine annually consumed in Europe transits West Africa, with trends rising significantly. In addition to the health and medical problems resulting from the distribution and spread of narcotics along the trafficking routes, the presence and influence of traffickers in the West African region has had a profoundly corrosive effect on the rule of law in many West African states. It must be noted that the narcotics trafficking from Southwest Asia through the islands into East and Southern Africa also remains a significant a concern. Although there is a degree of political will within many African states, efforts to combat narcotics trafficking are hampered by resource shortfalls, law enforcement and judicial capacity, and corruption.

Other Nations and Organizations Operating Within the AOR

As Africa's importance is recognized, more non-African countries and international governmental organizations seek to develop, maintain, and expand relations with African states. China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, Russia, European states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

European Union (EU) have all focused increasingly on Africa's potential and its strategic significance.

European leaders remain committed to working with their African counterparts on a broad range of developmental issues. Specifically, in the peace and security arena, the EU has mounted several security sector reform operations in Africa, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea Bissau, Chad, and the Central African Republic. NATO airlifted African Union (AU) peacekeepers into Darfur and Somalia and NATO supports development of AU peacekeeping capability with U.S. and other NATO officers embedded into AU Peace Support Operations Division. Recently, both NATO and the EU initiated Horn of Africa counter-piracy operations and they coordinate their counter-piracy efforts with U.S Central Command's Combined Task Force-151.

Other European nations without historic ties with Africa, such as Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, have increased their support for UN operations, and have bilateral assistance efforts that contribute to capacity building. U.S. Africa Command continues to build cooperation with European partners to coordinate programs and contribute to a focused, collaborative approach to capacity building.

Additionally, it is important to note China and India's ongoing efforts in Africa. Over the last ten years, China's interests in Africa have increased significantly. China is the world's leading consumer of copper, steel, cobalt and aluminum, and is second only to the United States as an importer of African oil. India, as of April 2008, pledged to invest $500 million over the next five years in development projects in Africa, and also pledged to double financial credit to African countries from $2 billion dollars during the past five years to $5.4 billion over the next five years. The actions and contributions of both of these nations demonstrate the active role they play in Africa today.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND STRATEGY

U.S. Africa Command's strategy of sustained security engagement focuses our military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs on conflict and crisis prevention rather than reaction. The Command, in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, creates, sustains, and supports opportunities to assist our African partners in their efforts to build enduring security capacity to prevent or mitigate the catastrophic effects and costs associated with instability, conflict, transnational threats, and humanitarian disasters.

Interests, Endstates, and Objectives

The National Defense Strategy objectives of defending the homeland, promoting security, deterring conflict, and winning our nation's wars define

U.S security interests in Africa. U.S. Africa Command, in developing its command strategy, identified the following as our theater strategic interests:

- Prevent attacks against Americans by transnational threats emanating from Africa;
- Prevent acquisition, transfer, or transit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material or expertise;
- Maintain our freedom of movement into and through the AOR;
- Foster the prevention, mitigation, or containment of conflict;
- Foster sustained stability;
- Mitigate the effects of significant humanitarian crises or natural disasters;
- Deter and contain pandemic influenza in the AOR.

The DOD Guidance for Employment of the Force specifically directs three strategic endstates as guidance for U.S. Africa Command's activities. These are:

Endstate 1: African countries and organizations are able to provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent.

Endstate 2: African governments and regional security establishments have the capability to mitigate the threat from organizations committed to violent extremism.

Endstate 3: African countries and organizations maintain professional militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the rule of law, and abide by international human rights norms.

U.S. Africa Command's primary effort is building African security capacity so our partners can prevent future conflict and address current or emerging security and stability challenges. This approach reinforces African states' gains in improving governance, and enables the United States to help improve the effectiveness of current African supported UN and AU peacekeeping missions.

The Command-developed theater strategic objectives are designed to: 1) support the achievement of the theater strategic endstates, 2) protect or advance U.S. interests in Africa, and 3) provide focus for the Command's engagement activities. The primary mechanism for meeting the following objectives is building African security capacity.

U.S. Africa Command theater strategic objectives are:

- Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks;
- Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to emerging crises, and continental peace support operations are effectively fulfilling mission requirements.

- Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities and expertise;
- Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states;
- Protect populations from deadly contagions.

U.S. Africa Command's strategy of security capacity building will support long-term African stability, while also fostering the development of African forces that can address contemporary and future conflicts. Our strategy allows the Command to provide support to efforts led by other U.S. Government (USG) agencies responsible for development and diplomacy. Most importantly, this strategy allows U.S. Africa Command to defend the Homeland and secure U.S. interests abroad.

Continent Wide Programs, Activities, and Plans

To meet our theater strategic objectives, U.S. Africa Command implements and supports programs that span the whole of Africa, as well as programs specific to regions and countries.

Support to the Fight Against Violent Extremism

Combating violent extremism requires long-term, innovative approaches, and an orchestration of national and international power. By strengthening our partners' security capacity, we will deny terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing the conditions that foster violent extremism.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-TRANS-SAHARA (OEF-TS) is the DOD contribution to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This partnership uses the capabilities of U.S. Government (USG) agencies to counter terrorism in North and West Africa. The OEF-TS component of TSCTP is designed to assist participating African nations as they improve control of their territories and thus deny safe havens to terrorist groups. Cooperation strengthens regional counter terrorism (CT) capabilities and reduces the illegal flow of arms, goods, and people through the region. The military train and equip component of TSCTP is primarily funded with DOS Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds. PKO funds for TSCTP are a critical component of the long-term strategy for OEF-TS and TSCTP.

Our partners' enthusiasm and support for these efforts was evident during Exercise FLINTLOCK in November 2008, when nine African and four European partners came together to conduct a CT exercise spanning an area larger than the continental United States. The principal purpose of the

FLINTLOCK exercises is to improve military interoperability, and strengthen regional relationships.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - HORN OF AFRICA (CJTF-HOA) is the second named operation ongoing in Africa. Discussed in greater detail in the Component and Subordinate Command Section, CJTF-HOA employs an indirect approach to counter extremism. Through a strategy of Cooperative Conflict Prevention, the task force builds security capacity, promotes regional cooperation, and protects coalition interests.

OPERATION OBJECTIVE VOICE (OOV), known previously as OPERATION ASSURED VOICE - AFRICA (OAV-A), is an operation that strikes at the heart of violent extremist efforts--ideology. OOV is a proactive effort where multiple agencies partner with African governments to broadcast messages to counter extremist propaganda. Military Information Support Teams, in conjunction with DOS public diplomacy, have demonstrated success in several countries including Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya. We continue to work with participating nations, Embassy Country Teams, and DOS to enhance this program.

Security Assistance

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs remain the cornerstone of our persistent, sustained engagement. These programs build lasting relationships, promote common interests, and enhance partner capabilities to provide safe and secure environments. Our mil-to-mil programs assist our allies and partners in maturing their capabilities to conduct operations with well-trained, disciplined forces that respect human rights and the rule of law. Our cooperative security efforts provide essential peacetime and contingency access and infrastructure, improve information sharing, and are vital to U.S. Africa Command's support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs provide education and training to foreign military and civilian personnel. IMET is a critical form of security cooperation in theater. A robust IMET program is a long-term investment in the future and directly supports U.S. interests.

The target audience of IMET is future military and civilian leaders. IMET provides education and training for both military and civilian personnel to help militaries understand their role in a democracy. IMET exposes countries to our democratic principles, but achieving long-term results is impeded if these programs are not sustained over a long period. If we are perceived as unreliable, African states may pursue training with countries that do not share our values, including our commitment to respect for human rights, good governance, and transparency, and this could impact our relationship with a state's security forces--a relationship that might not

recover for a generation. The long-term benefit of IMET cannot be overstated. Forty-six of fifty-two African states and one organization (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) are expected to have IMET programs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical U.S. military equipment and services to partner countries. U.S. Africa Command seeks to align FMF programs to enhance security capacity building by including FMF as part of our long-term strategy to procure compatible systems that increase interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency of training. FY 2008 FMF numbers were approximately $18.7 million for 53 countries, with most of this going Tunisia and Morocco. If we are to achieve our endstates and avoid undesirable strategic consequences, we must continue to closely monitor our strategic use of FMF and cooperatively work together to ensure its distribution contributes directly to our long-term goals.

IMET and FMF are critical to accomplishing the United State's mission in Africa and constitute long-term investments in critical relationships. Both programs are fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive response.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Goods bought through FMS have improved interoperability with countries that benefit from the program. Vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, and equipment purchased through the program are often the same materials currently being used by U.S. forces. Countries that are eligible to receive FMS are eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) as well. Trucks supplied to the Senegalese military through the EDA program will be instrumental during the deployment of Senegalese Battalions in support of their peacekeeping operations in Darfur.

Continental peace support operations and military-to-military programs

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. State Department-led initiative to enhance global capabilities to conduct peace support operations, with a particular emphasis on building African capacity. This program is expected to train 75,000 peacekeeping troops worldwide by 2010, develop a transportation and logistics architecture to facilitate peacekeeping deployments, and establish an international training center for the training of formed police unit trainers. In Africa, GPOI funds are primarily used to support and expand the pre-existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Since FY2005, ACOTA has directly trained more than 68,000 African soldiers, including approximately 3,500 military trainers. U.S. Africa Command supports the ACOTA program by providing military mentor teams. The U.S. military has provided approximately 350 mentors over the life of the ACOTA program, and we are actively seeking ways to provide additional support.

In 2009, the GPOI program is expected to support and expand our communication initiatives on the continent. In West Africa, specifically, GPOI will expand the ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System (ERIES) satellite network enabling its 15 partner countries to communicate and exchange information.

GPOI programs such as ACOTA and ERIES are critical to our efforts to develop and improve our African partners' security capacity.

The *Mil-to-Mil Contact program* is a pillar of U.S. Africa Command's security cooperation activities in African countries. Since 2003, over 400 mil-to-mil events have helped host nations address such fundamental topics as integration of women in the military, civilian control of the military, establishment of military legal codes, and programs to develop professional officer, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and chaplain corps. Funding for mil-to-mil operations uses Traditional Combatant Commander Activities (TCA) funds. In FY 2008, $3.3 million of TCA monies were spent on Africa mil-to-mil activities. We plan to expand this critical program, with $6.1 million in TCA budgeted for FY 2009.

The *National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)* remains a superb, effective TSC program. Linking U.S. states and territories with African countries, the SPP helps build long-term relationships, promotes access, enhances African military professionalism and capabilities, interoperability, and promotes healthy civil-military relations. U.S. Africa Command currently has seven state partnerships: Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North Dakota; South Africa-New York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont, and Botswana-North Carolina. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard enables it to interact consistently, over time, with all security forces, and, when appropriate, African civilian officials. We are seeking support from Adjutant Generals to expand this valuable program.

Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) Programs and Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

U.S. Africa Command's Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program is a successful program focused on a source of suffering and a hindrance to sustained development and stability in Africa--the HIV/AIDS pandemic. HIV/AIDS is a military force generation and sustainment problem for African forces and is a risk to African security and stability. The Command addresses HIV/AIDS in the military context through technical program assistance and implementation from the Department of Defense Executive Agent (DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office) and the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator using three funding sources: the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office using a congressional supplemental provided via the Office of the Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Defense Health Program; the DOS Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator using the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

(PEPFAR); and the DOS, using the HIV/AIDS Military Health Affairs FMF program. The Command's Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program implemented and executed by the DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program Office in collaboration with PEPFAR, provides strategic direction and oversight for designated countries to further U.S. Africa Command strategic objectives.

DOD activities supporting African Military's fight against HIV/AIDS have been very successful and now reach 39 countries in Africa. When DOD's program began in 2001, few African militaries had yet tested their forces for HIV infection, and only a small number had programs or policies addressing HIV/AIDS. Today, as a result of past joint efforts between DHAPP, PEPFAR and U.S. Africa Command, many militaries in Africa now test their forces for HIV and have active programs for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment. In the past year, U.S. Africa Command's programs have reached 497,000 African troops and family members with prevention messages, and provided testing and counseling and testing services for 102,000 service members and their families. In addition, 800 senior military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS policies in their countries, and 7,000 peer educators and 5,000 health care workers received training. About 19,000 individuals are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts. These programs and voluntary counseling and testing are helping to affect behavioral change by reducing the stigma often associated with HIV/AIDS in Africa.

Humanitarian Assistance Programs. Interagency coordination multiplies the effectiveness of Humanitarian Assistance (HA) programs. U.S. Africa Command coordinates its humanitarian efforts with those of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DOS to ensure its HA efforts on the continent complement and support USAID's lead on development initiatives in a country. U.S. Africa Command Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) events are undertaken when they support the security and foreign policy interests of the United States, the security interests of the country in which the activity is performed, and promote the specific operational readiness skills of the U.S. forces that participate. Humanitarian Assistance-Other (HA-O) programs are another means for the Command to complete projects that benefit the civilian population of a host nation and support overall development priorities. The command's FY 2008 projects included providing veterinary and medical care, building and furnishing schools and clinics, digging wells, providing clean water in rural and austere locations, and help in delivering disaster relief. Such activities have proven successful in the Horn of Africa.

A variety of innovative HA activities support our long-term interests by building partnerships with African nations and establishing good working relations with international and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. In Tunisia for instance, the HA program funded architectural and engineering services and partial construction of a new educational facility for

marginalized autistic children, while French partners supported construction and training by an international NGO for special educators. In Burkina Faso, from August to October 2008, both the Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) and Excess Property Programs were used in combination to conduct a three-phased Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) to combat eye disease. The Burkina Faso Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense, with support of the U.S. Embassy, and the Burkina Faso Ministry of Defense, worked jointly to achieve this mission. In another program, fully adjustable, self-prescribing glasses--fine tuned by U.S. military personnel--have been distributed during U.S. military medical outreach projects. In Botswana, HA funds doubled the size of a facility used by an international NGO to provide after-school services for orphaned children. All of these activities contribute significantly to well-being while complementing development efforts that serve the interests of our nation and U.S. Africa Command.

Over the next year, U.S. Africa Command will work closely with Country Teams to ensure HA resources are used to complement other USG funding and achieve overall USG foreign policy objectives while continuing to further American and African security objectives. HA resources are a flexible tool to complement larger humanitarian and development programs implemented by USAID, PEPFAR, and Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Pandemic Response Programs

In light of the important role national militaries are likely to play in pandemic response globally, Congress provided FY 2008 funds to enable USAID and the U.S. Africa and Pacific Commands to partner to develop host nation militaries' pandemic response capacity. Our Pandemic Response Program will help develop and exercise African military pandemic response plans that compliment civilian activities during a pandemic. Our assessment teams are beginning to work in East and West Africa to develop national and regional activities that focus the military role on maintaining security and communications, providing logistic support for provision of food, medicine, and other commodities, as well as providing augmented medical care. This program will build local capacity to respond to other disasters as well.

Interagency Cooperation and Partnership

U.S. Africa Command's interagency efforts are of critical importance to the Command's success. The Command has three senior Foreign Service Officers in key positions as well as numerous personnel from other USG agencies serving in leadership, management, and staff positions throughout our headquarters. From piracy off the coast of Somalia to supporting the UN Africa Union Mission in Darfur, embedded interagency personnel are involved in the earliest stages of U.S. Africa Command's planning. These invaluable experts help the Command ensure its plans and activities complement those of other USG agencies.

The Command's development of its Theater Strategy and supporting campaign plan is another example of its extensive interagency cooperation. Through collaboration among departments and federal agencies, we strive to ensure that our collective activities are integrated and synchronized in pursuit of common goals. In developing the U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), a plan that accounts for peacetime activities over the next five years, the Command has involved interagency experts from the very beginning of the planning process. In the summer of 2008, U.S. Africa Command planners met in Virginia with representatives from 16 agencies in a series of workshops designed to gain interagency input on Africa Command's Theater Strategy and TCP. Representatives from other agencies have also participated in Theater Strategy and TCP discussions and most remain involved in a planning effort designed to complete the TCP by the spring of 2009.

The growth and development of our interagency team depends on the human resources of our partner agencies. USG agencies and departments have been supportive of our requests to fill our interagency billets, and we remain flexible in defining the role and participation of these agencies as we continue to grow and evolve. Today, all senior executive interagency positions at U.S. Africa Command have been filled, and we continue to work with the interagency to fill additional positions. A total of 27 interagency personnel are assigned to Africa Command from the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, USAID, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Open Source Center. The Department of Energy and Department of Justice both have pending assignments. Other agencies, such as U.S. Geological Survey and the Department of Agriculture, have sent representatives to U.S. Africa Command to examine the possibility of placing people at the command permanently.

U.S. Africa Command is aggressively pursuing new, innovative processes and relationships to improve DOD collaboration with other USG agencies in order to maximize the effectiveness of all U.S. activities in Africa.

Regional African Programs, Activities, and Plans

Many of the programs we are currently implementing were transferred from the commands previously responsible for portions of U.S. Africa Command's AOR. As we move forward, we will synchronize this collection of programs across the five regions of Africa so that, together, they enable us to implement the coherent approach outlined in U.S. Africa Command's Theater Strategy. The command's definition of the five regions of Africa mirrors that of the African Union. The regions are: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa.

North Africa

While Egypt remains within U.S. Central Command's AOR, we recognize the importance of Egypt's influence throughout the continent. Egypt's partnerships with other African nations contribute to their stability and the professionalization of their militaries, and Egypt has expressed a desire for a close relationship with U.S. Africa Command. As a result, we participated in the U.S.-Egypt defense talks in 2008, and we have concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with U.S Central Command that ensures synchronization and coordination between commands whenever U.S. Africa Command missions require engagement with Egypt.

Regarding Libya, the lifting of Section 507 sanctions and the recent signing of a MOU on defense contacts and cooperation provide a solid foundation upon which we can build our bilateral military relationship. My staff is diligently preparing a proposal for engagement activities with the Libyans. In February of 2009, we conducted a site visit to determine ways to assist Libya's Coast Guard, advise them on the procurement of English Language labs in preparation for attendance in our professional schooling, and to conclude a foreign military sales contract enabling Libya's purchase of border patrol vehicles. We approach this new relationship carefully, deliberately, and with the intention to improve military relations consistent with U.S. foreign policy guidance and national security objectives.

U.S. Africa Command will seek opportunities in this region for increased collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, border, and maritime security. The U.S. SIXTH Fleet, along with several European and North African navies (Malta, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), conducted PHOENIX EXPRESS 2008, a multilateral naval exercise. PHOENIX EXPRESS concentrates on operations that directly contribute to safety and security in the maritime domain, focusing on maritime interdiction, communications, and information sharing. U.S. Africa Command's naval component, U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) will expand PHOENIX EXPRESS 2009 to include navies from Algeria, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Senegal, and possibly others.

In June 2008, the Marines that have since become U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) conducted exercise AFRICAN LION in Morocco. This annual bi-lateral exercise focuses on small-unit infantry tactics, staff training, and humanitarian assistance. In 2009, U.S Africa Command's Army component, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), will support the joint exercise, AFRICAN LION, in Morocco.

U.S. Africa Command's air component, Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA), is responsible for four exercise related construction projects in Morocco totaling over $1.2 million. These projects will improve runway capability and construct exercise reception facilities to support current and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises in Africa. Additionally, AFAFRICA HCA

programs in Morocco have awarded contracts for veterinarian clinic supplies, water wells and school construction.

An excellent model for future USG whole-of-government cooperation can be found in North Africa. In October 2008, one of Africa Command's senior USAID representatives traveled to Morocco to help integrate DOD HA activities into the U.S. Embassy's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). Working closing with the Embassy team, a MOU between U.S. Africa Command's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) and USAID's Mission Director was completed. This MOU is designed to align and focus programs and activities to provide for a coordinated, consistent USG response in pursuit of shared policy goals. As strategic partners, U.S Africa Command and USAID are implementing a program that targets the number-one goal of the U.S.-Embassy's CAS--"Mitigating the factors of youth disaffection and marginalization." This coordinated interagency approach facilitates a whole-of-government, preventative approach to the problem of disaffected youths, with each agency working closely together, within their mandated areas of responsibility, to achieve a greater effect than had they acted alone.

This project serves as an interagency model for other U.S. Embassies while reemphasizing that, while U.S. Africa Command does not have the lead in the development sphere, it plays an important supporting role to U.S. Mission Strategic Plans.

West Africa

As with much of Africa, West African states are confronted with porous maritime and territorial borders contributing to illegal trafficking in narcotics, persons, and counterfeit goods, illegal fishing and extraction of resources, and other criminal activities. There is also ethnic, religious, and social strife, and a lack of adequate infrastructure to support populations and foster economic development. Often, a crisis in one country affects surrounding countries; likewise, a threat to one country often emanates from or rapidly proliferates to neighboring countries. This requires a multilateral approach to improve security, stability, and development. Despite the success achieved by ECOWAS and the ECOWAS Standby Force, various threats continue to inhibit the sustainment of security and prosperity in West Africa. U.S. Africa Command is working with bilateral partners, ECOWAS, USG agencies, and non-African nations active in the region to address these threats for the mutual benefit of West Africa, the United States, and the international community.

U.S. Africa Command has partnered with several countries in West Africa to develop plans to counter regional threats. In Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Nigeria, the TSCTP and its military element, OEF-TS, are the U.S. lead programs in countering violent extremism in the Sahel. U.S. Africa Command cooperates with the British in their efforts to develop the Republic of Sierra

Leone Armed Forces, and, through MARFORAF, also supports the Security Sector Reform program to mentor and develop the new Armed Forces of Liberia.

We have seen significant progress in Liberia during its transition to peace and stability following a 14-year civil war. The Armed Forces of Liberia are completing basic training of their new 2,000 soldier army, but the work here is far from finished. We must continue to provide adequate IMET for officer and non-commissioned officer development, and we must provide additional FMF and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding if we are to sustain the SSR program, mil-to-mil engagements, and develop the Liberian Coast Guard. Additionally, the other security sector elements, police and judiciary, will need significant assistance if they are to successfully replace the departing UN Police Units and improve their legal system. In recognition of the pending UN withdrawal, Liberia was our number one Security and Stabilization Assistance request for West Africa in FY 2008. DOS requested funds to support the restructuring of the Liberian National Police. Security Sector Reform, supported by IMET and FMF along with persistent and sustained engagement are essential if we are to secure the gains made in establishing peace and security--the essential foundation for national reconstruction and economic development.

In Ghana, the professionalism of its armed forces demonstrated during the December 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections is to be noted. The planning, coordination, and exercises conducted with the Ghana Police and other security forces during the run up to the election were critical to its success. While there were a few instances of election related violence, the security forces quickly and professionally restored order. While domestic security is a police task in Ghana, the military is tasked to provide support when requested, and their recent performance was a positive example of what we intend to support when we work with a partner as they seek to professionalize their military forces. Ghana provides a clear example of an African military force respecting and supporting civil authority.

NAVAF's focus on security cooperation activities in this and the Central Region has been through its key initiative, Africa Partnership Station (APS). In recognition of this important effort, both the Senegalese Minister of Defense and the U.S Ambassador attended the opening meeting of the APS-hosted Oil Spill Prevention Workshop in Senegal. In Liberia, fifteen U.S. Marines along with five soldiers from USARAF and a U.S. Navy corpsman are working with the new, U.S.-trained Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). They are training 350 AFL members on basic officer and non-commissioned officer leadership, logistics and vehicle safety, martial arts, and non-lethal weapons and riot control procedures. Other U.S. Marines, along with their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts, are in Ghana providing similar training there. Our African partners see APS as a successful maritime initiative and are eager to participate and improve this valuable program.

Also in the maritime domain, joint Law Enforcement Detachment operations were conducted to enforce maritime law within the Cape Verde waters in 2008. This was done with support of the host nation, our State Department, the French Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. In 2009, we hope to continue to build these capabilities with other interested countries, such as Senegal.

Additionally, MARFORAF conducted the bilateral exercise SHARED ACCORD in Ghana in June 2008. This annual U.S. and West African exercise focuses on small-unit infantry tactics, staff training, and HA. In July 2008, exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR 08 in Nigeria improved communications and information systems interoperability between U.S. and African partner nation militaries. Exercise MEDFLAG 08, a joint medical exercise with the Malian Armed Forces that included HA to the Malian people, was conducted during July in Mali.

Throughout 2008, MARFORAF African Logistics Initiative events provided Senegal, Ghana, and Liberia with an array of logistics training. In May 08, MARFORAF Intelligence conducted the Military Intelligence Basic Officers Course for Africa. MARFORAF also provided military mentors in support of the ACOTA program and expanded mil-to-mil programs in Senegal and Ghana

One of AFAFRICA's key programs for all of West Africa is the Air Domain Safety and Security program. The Air Domain Safety and Security program is a long-term, steady-state, general purpose Air Force Program of Record. Utilizing general purpose air forces, AFAFRICA is working together with interagency and host nation representatives to enhance the safety and security capacity of civil and military air domains comprising four mutually supporting elements of infrastructure, personnel, situational awareness, and response.

Additionally, AFAFRICA supports an exercise program that included SHARED ACCORD 08 in Ghana and Liberia. One of the highlights of SHARED ACCORD 08 was the treatment of 2,323 pediatric, 961 optometry, 558 dental care and 2,686 adult care patients. AFAFRICA also participated in MEDCAP, DENTCAP, and Civil Affairs outreach projects in Ghana in Feb 2008. Over 758 dental screenings with 361 patients receiving treatments and 666 child preventative dentistry screenings were conducted.

Central Africa

The Central Region is rich in natural resources. However, resource wealth has brought corruption and the misuse of government funds, which in turn can lead to weakened government institutions, and thereby hinder growth and prosperity.

Active rebel movements persist in the DRC, Burundi, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Despite years of efforts for a negotiated settlement in Northern Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army, operating out of Eastern DRC, threatens the sub-region. Additional areas of concern include movement of transnational terrorist organizations and drugs, as well as the flow of refugees, IDPs, and arms from conflict zones.

The DRC, due to its immense size and strategic location, is a focus of effort because instability there has wider regional implications. An OSC was opened in DRC in the fall of 2008 to manage and coordinate growing theater security cooperation activities. One of our security cooperation focus areas is the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, which works to develop a viable and transparent military judicial system. We have a great deal of work ahead of us in DRC, and we are taking steps to address the security issues of this important region.

Regarding other U.S. Africa Command efforts in the Central Region, MARFORAF is expanding mil-to-mil programs in Cameroon. Likewise, AFAFRICA has been instrumental during the initial planning for Exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2009, which will bring together 37 countries and 2 international organizations in Cameroon, Gabon, and Senegal.

In 2008, APS featured the successful deployments of USS FORT MCHENRY and HSV-2 SWIFT with an international staff comprised of representatives from 10 countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Gabon and Cameroon) that engaged 14 West and Central Africa countries, conducted 35 port visits, and engaged more than 1700 African maritime professionals in courses custom-tailored to each nation's maritime governance needs. In 2009, the centerpiece of APS engagement is the deployment of USS NASHVILLE. France, United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana are providing staff members and training teams, complemented by participation or support from the U.S. Coast Guard, embarked Department of State Political Advisors (POLADS), and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

MARFORAF also supported the 2008 APS deployment aboard the USS FORT MCHENRY. Throughout the APS deployment, U.S. and Spanish Marines conducted non-commissioned officer leadership training with African military personnel from Liberia, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.

The Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) Project serves as another excellent example of interagency coordination. RMAC provides awareness of maritime threats to the Coast Guard of Sao Tome and Principe. This project has become the catalyst for other assistance, including U.S. Navy Seabee construction of a pier next to the RMAC facility, U.S. Navy mapping of the port, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies assistance in developing maritime laws, and U.S. Treasury Department and Customs assistance in developing laws against money laundering.

East Africa

East Africa includes the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, portions of both the Swahili Coast and Mozambique Channel, and regional island nations. Kenya is returning to stability and economic growth following the aftermath of the post-election turmoil of December 2007. Ethiopia, host of the AU and a key USG CT partner, faces an unresolved border dispute with Eritrea and continues to conduct counter insurgency campaigns in the Ogaden. Situations in Sudan and Somalia destabilize the entire region. The government of Sudan has been implicated in genocide in Darfur and continues to pose a threat to the Government of Southern Sudan despite the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) following 20 years of civil war. Somalia, a weakly governed state, provides a haven for extremists and a base for piracy operations. However, we are fortunate amongst the problems of this area, to have a solid and reliable partnership with Djibouti. With accepted presence and mature relationships, Djibouti is invaluable as we conduct our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with our African partners. A stable friend in a fragile region, Djibouti provides the only enduring U.S. military infrastructure in Africa.

In recent years, incidents of piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia have received global attention. In 2008, over 120 attacks occurred off Somalia, which has a long and sparsely populated coast that poses challenges to international counter-piracy operations. Approximately 10 percent of the world's shipping passes through the Gulf of Aden or into and out of the Red Sea. While most of the incidents here have occurred in the eastern Gulf, pirates have struck as far as 450 nautical miles off the Horn of Africa. Crew abductions are common, and ransoms are generally paid within a month of capture. The average ransom has tripled since 2007--as has the number of ships seized.

To address regional instability, the USG, with U.S. Africa Command's support, is leading an international community effort to conduct an effective Security Sector Reform program for Southern Sudan. The goal of U.S. Africa Command's support to the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is to professionalize their army and increase their defensive capabilities. These improvements are intended to help facilitate implementation of the requirements of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Also, our Air Force component continues to provide transport support to peacekeeping forces destined for Darfur.

Despite the security and humanitarian challenges facing East Africa, our military-to-military professionalization efforts, bilaterally and through our support to ACOTA, have enabled Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and soon Tanzania to contribute to peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere. Also, USARAF will conduct a multilateral, regional, disaster relief exercise with Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (NATURAL FIRE) in 2009. Increasing the capabilities of our partner nations allows them

to address instability and the enabling effects it has on piracy and violent extremism.

Additionally in East Africa, and as part of our overall professionalization efforts, U.S. Africa Command works with partners to promote stability and security through support to professional schools. Five U.S. military instructors currently teach and assist in curriculum development for Ethiopian senior officers at the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College. In Kenya, we are supporting Kenyan efforts to develop a professional NCO corps. In Uganda, CJTF-HOA provides twelve instructors for their NCO Academy, as well as guest lecturers at the Command and Staff College in Jinja.

CJTF-HOA conducts security cooperation programs throughout the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the regional islands. The CJTF focuses its operations on building regional and bilateral security capacity to combat terrorism, deny safe havens and material assistance support to terrorist activity, and prepare for other challenges such as natural and manmade disasters. The effect of CJTF-HOA is maximized by close coordination with our OSCs, coalition members, partner countries, other USG agencies, and NGOs operating in the region.

Mil-to-mil engagement is the foundation of building security capacity in the East African Region. CJTF-HOA mil-to-mil activities includes Staff Officer and NCO mentoring, ACOTA mentors, counter-terrorism training, Peace Support Operations, Maritime Engagement Team activities, disaster response, and Standard Operating Procedures development. CJTF-HOA invests in regional institutions to ensure Africans are on the leading edge of solving their own challenges.

Civil-military activity and development are also pathways to security capacity building for CJTF-HOA. The presence of Civil Affairs (CA) teams in the region help partner nations improve their civil-military relations with local communities. These teams provide CJTF-HOA the ability to access high risk areas, thereby helping advance USG and host nation development priorities. In coordination with USAID and DOS, civil affairs activities help mitigate the stresses that contribute to regional instability.

CJTF-HOA is a model for multinational and interagency collaboration, and its presence in the region is critical to accomplishing U.S. Africa Command's mission.

Southern Africa

With the exception of Zimbabwe, the southern African countries are relatively stable but face significant challenges in improving living standards, reducing government corruption, and developing strong democratic systems. The political and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe has had spillover effects on the region, with refugees and disease moving across borders. While

HIV/AIDS afflict the entire continent, Southern Africa has the highest infection rates in the world. Security forces across this region are compromised by the disease, which reduces their ability to conduct operations.

Additionally, with the exception of South Africa, coastal countries here lack the ability to monitor and control their territorial waters. As a result, the region is vulnerable to illicit trafficking and continues to lose important economic resources through illegal fishing.

Despite these regional challenges, South Africa remains the economic powerhouse of Sub-Saharan Africa, producing over 40 percent of the sub-continent's gross domestic product and exporting strategic minerals throughout the world. South Africa's contributions to Africa's stability are not only economic; its professional and capable military provides over 3,000 soldiers to UN and AU missions. U.S. Africa Command is developing a growing and improving relationship with the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). We had a productive pre-planning meeting with SANDF in November of 2008 as we worked together to prepare for the upcoming U.S.-South Africa Defense Committee meetings scheduled for this summer. We look forward to co-chairing the military relations working group with SANDF during these bilateral Defense Committee meetings. In addition, NAVAF completed staff talks in February 2009, and we have a MEDFLAG scheduled by USARAF in Swaziland for this year.

Botswana is also one of Africa's success stories, rising from one of the world's poorest countries at independence to middle income status, and it recently celebrated 40 years of uninterrupted democratic governance. Botswana's military is professional and capable, but remains focused on potential regional instability that may arise from the collapse of the Zimbabwe government. Namibia and Malawi also contribute to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and states such as Mozambique and Swaziland have also expressed an interest in contributing forces to UN peacekeeping operations.

At the request of the Chief of Staff of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), Colonel Martha McSally, my Joint Operations Center Chief, has been assisting the BDF for 18 months as they integrated the first female officers into their force. She has led seminars for senior BDF leaders on good order, discipline, and professionalism in a male-female integrated military, and has also conducted seminars in Swaziland and Lesotho.

Advancing the U.S.-South Africa relationship and expanding military cooperation to focus on regional and continental security challenges is extremely important. NAVAF, expanding its maritime safety and security program, deployed the U.S. aircraft carrier USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT to South Africa this past year in an historic visit--the first U.S carrier visit since the end of apartheid.

U.S Africa Command Component and Subordinate Commands

U.S. Africa Command is comprised of four component commands, one sub-unified command, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. The service components currently have no assigned forces and rely on forces provided through the Global Force Management and Request for Forces system.

U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)

In January of 2009, U.S. Africa Command gained operational control of U.S Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF), which now, as U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), serves as U.S. Africa Command's Army component. USARAF, in concert with national and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote peace, stability, and security in Africa. As directed, USARAF deploys as a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response. USARAF is currently manned at 67 percent of its approved personnel strength for military and civilian positions, with 244 of its 318 military positions and 44 of 110 civilian positions filled. USARAF capabilities center on planning, directing, and providing oversight of security cooperation activities and stability operations.

Recognizing the Army's important contribution to U.S. Africa Command's Theater Strategy, USARAF continues to execute engagement and exercise programs on a bi-lateral, multi-lateral, and regional basis. These programs are designed to help our African partners develop capable security forces that respect the rule of law, abide by human rights norms, are accountable to legitimate civilian authorities, and contribute to internal security and external peace operations.

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)

NAVAF's primary mission is to improve the maritime safety and security (MSS) capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law enforcement operations, and TSC activities mentioned earlier, NAVAF is working to enhance MSS by focusing on the development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals, maritime infrastructure, and response capabilities.

A critical aspect of MSS is awareness of activities occurring in the maritime environment. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) provides participating states the capability to network maritime detection and identification information with appropriate national defense and law enforcement agencies. A widely accepted first step in achieving MDA is installation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS is similar to the U.S. Federal Aviation Association system for aircraft identification. Although AIS is used around the globe, the data has not been widely shared to date. In response to NAVAF initiatives, 18 nations in Africa now share unclassified AIS data through the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS).

Partnering with our reserve components, NAVAF is assigning Maritime Assistance Officers (MAOs) to U.S. embassies. MAOs assist country teams in

planning for maritime security cooperation activities. They provide insight into maritime culture, attitudes, and capacity--all of which are necessary for understanding where we can best assist each country in building MSS.

U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA)

AFAFRICA is the Air Force component to U.S. Africa Command. Its mission is to command and control air forces to conduct sustained security engagement and operations to promote air safety, security, and development.

AFAFRICA was activated at Ramstein Air Base, Germany on 1 October 2008. AFAFRICA is administratively assigned to the United States Air Forces Europe for organize, train, and equip (Title 10) support. However, AFAFRICA reports directly to U.S. Africa Command for operational taskings and support, and will be organized into an Air Force Forces staff and the 617th Air and Space Operations Center.

AFAFRICA's current command and control center was established on 1 October 2008 to provide a continuous command and control capability for all theater security cooperation exercise and engagement activities as well as on-going crisis response contingencies such as foreign HA, non-combatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian relief operations. Ultimately, this capability will evolve into a tailored air operation center, the 617th Air and Space Operations Center. Scheduled to reach full capability in October 2009, the 617th will be the lead command and control organization for air and space operations and will provide a common operating picture of all air missions within the AOR.

AFAFRICA's total force partnership coupled with an increased reliance on technologies and reach-back assets from Headquarters Air Force and lead major commands will ensure AFAFRICA is prepared for the challenges ahead.

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) was established on 1 October 2008. MARFORAF is currently co-located with U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR), in Stuttgart, Germany. One dual-hatted Marine Corps general officer commands both organizations. The two Marine staffs, in addition to sharing facilities, also share common administrative support elements.

MARFORAF has assumed duties for the conduct of operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities in the U.S. Africa Command AOR. The preponderance of the Marine Corps' recent activity has been in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. With the establishment of U.S. Africa Command, MARFORAF is planning to expand its activities into other regions of Africa and execute more than sixty engagement events in FY 2009.

U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)

On 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA was established as U.S. Africa Command's Theater Special Operations Command--a functional, sub-unified special operations command for Africa. SOCAFRICA contributes to U.S. Africa Command's mission through the application of the full spectrum of special operations forces capabilities including civil affairs, information operations, TSC, crisis response, and campaign planning.

In FY 2009, SOCAFRICA plans to conduct 44 engagement events with 13 countries in Africa. In addition to Joint Combined Exchange Training and bi-lateral training, SOCAFRICA will supplement its efforts by bringing senior officers and civil authorities from partner nations together to attend seminars and courses to promote exchanges about military aspects of good governance. In FY 2009, SOCAFRICA's information operations and civil affairs activities will focus on eroding popular support for violent extremist organizations--particularly in countries located within the Horn of Africa, Trans-Sahara, and Central Region.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

Since conception in 2002, CJTF-HOA's mission has migrated to building security capacity through cooperative conflict prevention. During this time, the country of Djibouti has become increasingly important in terms of significance to the U.S. military due to its strategic location. Our enduring presence at Djibouti helps build relationships which are the strongest mechanism for furthering U.S. objectives on the continent.

Responding to the expressed desires of African states, CJTF-HOA focuses its efforts with regional militaries on building state and regional security capacity. Regional security cooperation is fostered through coalition efforts with member countries of the East African Standby Force (We do not provide direct support to the East African Standby Force(EASF); we have bilateral relationships with EASF participating member countries), International Peace Support Training Center, and the International Mine Action Training Center--along with Liaison Officer support for ACOTA training. CJTF-HOA seeks to improve East Africa Maritime Security and Safety through the expansion of maritime domain awareness and implementation of an African Partnership Station East. Working with Partner Countries to develop a professional officer and NCO corps is a foundational element of CJTF-HOA capacity building. Professional Military Education development through engagements at Command and Staff Colleges and various Senior Leader Engagements support professionalization of militaries, and assist other USG agencies in helping partner states diminish the underlying conditions that extremists seek to exploit.

All of these efforts and activities provide collaborative opportunities for CJTF-HOA to better understand cultural dynamics and tailor programming and

projects that support partner militaries while enhancing long-term security capacity building.

THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS

Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements

U.S. Africa Command infrastructure and posture requirements are in two major areas: headquarters establishment, and theater operational support. The command's posture plan and facilities master plan are built around these two requirements.

Infrastructure: Headquarters establishment. For the foreseeable future, our headquarters will remain at Stuttgart. For the next five years, operational factors will be paramount, and we will benefit from the stability of staying in one location where we can polish our operational processes, cement relationships with our partners on and off the continent, and consolidate our gains.

Posture: Theater operational support. U.S. Africa Command seeks to posture itself via its Theater Posture Plan in a manner that enhances its peacetime mission, ensures access throughout the AOR, and facilitates the conduct of contingency or crisis response operations. The command's posture will support U.S. Africa Command's efforts to integrate and synchronize its theater engagement activities with the rest of the USG and key international partners.

Forward Operating Site (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) in U.S. Africa Command's AOR. The command's two FOSs are Ascension Island (United Kingdom) and Camp Lemonier (Djibouti). Ascension Island, a major logistic node for the United Kingdom, is a newly identified node for U.S. Transportation Command in support of Africa Command.

Camp Lemonier is the enduring primary support location for East Africa, and is an identified FOS. As U.S. Africa Command matures, Camp Lemonier remains essential to supporting long-term TSC efforts and establishing strong and enduring regional relationships. Camp Lemonier and CJTF-HOA operations have largely been resourced from the Global War on Terror emergency supplemental appropriations to establish expeditionary infrastructure and achieve operational needs. Current and programmed projects are an integral part of the Camp's installation master plan. These projects are necessary to support sustained security engagement activities and their supporting units. Camp Lemonier is a critical part of supporting and developing regional African capability and capacity.

Also key to operational support is U.S Africa Command's *Adaptive Logistics Network (ALN)* approach to logistics on the continent. Our goal with ALN is to develop a flexible network of logistics capabilities that has ability to respond to logistic demands. The heart of the ALN will be

comprehensive, real-time knowledge of available logistic capabilities and capacities across the continent of Africa. ALN will be the key to integrate the distributed network of FOS and CSL.

En-Route Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command's AOR. In addition to the facilities mentioned above inside our AOR, U.S. Africa Command has identified the main operating bases in Rota (Spain), Sigonella (Italy), and the CSL Cairo West as important logistic support facilities. Although these sites are located in other geographic combatant command areas of responsibility, they are critical intermediate nodes for logistics coming in and out of our AOR. Transportation Command requires these facilities to support U.S. Africa Command.

Quality of Life (QoL) Programs

Africa Command's QoL investments affirm our commitment to our team members and their families. Their sacrifices deserve our total dedication. The foundation for our success will be derived from the strength of our families. The Command is committed to providing a strong, supportive environment which fosters growth and excellence, while providing the highest quality of resources and services to our Africa Command family.

The Command has created a QoL office to manage and oversee QoL activities both in the headquarters location and on the African continent. This office will continuously assess the theater-wide environment in order to identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL issues. Additionally, it will serve as an advocate for the well-being of our team members and families on the continent. Providing for our service members and their families living on the continent of Africa and at other European locations remain a high priority for the Command.

In March 2008, we held our first Africa Command Families on the African Continent meeting to address issues facing families living in Africa, followed by a second meeting in February of 2009. This will be an annual forum where we can address emerging issues and develop our QoL Action Plan. This will be particularly important as we incorporate CJTF-HOA and its mission. We must ensure that the quality of life for service and family members supporting CJTF-HOA meets their needs as U.S. Africa Command continues to develop. Our goal working with Department of Defense Education Activity and the Department of Defense Dependent Schools - Europe (DoDDs-E) is to provide every student with an opportunity for a quality education.

To assist our team members and their families in solving problems resulting from deployment, reunions, and other family changes, U.S. Africa Command is implementing the Military and Family Life Consultant Program to support both the Command headquarters and the African continent. The program has obtained funding for FY 2009 which will provide licensed social workers and psychologists to the embassies, ensuring services are available as needed.

We must ensure that quality of life for our serving members--wherever they are posted--remains a priority and is funded properly.

U.S. Africa Command Interagency Initiatives

We multiply effects and achieve greater results when we work closely with our USG interagency partners. Having interagency personnel imbedded in our Command enhances our planning and coordination, and the MOU signed between U.S. Africa Command and USAID in Morocco is a model we hope to replicate throughout our AOR. Also, the flexibility provided through partner capacity building programs enabled us to react quickly to provide security enhancing activities and support to U.S. Embassy plans and operations.

Building Partner Capacity

Partner capacity building programs have provided important tools for addressing emerging threats. We were able to put these funds to good use in assisting our partners in Africa in FY 2008, and sought greater funding--in one case twice the previous years amount--for FY 2009.

Our previously mentioned contribution to a U.S. Embassy's program for "Mitigating the factors of youth disaffection and marginalization" is a wise use of capacity building funds in an interagency fashion that best meets U.S. strategic, security, and foreign policy objectives. This program will reduce disaffected youths' exposure to extremist ideologies as well as the recruiters often found in prisons and elsewhere.

Likewise, use of partner capacity building funds in Liberia is intended to develop police force capabilities to maintain security and stability following the pending departure of UN police units. Support to USG security sector reform and rule of law activities is particularly important across the continent since personal security and stability provides the foundation for constructive economic development, and this development serves the interests of all the peoples of Africa.

Support for Regional Programs

Many of the security and stability challenges on the continent are transnational in nature and require regional, rather than national responses. For example, seasonal droughts and floods usually affect multiple countries and require regionally-based responses. Programs such as the USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) provide valuable data enabling improved preventive and response activities on the part of both civilian agencies and the U.S. military. FEWS and other regional programs, including various conflict early warning initiatives led by other USG agencies, demonstrate the advantages of a holistic approach to the problems of Africa.

Foreign language skill, cultural awareness, and regional proficiency are core competencies for U.S. Africa Command. The many bilateral and

multilateral relationships that U.S. Africa Command maintains as we work with our partners depend on the language skills, advanced cultural awareness, and regional expertise of our forces. Effective interaction with regional partner's governments, militaries, and populations demands a robust ability to communicate on a face-to-face level. Growing and enhancing these language and cultural capabilities is vital for U.S. Africa Command.

CONCLUSION

Today United States Africa Command is serving effectively in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives in Africa. As the newest unified command and the DOD's single focal point for activities in this important region, we are implementing the visionary concept of an integrated command, with key interagency personnel included in our organizational structure, to advance collaboration between DOD and other USG agencies to build greater security with our African partners.

Our priority remains the delivery of effective and sustained security cooperation programs designed to build African security capacity. Long-term security and stability in Africa is dependent on our partners' ability to address their own challenges, so that they can take action not only against security threats, but also to conduct regional humanitarian operations.

In this effort, the importance of our interagency partners cannot be overstated. Diplomacy, development, and defense all require time, funding, and people if we are to meet our obligations successfully. Your support to U.S. Africa Command, as well as to our interagency partners, is critical to our collective ability to meet our national objectives.

It is my honor to serve with the uniformed men and women, our DOD civilian employees, as well as our interagency partners who have made U.S. Africa Command a functioning reality in a very short time. Your sustained support will allow their good work to continue in service of our country.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 18, 2009

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Do you support the Navy's reasoning, as identified below, for re-establishing the 4th Fleet in Florida? "This is a significant change and presents us the opportunity to garner the right resources for the missions we run for Southern Command," said Rear Adm. James W. Stevenson Jr., Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSO). "As a numbered fleet, we will be in a better position to ensure the Combatant Commander has the right assets available when needed." http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story__id=36606

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The 4th Fleet has been very positive for USSOUTHCOM in our efforts. The ability of the planning staff in Mayport, Florida to reach back to the Navy and obtain assets has been a singular success. Our ability to bring Navy ships like the Boxer and the Kearsarge into the region to do medical activities, our disaster relief off of Haiti, our counter-narcotics interdictions of last summer and this past fall are just a few examples of the positive effect of the 4th Fleet. We're very satisfied with the Navy's decision to stand up the 4th Fleet.

Mr. MILLER. As a Senate-confirmed 4 star flag officer, you have testified many times that when asked to provide your personal opinion to the Congress, you would do so. With that in mind, do you agree with the following statements made by the Navy to Senator Webb and his staff: "The decision to create the capacity to homeport a CVN at Naval Station Mayport represents the best military judgment of the Navy's leadership regarding strategic considerations. The need to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in the decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport. The consolidation of CVN capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the East Coast presents a unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the West Coast are spread among three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available to Pacific Fleet CVNs if a catastrophic event occurs. By contrast, Naval Station Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only East Coast location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. It is the only location in the U.S. capable of CVN construction and refueling. The Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet trained crews and associated community support infrastructure. A second CVN homeport on the East Coast will provide additional CVN maintenance infrastructure and provide strategic options in case of a catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area. It will also enhance distribution of CVN assets, thereby reducing the risks to CVNs and associated maintenance and repair infrastructure supporting those crucial assets."

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Navy's objectives for homeporting a CVN in Mayport are independent of 4th Fleet operations in the SOUTHCOM Area of Focus. Homeporting decisions and policies are made by the Navy and they consider many factors. I have no reason to doubt the Navy's reasons for this move.

Mr. MILLER. ADM Stavridis: I'd like to ask you about President Obama's Executive Order to close the detention facility at GITMO since it is in your Area of Responsibility (AOR). To what extent were you consulted by the Administration to get your military expertise on whether or not to close GITMO, the risks of closing GITMO and the practicality of closing GITMO?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Providing oversight of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and the mission of safe and humane, transparent, legal care and custody of detainees in our charge, remains our focus. The Secretary of Defense has appointed a Detainee Task Force (DTF), co-chaired by Mr. Joseph Benkert (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs) and Major General Irving Halter (Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff), to coordinate the Department of Defense decision-making and actions necessary to implement the 22 Jan 09 Executive Orders affecting detainees and detainee operations. This includes expediting the Department-wide responses to the President's orders to review and determine the disposition of individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This Command provides input to the DTF through a U.S. Southern Command representative, who participates in all planning efforts. I receive routine updates on the DTF progress and have opportunity to pro-

vide input. USSOUTHCOM also provided membership to the Admiral Walsh Compliance Team that visited Joint Task Force Guantanamo in February and reported back to the Secretary.

Mr. MILLER. ADM Stavridis: In your testimony, you discuss the growing Islamic extremist threat in South and Central America. Please elaborate on this, particularly increased support for Hizbollah in Venezuela. To what extent is Islamic extremism's reach in SOUTHCOM and what steps can we take to better combat this?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of "soft power." I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. At Southern Command, Strategic Communication is our main battery. Within our Area of Focus, there is no conventional country on country conflict, nor will there likely be in the foreseeable future. Instead, we face a market place of ideas. Strategic Communication at Southern Command enables our leaders to synchronize words, images and actions to reduce and ultimately eliminate what we call 'the say-do gap.' By ensuring our words, images and actions are in alignment, we build credibility with both our friends and adversaries. This creates the conditions necessary for our ideas to resonate most effectively in the market place. This approach can only improve with greater interagency integration.

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of "soft power." I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?

General RENUART. Mr. Miller, we agree that a better whole-of-government approach to unifying our words and deeds would be beneficial to the nation. I am confident that the President's designation of the Department of State as the lead for the U.S. Government's strategic communication efforts will ensure the needed unity of effort. As part of the Department of Defense, NORAD and USNORTHCOM represent the military elements of the U.S. Government's strategic communication efforts in the United States, Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. It is my responsibility to ensure our actions are consistent with the intent of the Secretary of Defense's and Secretary of State's larger vision.

At NORAD and USNORTHCOM, our strategic communication efforts are centered on developing, executing, and assessing communication strategies that have been integrated across the Commands, as well as synchronized with interagency partners. These strategies are designed to support the strategic objectives of our military plans. In general, these objectives include dissuading and deterring external threats, providing timely and effective civil support, and enhancing unity of effort with our interagency, intergovernmental and international partners.

To date, we have been remarkably successful in our strategic communication efforts for a very limited set of outcomes. However, more work needs to be done to appropriately scale this effort to address the whole of the Commands' objectives. We are committed to resourcing this effort to ensure its success.

Mr. MILLER. What is NORTHCOM's readiness if and when there is a coordinated cyber attack on the United States?

General RENUART. USNORTHCOM's readiness in a coordinated cyber attack on the U.S. is at a moderate to high level for computer networks within DOD, and at a low to moderate level for support of civil authorities with respect to the cyber domain. On a day-to-day basis, USNORTHCOM's focus is on cyber defense of those computer systems, networks, and related infrastructure required to execute our assigned missions. Defensive measures by DOD and non-DOD mission partners help to mitigate the adverse impact of cyber events on our mission performance. We believe that our cyber defensive posture will allow USNORTHCOM to operate effectively during major cyber incidents in order to ensure continuity of operations, but we recognize that more needs to be done.

To improve the command's readiness, USNORTHCOM is an active participant in National and DOD-level cyber exercises. We have participated in such exercises as Cyber Storm (Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-sponsored), Bulwark Defender (DOD-sponsored), and have integrated more cyber play into our Command's exercise events.

One of USNORTHCOM's missions is civil support, to include Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), at U.S. Federal, tribal, State, and local levels, as directed.

The recent addition of cyber to USNORTHCOM's role in DSCA has expanded our responsibilities and will require the Command to plan for and provide augmentation of DOD capability to DHS in an effort to mitigate cyber threats to the homeland. In February 2009, USNORTHCOM staff, with support from Department of Homeland Security, initiated a DSCA cyber mission analysis which helped define the cyber capabilities DHS might need from DOD. Operational planning that includes identifying/provisioning DOD force structure to address the DSCA cyber requirement is a task that will be completed during calendar year 2009. This includes planning for second and third order effects that may occur as a result of a coordinated cyber attack on the United States.

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of "soft power." I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?

General MATTIS. USJFCOM's strategic communication effort focuses across a "functional AOR," providing joint forces that are well-trained in the subtleties of operating in complex public information environments. Defense and service schools, and Joint Professional Military Education venues provide basic knowledge on strategic communication, but USJFCOM is tasked with providing applied training for joint force commanders and staffs through participation in major exercises, seminars, and planning events. USJFCOM closes this cycle by encouraging dedicated improvement of joint capabilities across doctrine, training, education, and technologies through collaboration, concept development and experimentation.

USJFCOM's strategic communication training and capabilities development efforts continue to grow. The following items reflect some of the demands placed on USJFCOM strategic communication requirements during the past two years, and manifest as a summary of shortfalls.

- Development of media analysis tools/capabilities to support the joint force
- Development and integration of strategic communication education, language, cultural awareness in existing training mechanisms
- Delivery of strategic communication training across COCOMs and applying it to exercise support requirements
- Design and conduct of a study to determine what force structure is needed to properly conduct strategic communication processes across DoD at the joint force level
- Study and design processes to integrate viable SC planning and execution across DoD and with other agencies
- Developing access, understanding, and processes and procedures for dealing with social/emerging media
- Resource (Man and equip) and operate the Joint Public Support Element (JPASE) to ensure quality connectivity at all classification levels
- Completion of fourteen 2006 QDR SC Roadmap tasks

So the needs focus on a lack of sufficient manpower and resources for adequate coverage of training requirements, and a lack of sufficient funding to address capabilities and requirements for joint strategic communication in the future. This is commensurate with the importance of USJFCOM's strategic communication task at hand: developing innovative capabilities that enable contributing joint functions to perform strategic communication as well as they perform coordinated, joint kinetic operations.

Mr. MILLER. Strategic Communications is a vital part of "soft power." I believe we as a nation must do a better job at unifying our themes and messages across the globe. For all COCOM commanders, What is your assessment of the strategic communication plans in your AORs? What are your shortfalls and what do you need to be more effective?

General WARD. Strategic Communication is a priority at U.S. Africa Command, and we have made it a consideration in all our programs, operations, and activities. The Command has developed Strategic Communication guidance that includes all appropriate audiences, encourages two-way communication, and ensures a consistent message in our area of responsibility. We have collaborated closely with the interagency community and CENTCOM on a Strategic Communication plan to support anti-piracy efforts. We still have work to do, of course, in improving interagency coordination and becoming more proactive than reactive in our Strategic Commu-

nication efforts. In order to be more effective, we currently are identifying the training and manpower resources that our component commands need to plan and execute Strategic Communication in support of our missions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. What is your response to the GAO report that eradication efforts have been offset by increased efficiencies of the cultivators of coca? Do you believe that it is time for new counter-narcotics strategy in the Hemisphere?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am not significantly surprised to see new efficiencies in coca cultivation partially offsetting our collective efforts to reduce supply. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are well financed, adaptable and utilize the latest technology. The fact that DTOs must pursue new techniques indicates that we are having an impact, forcing them to adapt. This is also borne out by recent DEA statistics that show an approximately 104 percent increase in price and approximately 35 percent decrease in purity in U.S. markets.

Our overall hemispheric strategy includes efforts in the source, transit and arrival zones. As you know, DoD's primary role is in supply reduction. Whereas DoD focuses on Detection and Monitoring and supports Law Enforcement in interdiction and apprehension, Department of State (DoS) is lead for eradication. Both missions are mutually supportive and overlap. We constantly strive to refine our strategy in order to counter a highly adaptive adversary. Again, changes in DTO practices across the drug spectrum; cultivation, production, transportation to markets, and distribution indicate that we are having an impact on DTO's. We will continue to review our strategy to ensure it is the most effective possible and anticipates future shifts in DTO methodology.

Mr. WILSON. Can you describe the current mix of U.S. military forces in SOUTHCOM's AOR? What is the optimal mix of active and reserve forces to execute your mission? Do you have the right mix of force skills and capabilities?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I believe that there is a proper mix of reserve and active duty forces throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR. At any one time, there are approximately 7,000 personnel assigned to 30 countries and the Services have determined the best fill for our requirements, whether from reserve or active duty forces. I recognize that there are some skill sets that exist primarily in the reserve component and we welcome their deployment to the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

USSOUTHCOM utilizes forces from both the reserve and active component to accomplish Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, Counter Drug/Counter Narcoterrorism (CD/CNT) operations, detainee operations at Joint Task Force–Guantanamo (JTF–GTMO), Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions, exercises, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations as required. Capabilities required to successfully accomplish the missions outlined above reside in both the active and reserve components of the force providers. For example, JTF–GTMO utilizes reservist lawyers and doctors to provide safe and humane treatment of detainees. Our theater special operations command's missions are augmented by the 20th Special Forces Group, which is regionally aligned for South and Central America, as well as Navy reserve Special Warfare operators that carry out missions throughout the region. The National Guard also provides security forces at Joint Task Force–Bravo in Honduras in the form of a 35 person security detachment.

Exercises are another form of reserve support to the command and the Services provide reserve units to exercises as a means to accomplish key and critical training objectives to ensure unit readiness throughout the year. Additionally, reservists provide significant support for headquarters USSOUTHCOM and the military groups around the region. Virtually every office at headquarters USSOUTHCOM receives some reserve support and without their service, there would be an additional workload on the civilians and active duty forces assigned to the headquarters.

Active duty forces provide a preponderance of the force at JTF–GTMO, for CD/CNT operations, and disaster relief operations. There are currently more than 2,000 personnel assigned to JTFGTMO and except for the lawyers and doctors mentioned above, most are active duty. CD/CNT operations are carried out by forces from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard. The Navy sources approximately four guided missile frigates at any one time, the Marine Corps provides training teams that deploy to the region and teach small unit tactics for host nation counter drug forces, the Air Force provides base operating forces at Curacao in addition to flying AWACS sorties in support of the ongoing CD/CNT efforts, and the Army provides SOF assets to increase the capability of host nation SOF forces in an effort to reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and increase the capability of host nation forces.

Mr. WILSON. With the closing of SOUTHCOM's access to the Manta Air Base this year, how will the counter-narcotic missions that were being staged out of Ecuador be executed?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USSOUTHCOM is grateful for Ecuador's assistance and support over the last ten years, and appreciates and commends the Ecuadorian Air Force for its hospitality and cooperation. Ecuador has fulfilled its commitment to the U.S., and we look forward to continued cooperation with Ecuador on counterdrug efforts.

Some operations currently conducted from Manta can be conducted from other locations where we have access to facilities. For example, the Air Bridge Denial program can be conducted from Curacao, but at higher operational cost due to increased transit times to the operational area in Colombia.

Additionally, JIATF–S is able to operate law enforcement aircraft in support of USSOUTHCOM's Detection and Monitoring (D&M) mission from commercial locations in partner nations that are reluctant to allow U.S. military air operations. Military aircraft conducting D&M missions will continue to operate from existing facilities in El Salvador, and other locations where we currently have access.

However, it is important to identify alternate locations in order to maintain the operational reach needed to monitor trafficking corridors that extend deep into the Pacific. We are in discussions with other governments to allow the U.S. to utilize their airfields and support facilities. These airfields must have runways of adequate length, sufficient fuel available and appropriate force protection. Additionally, they must be close enough to the threat vector to give aircraft as much on station time as possible.

As we continue to analyze the available options to offset the loss of Manta, we will make the Committee aware of any additional resources that may be required in the National Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. WILSON. What is your assessment of Venezuela's relationship with Iran? How does this correspond with indications of increased support for Hizbollah in Venezuela?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Iran views Venezuela as a gateway to increased involvement in Latin American affairs, leveraging Venezuelan ties in Latin America to diminish the effectiveness of UN sanctions and U.S. influence. Venezuela benefits by increasing its international profile while continuing to push an anti-U.S. Agenda. Increased support for Hizbollah would add to this anti-U.S. agenda.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the future of the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission in the future, both near term (one to five years) and long term (five years plus)?

General RENUART. As long as we have population and infrastructure that our government deems necessary to protect, the requirement for the ASA mission will not diminish over both the near and long term. What will change are two things: (1) the asymmetric air threat, which likely will become increasingly sophisticated and (2) the ASA force structure, which will continue to evolve with modernized technologies and capabilities. Just as the September 11th attacks demonstrated a level of terrorist sophistication never before seen, we must be ready for the next level of asymmetric aerial attack. ASA aircraft will remain essential in getting eyes on unusual aerial activity, determining intent and ultimately defeating the aerial activity, if required. Our ASA force structure must remain technologically viable to counter future threat sophistication and of sufficient numbers to be postured to defend assets specified by our government.

So, assuming the asymmetric threat will remain a reality, I believe the future of the ASA mission is a continued evolution to counter a more sophisticated air threat with the goal of protecting what we value most—our homeland and way of life.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Beginning in 2015, 80% of the Air National Guard ASA units begin losing aircraft due the planes running out of flying hours. How will this affect the ASA mission? Does the USAF and/or NORTHCOM have any plan to address this so-called Fighter Gap? And its effects on the ASA mission? What steps can this committee and Congress take to assist you in addressing the Fighter Gap issue?

General RENUART. I have a requirement for a certain level of capacity to maintain the sovereignty of our nation's airspace. As such, I work closely with the Chiefs of the Services, not just the Air Force but the Navy and Marine Corps, to ensure we have a robust, sustainable capacity to fulfill this requirement in the next 10–20 years. The DoD is working very aggressively to look at bridge capabilities and I'm

comfortable with their approach. Congress can assist in addressing the "Fighter Gap" by fully funding the President's current and future requests for fighter aircraft.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide training and equipment to partner militaries in both South America and Africa. Could you briefly give a couple of examples of how this money has been used in your areas of responsibility?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. USSOUTHCOM used Section 1206 funds, with DoS concurrence, to support two major partner nation capacity building programs addressing Counter Terrorism (CT) requirements: Enduring Friendship Maritime Security Program and the Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean/Central America (OEF–CCA) CT Units.

Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM's key maritime security initiative, utilized 1206 funds to achieve Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) crew training, command-control-communication (C3), and interceptor boats for Jamaica, Bahamas, Nicaragua, Belize, and Honduras. Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) also utilized the funds to support Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean Central America (OEF–CCA) in an effort to equip elite partner nation Counter-Terrorism units in support of Operation Enduring Freedom—Caribbean Central America (OEF–CCA). Countries were: Belize, Colombia, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, and Suriname.

USSOUTHCOM used 1207 funds in Colombia for the U.S. Embassy's support to the Colombian government's 'Colombian Coordination Centers for Integrated Action' (CCIA). The CCIA is a program designed to reestablish governance in previously ungoverned spaces of Colombia. It synchronizes the Colombian military's operations with the operations of other Colombian ministries.

In Haiti, 1207 funds were used to support the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) run by DoS/SCRS (State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization). This project was built around small projects that develop local leadership, train and equip local police, including "community oriented police programs", and provide justice system access to the residents of marginalized slums.

Mr. LARSEN. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207 money is being used to promote broader regional interests? To what extent is the State Department involved in formulating and approving funding plans? Has the State Department ever vetoed a DOD-formulated plan, or vice versa?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The initiatives purchased under both 1206 and 1207 were part of two major regional strategic and interagency programs: Enduring Friendship, USSOUTHCOM's key maritime security initiative; and Operation Enduring Freedom-Caribbean/Central America (OEF–CCA), the theater supporting plan to combat violent extremism. These activities under Enduring Friendship and OEF–CCA were synchronized with SOCOM programs. The Department of State/PM has ultimate authority to approve or deny both programs.

Section 1207 initiatives in Colombia and Haiti were integrated and synchronized with the U.S. Embassy Country Team effort to support each partner nation's government plan to establish government presence and services in areas of the country taken over by armed illegal transnational groups. These programs are also synchronized with FMF to support sustainment in the out years for 1206 programs.

Department of State has vetoed further funding of OEF–CCA initiatives due to the lack of compelling and credible evidence of an active Counter Terrorist threat presence in the Caribbean/Central America region.

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have used funding from the 1206 and 1207 (train and equip) programs to provide training and equipment to partner militaries in both South America and Africa. Could you briefly give a couple of examples of how this money has been used in your areas of responsibility?

General WARD. One example of 1206 funding is the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) Project. This capability gives the Coast Guard of Sao Tome and Principe the ability to observe maritime traffic and potential threats in its territorial waters. This 1206 project served as the catalyst for other assistance projects including U.S. Navy Seabee construction of a pier next to the RMAC facility, mapping of the port, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies' assistance in developing maritime laws.

1207 projects are in various stages of implementation and are proving to be successful. The Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization program has made progress in

addressing tensions along the Somalia and Kenya border. For example, after a violent conflict between two clans, 1207 resources were used to establish dialogue among security personnel, high ranking government officials, and clan leaders.

These accomplishments came about through interagency coordination and support, and through the use of critical 1206/1207 funding and flexible funding authorities.

Mr. LARSEN. What steps do you take to ensure that 1206 and 1207 money is being used to promote broader regional interests? To what extent is the State Department involved in formulating and approving funding plans? Has the State Department ever vetoed a DOD-formulated plan, or vice versa?

General WARD. The Department of Defense has a process in place for developing and prioritizing 1206 and 1207 requests. At the Africa Command level prior to submission to DoD, a board of Interagency experts consisting of representatives from USAID, Treasury Department, and U.S. Africa Command's Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, Legal Counsel, and the Foreign Policy Advisor meet to detemiine the most effective use of 1206 and 1207 funding. This board uses criteria that are linked to U.S. Africa Command's theater strategy, long-term sustainability, how the project complements other programs already in place, and the current threat level within the area.

The State Department is involved at the ground level in developing the 1206 and 1207 projects. The Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices work with their respective Country Teams to develop proposals supported by the Ambassador. U.S. Africa Command requires an Ambassador's cable approving the proposal before it is forwarded to the Joint Staff for consideration.

U.S. Africa Command works closely with the Department of State Africa Bureau through the entire process to ensure the State Department is involved in formulating and approving the programs.

Mr. LARSEN. Given that the Commander of JFCOM has traditionally been "dual-hatted" in his role as combatant commander and commander of the Allied Command Transformation, how would you view this recent development of splitting up the position?

General MATTIS. If the political decision is made at NATO Headquarters to have a separate commander for Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) I view this change as a positive development. Guiding the transformation and modernization of the twenty-eight NATO Nations and twenty-four Partner Nations is a full time job. It requires continuous interaction with NATO Headquarters leadership and National representatives. Likewise, interacting with Contact, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries as well as various International and Regional Organizations such as United Nations and European Union requires a considerable investment of time. Nurturing the special relationship NATO has with Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia also places demands on SACT's time. By delinking the command of USJFCOM from ACT it will allow the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to focus his attention on transforming and modernizing the U.S. Joint Force. Similarly, it will allow Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to devote the time and energy necessary for transforming NATO's military capabilities to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st Century. Since the two commands are co-located in Norfolk I foresee no degradation in the working relationship between USJFCOM and ACT. The existing procedures and command relationships that have been institutionalized over the years between the two commands will continue to produce world-class collaboration, coordination, and information sharing results as if they were led by a single commander.

Mr. LARSEN. Recent reports state that a French officer may assume the position of Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation. How might this transform the relationship between NATO and U.S. forces?

General MATTIS. If the decision is made to assign a French Officer to command Allied Command Transformation I see this as strengthening the Trans-Atlantic link. The French bring a great deal of experience and expertise to the table. They have a modern military force, vibrant and innovative industry, a mature lessons learned process, excellent working relationships with a variety of international agencies and Non Governmental Organizations, strong democratic institutions, competitive economy, and a great deal of military experience around the world. These are all characteristics and qualities that will enable the French to effectively lead and guide NATO's military transformation. The French also have a solid understanding of whole of government approach to operations. They understand that to be effective at countering a wide variety of threats in the 21st Century a "Comprehensive Approach" to operations is necessary. This clear understanding of the future security environment will help NATO and the U.S. to better leverage best practices and

share lessons learned. Finally, the United States and France have a strong tradition of teamwork dating back to the Revolutionary War and extending through World War II. I see this same spirit of cooperation continuing if the French are assigned command of ACT.

○